IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10059
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TODD WILLIAM BARR,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(1:01-CR-41-ALL)
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August 6, 2002
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-Appellant Todd William Barr appeals his conviction
for being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the district
court erred in admitting evidence of parole instructions and in
giving the jury the “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness”
instruction.
The parole instructions, admitted into evidence over Barr’s
objection, were evidence of his knowledge that he was a convicted
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
felon and that it was unlawful for him to possess a firearm.
Because the government was not required to prove either of these
facts, see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216 (5th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2362 (2002), and United States v.
Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), it was not relevant and
should not have been admitted. In light of the overwhelming
evidence of Barr’s constructive possession of the guns and
ammunition, however, the error was harmless. See United States v.
Skipper, 74 F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1996).
The jury instruction on “deliberate ignorance” was arguably
appropriate to show that Barr knew that he was prohibited from
possessing guns and ammunition and could be considered to have
deliberately blinded himself to the fact that he did not have to be
the owner of the guns and ammunition to possess them knowingly.
Even if the instruction was improper, however, it too was harmless.
The record contains substantial evidence of Barr’s constructive
possession of the guns and ammunition, so this instruction was mere
surplusage and thus did not create the risk of prejudice. See
United States v. Cartwright, 6 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
2