PER CURIAM
Appellant pleaded guilty and judicially confessed to engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to deliver over fifty pounds of marihuana. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). The district court assessed punishment at imprisonment for thirty years.
Appellant's court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
Appellant has also filed a pro se brief. In his first two points of error, appellant complains that the attorney who represented him at the time he entered his plea provided ineffective assistance. The facts alleged in support of this contention are not in the record. Pro se points of error one and two are overruled.
A different attorney was appointed to represent appellant at the sentencing phase of his trial and also on appeal. By point of error three, appellant contends this attorney was ineffective with respect to the appeal. He again cites facts not shown in the record. Pro se point of error three is overruled.
Appellant's fourth through twelfth points relate to the conduct of the sentencing hearing. After the presentence investigation report was offered and admitted in evidence, both sides closed. Defense counsel then made her argument without incident. When the prosecutor began to argue facts not in the record, defense counsel objected and the objection was sustained. The prosecutor then asked permission to reopen in order to call a Department of Public Safety officer. The motion to reopen was granted over defense objection. Most of the officer's testimony was hearsay, to which defense counsel repeatedly objected. These objections were sustained. The court informed counsel that it would not consider the witness's testimony, but would allow the prosecutor to complete his questioning simply for the record.
Defense counsel ably represented appellant at the sentencing hearing. Any error that occurred was preserved. Pro se point of error four is overruled. Any error in allowing the State to reopen, or in the questions asked and testimony adduced by the prosecutor at the hearing, was rendered harmless when the court stated that the testimony would not be considered in assessing punishment. Pro se points five through twelve are overruled.
Appellant's last point of error is that the punishment is too severe. Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(b) (West 1994); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.120(b)(5) (West Supp. 1999). The punishment assessed is within the range prescribed for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 (West 1994). We find no basis for disturbing the district court's punishment decision. Pro se point of error thirteen is overruled.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel
Affirmed
Filed: July 29, 1999
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PER CURIAM
Appellant pleaded guilty and judicially confessed to engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to deliver over fifty pounds of marihuana. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). The district court assessed punishment at imprisonment for thirty years.
Appellant's court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
Appellant has also filed a pro se brief. In his first two points of error, appellant complains that the attorney who represented him at the time he entered his plea provided ineffective assistance. The facts alleged in support of this contention are not in the record. Pro se points of error one and two are overruled.
A different attorney was appointed to represent appellant at the sentencing phase of his trial and also on appeal. By point of error three, appellant contends this attorney was ineffective with respect to the appeal. He again cites facts not shown in the record. Pro se point of error three is overruled.
Appellant's fourth through twelfth points relate to the conduct of the sentencing hearing. After the presentence investigation report was offered and admitted in evidence, both sides closed. Defense counsel then made her argument without incident. When the prosecutor began to argue facts not in the record, defense counsel objected and the objection was sustained. The prosecutor then asked permission to reopen in order to call a Department of Public Safety officer. The motion to reopen was granted over defense objection. Most of the officer's testimony was hearsay, to which defense counsel repeatedly objected. These objections were sustained. The court informed counsel that it would not consider the witness's testimony, but would allow the prosecutor to complete his questioning simply for the record.
Defense counsel ably represented appellant at the sentencing hearing. Any error that occurred was preserved. Pro se point of error four is overruled. Any error in allowing the State to reopen, or in the questions asked and testimony adduced by the prosecutor at the hearing, was rendered harmless when the court stated that the testimony would not be considered in assessing punishment. Pro se points five through twelve are overruled.
Appellant's last point of error is that the punishment is too severe. Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.02(b) (West 1994); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.120(b)(5) (West Supp. 1999). The punishment assessed is within the range prescribed for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 (West 1994). We find no basis for disturbing the district court's punishment decision. Pro se point of error thirteen is overruled.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Before Justices Jones, B. A. Smith and Yeakel
Affirmed
Filed: July 29, 1999