TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
NO. 0982569, HONORABLE WILFORD FLOWERS, JUDGE PRESIDING
On March 6, 1998, Gary Haston was a Williamson County deputy sheriff assigned to a multi-county narcotics task force. That afternoon, Haston stopped appellant's car for traffic violations. Appellant got out of his car after stopping and was questioned by Haston "about the purpose of his trip, where he was coming from, where he was going." Haston said appellant "seemed pretty nervous . . . more nervous than what he should be for a regular traffic violation." Asked for identification, appellant gave the officer a prison identification card. Appellant told Haston he had gone to prison for a drug offense, a fact Haston confirmed in a records check.
Haston next spoke to the passenger in appellant's car. The passenger's explanation for where the men had been and where they were going conflicted with appellant's. The passenger told Haston he was in a work-release program following a conviction for driving while his license was suspended, but the records check disclosed that the passenger actually had a controlled substance conviction.
Haston testified that the circumstances "fit what I normally see when people have narcotics in the vehicle." He added, "The way that [appellant] was acting, the nervousness and the conflicting statements between the two. The denial of narcotic charges of the passenger, all of that with my experience leads to something they're not telling me." Haston asked appellant if there were "any drugs or marihuana in the car." Appellant replied, "There could be, or there may be, he didn't know." Questioned further, appellant told the officer that there might be one pound of marihuana in the trunk of the car. Appellant then gave Haston permission to search. The officer found a plastic sack containing approximately one pound of marihuana under the spare tire.
Appellant concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful. Moreover, he does not contend that his consent to the search of his car was involuntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (voluntary consent is exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). He argues, however, that the investigation that led to the discovery of the marihuana was not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop. A traffic stop is analogous to a temporary investigative detention. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Such a detention may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant urges that Officer Haston did not expeditiously issue citations for the observed traffic offenses (in fact, no traffic citations were issued), but instead unreasonably detained appellant in order to investigate his unwarranted suspicion that appellant might possess a controlled substance. Appellant argues that the discovery of the marihuana was tainted by this unreasonable detention.
Requests for a driver's license or other identification, proof of insurance, and information regarding ownership of the car and the destination and purpose for the trip are proper inquiries following a traffic stop. See Mohmed v. State, 977 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd). Further, it is not unreasonable for an officer to check for outstanding warrants. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245 n.6. Articulable facts and circumstances that come to the officer's attention during the course of these routine inquiries may justify a continued investigatory detention and investigation. See Razo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Mohmed, 977 S.W.2d at 628.
Haston estimated that the search of appellant's car began five to ten minutes after the initial stop. We are not persuaded that ten minutes is an inordinately long time to carry out the routine procedures incident to a traffic stop. But in any case, this traffic stop was not routine. Appellant manifested a level of nervousness that, in the officer's experience, was greater than usual following a traffic stop. Appellant and his passenger gave Haston conflicting statements, and the passenger lied to the officer about his criminal history in an apparent attempt to conceal a drug conviction. When asked, appellant told the officer that his car might contain a pound of marihuana. Haston's suspicion that appellant had controlled substances in his car was reasonably warranted by these specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences arising from these facts. See Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (test for reasonable suspicion); Fields v. State, 932 S.W.2d 97, 105 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1996, pet. ref'd); Bustamante v. State, 917 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex. App.--Waco 1996, no pet.); Foster v. State, 814 S.W.2d 874, 879 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1991, pet. ref'd). Appellant's detention was constitutionally justified, and the ensuing search was lawful.
The points of error are overruled and the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Justices Jones, Yeakel and Patterson
Affirmed
Filed: April 27, 2000
Do Not Publish
Haston confirmed in a records check.
Haston next spoke to the passenger in appellant's car. The passenger's explanation for where the men had been and where they were going conflicted with appellant's. The passenger told Haston he was in a work-release program following a conviction for driving while his license was suspended, but the records check disclosed that the passenger actually had a controlled substance conviction.
Haston testified that the circumstances "fit what I normally see when people have narcotics in the vehicle." He added, "The way that [appellant] was acting, the nervousness and the conflicting statements between the two. The denial of narcotic charges of the passenger, all of that with my experience leads to something they're not telling me." Haston asked appellant if there were "any drugs or marihuana in the car." Appellant replied, "There could be, or there may be, he didn't know." Questioned further, appellant told the officer that there might be one pound of marihuana in the trunk of the car. Appellant then gave Haston permission to search. The officer found a plastic sack containing approximately one pound of marihuana under the spare tire.
Appellant concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful. Moreover, he does not contend that his consent to the search of his car was involuntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (voluntary consent is exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). He argues, however, that the investigation that led to the discovery of the marihuana was not reasonably related to the purpose of the stop. A traffic stop is analogous to a temporary investigative detention. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). Such a detention may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant urges that Officer Haston did not expeditiously issue citations for the observed traffic offenses (in fact, no traffic citations were issued), but instead unreasonably detained appellant in order to investigate his unwarranted suspicion that appellant might possess a controlled substance. Appellant argues that the discovery of the marihuan