TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
v.
James E. Nelson, (1) State Commissioner of Education, in his Official Capacity Only;
and Zapata County Independent School District, Appellees
NO. 98-13924, HONORABLE PAUL R. DAVIS, JR., JUDGE PRESIDING
Background
Zapata County Independent School District employed Pete Smith as the Athletic Coordinator/Head Football Coach pursuant to a term contract beginning in July 1997 and ending in June 2000. The contract provided among other matters that Smith was subject to "assignment and reassignment of positions or duties, additional duties, changes in responsibilities or work, transfers or reclassification at any time during the contract term." On October 22, 1997, Zapata County ISD relieved Smith of his duties as Athletic Coordinator/Head Football Coach and reassigned him to a position as physical education teacher at Zapata South Elementary School. The school district did not change Smith's pay as a result of the reassignment.
Smith filed a grievance complaining of the reassignment, which Zapata County ISD denied. Smith then filed a petition for review with the Board of Education contending that the reassignment violated his contract. Smith argued that the Commissioner had jurisdiction because his reassignment from head football coach to an elementary school physical education teacher would damage his ability to obtain future employment as a football coach or athletic coordinator at a comparable salary as contemplated by the "causes or would cause monetary harm" provision in section 7.057. See id. Zapata County ISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction before the Commissioner, contending that the Commissioner lacked jurisdiction because Smith's alleged future damages were not contemplated by section 7.057. Smith attached his own affidavit as well as the affidavits of two other high school football coaches and the executive director of the Texas High School Coaches Association as support for his position that this reassignment would diminish his future earning potential. Notwithstanding the affidavit testimony, the Commissioner concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed Smith's appeal. The district court affirmed the Commissioner's decision. Smith raises a single issue on appeal.
Discussion
The Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the person is aggrieved by (1) school laws of this state; (2) actions or decisions of a school district board of trustees that violate the school laws of this state; or (3) actions or decisions of a school district board of trustees that violate provisions of a written employment contract between the district and a district employee, if the violation causes or would cause monetary harm to the employee. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057(a)(1),(2)(A),(B). Because Smith's grievance involves an alleged violation of his employment contract, the Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain Smith's appeal only if the alleged violation "causes or would cause monetary harm." Id. § 7.057(a)(2)(B).
As stated above, Zapata County ISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the Commissioner's jurisdiction over Smith's appeal. The supreme court recently addressed the need for evidentiary hearings when deciding a plea to the jurisdiction. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000). In Bland, the Blues challenged the Bland ISD's payment of future installments due on a lease-purchase financing agreement they claimed was illegal because it violated the Public Property Finance Act. Id. at 549. The school district filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming the Blues lacked standing to sue. Id. at 550. The trial court did not consider evidence offered by Bland ISD, but rather relied solely on the pleadings and concluded that the Blues had standing. Id. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court was not limited solely to the pleadings and should have considered evidence in determining subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 555. According to the supreme court, because a trial court must not act without first determining that it has jurisdiction, it should hear evidence as necessary to decide its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 554. The supreme court acknowledged that while a plea to the jurisdiction allows the defendant to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiff's claims should never be reached, it does not force the plaintiff to preview the case on the merits. Id. Thus, the evidentiary inquiry should not extend into the substance of the plaintiff's claims, but should only examine matters that are "primarily jurisdictional." Id. Applying these principles, the supreme court concluded that the trial court should have taken evidence on issues that determine the Blues' standing--the financing arrangement and the source of the funds--but not on the merits of the Blues' claims--whether Bland ISD violated the Act.
Like Bland, the case at bar also has a preliminary jurisdictional question that the Commissioner had to resolve before reaching the merits of Smith's appeal. The Commissioner's jurisdiction depends on whether Smith's reassignment causes or would cause monetary harm. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057(a)(2)(B). Thus, the Commissioner should have considered, and according to the record did consider, evidence of whether Smith's reassignment causes or would cause monetary harm. Apparently, the Commissioner focused on the fact that Smith had not suffered any monetary harm in the year of his reassignment to determine that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal under section 7.057. We conclude that the Commissioner read the statute too narrowly. Section 7.057 covers appeals from written employment contracts, the breach of which "causes or would cause" monetary harm. Id. The affidavits proffered some evidence of future monetary harm that Smith would suffer as a result of his reassignment. That is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Commissioner to hear the merits of Smith's appeal--whether Zapata County ISD violated Smith's employment contract by reassigning him during the school year.
Given the broad language in section 7.057, we conclude that Smith provided evidence of possible monetary harm the reassignment would cause him sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Commissioner under section 7.057. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commissioner erred in determining that he lacked jurisdiction over the merits of Smith's appeal. We sustain Smith's issue.
Conclusion
Because Smith presented some evidence that his reassignment would cause him monetary harm, the Commissioner had jurisdiction under section 7.057 to hear the appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment and the Commissioner's order and remand
the cause to the Commissioner to determine the merits of Smith's appeal that the reassignment violated his written contract of employment.
Bea Ann Smith, Justice
Before Chief Justice Aboussie, Justices Kidd and B.A. Smith
Reversed and Remanded
Filed March 15, 2001
Publish
1. We have substituted the current Commissioner as the appropriate party. See Tex. R. App. P. 7.2(a).
was illegal because it violated the Public Property Finance Act. Id. at 549. The school district filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming the Blues lacked standing to sue. Id. at 550. The trial court did not consider evidence offered by Bland ISD, but rather relied solely on the pleadings and concluded that the Blues had standing. Id. The court of appeals affirmed.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court was not limited solely to the pleadings and should have considered evidence in determining subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 555. According to the supreme court, because a trial court must not act without first determining that it has jurisdiction, it should hear evidence as necessary to decide its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 554. The supreme court acknowledged that while a plea to the jurisdiction allows the defendant to establish a reason why the merits of the plaintiff's claims should never be reached, it does not force the plaintiff to preview the case on the merits. Id. Thus, the evidentiary inquiry should not extend into the substance of the plaintiff's claims, but should only examine matters that are "primarily jurisdictional." Id. Applying these principles, the supreme court concluded that the trial court should have taken evidence on issues that determine the Blues' standing--the financing arrangement and the source of the funds--but not on the merits of the Blues' claims--whether Bland ISD violated the Act.
Like Bland, the case at bar also has a preliminary jurisdictional question that the Commissioner had to resolve before reaching the merits of Smith's appeal. The Commissioner's jurisdiction depends on whether Smith's reassignment causes or would cause monetary harm. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057(a)(2)(B). Thus, the Commissioner should have considered, and according to the record did consider, evidence of whether Smith's reassignment causes or would cause monetary harm. Apparently, the Commissioner focused on the fact that Smith had not suffered any monetary harm in the year of his reassignment to determine that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear this appeal under section 7.057. We conclude that the Commissioner read the statute too narrowly. Section 7.057 covers appeals from written employment contracts, the breach of which "causes or would cause" monetary harm. Id. The affidavits proffered some evidence of future monetary harm that Smith would