TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
v.
John Cornyn, Attorney General of Texas; The Harris County-Houston Sports
Authority; Harris County; and City of Houston, Appellees
NO. GN0-00717, HONORABLE W. JEANNE MEURER, JUDGE PRESIDING
In a November 1996 election, the voters of Harris County and the City of Houston approved resolutions authorizing the City and County to exercise certain powers pertaining to the financing, establishing and operating of recreational facilities and parks. Those subdivisions were authorized to create a joint board and issue bonds for the purposes indicated. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 332.002-.005, .021 (West 1999). Following the election, the City of Houston and Harris County established the Harris County-Houston Sports Authority, a joint board. Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted Chapter 334 of the Local Government Code. Act of May 23, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1, §§ 1-10, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1929-1954. Chapter 334 authorizes municipalities and counties of a specified population classification to issue and sell bonds to finance the construction of arenas, coliseums, and stadiums for professional sports teams under conditions and procedures specified in the chapter. The bonds may only be secured by and redeemed from revenue derived from taxes specified in the chapter. Before the bonds may issue, the bonds and the proceedings authorizing them must be submitted to the Attorney General for examination and approval. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 334.043(b) (West 1999); see generally David B. Brooks, 35 Texas Practice: County and Special District Law §§ 17.16, .17 at 584-85 (1989). Although chapter 334 ordinarily requires approval of the electorate of bonds proposed to be issued under that chapter's authority, that chapter contained a "grandfather" clause to exempt bonds backing new or renovated sports facilities if the election authorizing that construction was held before the effective date of the Act. See Act of June 2, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch.551, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1929, 1953.
In August 1998, appellant sued in Travis County cause number 98-09828, requesting declaratory relief that the bonds by the Authority were invalid because no election to approve those bonds had been held. (1) The trial court dismissed that suit for want of jurisdiction. This Court affirmed that dismissal in Leonard v. Cornyn, No. 03-99-00110-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7412 (Tex. App.--Austin Oct. 7, 1999, pet. denied), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1081 (2001).
In March 2000, appellant brought the suit underlying this appeal, which seeks a declaration of invalidity for bonds backing the construction of a football stadium. In a general order, the trial court dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant brings seven points of error urging that the trial court erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction and attacking various possible bases for that dismissal. Specifically, he urges that the trial court erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction based on: failure to request injunctive relief along with declaratory relief; res judicata because no ruling by any court shows any issue in this case has been resolved; improper venue; sovereign immunity; lack of an allegation of unique injury; lack of an allegation of particularized injury; and including a request for mandamus relief as part of the suit.
Contrary to appellant's assertion that no court has resolved any issue in the case, this Court did exactly that in Leonard v. Cornyn. Appellant's request for declaratory judgment in this case involves the same 1996 election, the same 1997 legislation, and the same contention that voter approval of the bonds authorized pursuant to the 1996 election is required. This suit simply attacks a different sports venue. (2) The Court's opinion in Leonard v. Cornyn extensively discussed the interplay between chapters 32 and 34 of the Local Government Code, the "grandfather clause" applicable to bonds issued for these venues, the bond-approval process, and the incontestability provisions incorporated in chapter 34 that deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Leonard, slip op. at 9, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS at * 13. Leonard draws our attention to no distinction based on a different physical venue, and we see none.
Accordingly, for the reasons given in Leonard v. Cornyn, we overrule Leonard's seven points of error and affirm the trial court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
Mack Kidd, Justice
Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and Puryear
Affirmed
Filed: August 9, 2001
Do Not Publish
1. The August 1998 suit pertained to bonds for the construction of a new baseball stadium.
2. This suit attacks the construction of a football stadium as opposed to a baseball stadium in the prior suit.
h. 1, §§ 1-10, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1929-1954. Chapter 334 authorizes municipalities and counties of a specified population classification to issue and sell bonds to finance the construction of arenas, coliseums, and stadiums for professional sports teams under conditions and procedures specified in the chapter. The bonds may only be secured by and redeemed from revenue derived from taxes specified in the chapter. Before the bonds may issue, the bonds and the proceedings authorizing them must be submitted to the Attorney General for examination and approval. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 334.043(b) (West 1999); see generally David B. Brooks, 35 Texas Practice: County and Special District Law §§ 17.16, .17 at 584-85 (1989). Although chapter 334 ordinarily requires approval of the electorate of bonds proposed to be issued under that chapter's authority, that chapter contained a "grandfather" clause to exempt bonds backing new or renovated sports facilities if the election authorizing that construction was held before the effective date of the Act. See Act of June 2, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch.551, § 7, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1929, 1953.
In August 1998, appellant sued in Travis County cause number 98-09828, requesting declaratory relief that the bonds by the Authority were invalid because no election to approve those bonds had been held. (1) The trial court dismissed that suit for want of jurisdiction. This Court affirmed that dismissal in Leonard v. Cornyn, No. 03-