Bobby E. Haley v. Tax Appraisal District of Bell County

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-00-00179-CV

Bobby E. Haley, Appellant

Tax Appraisal District of Bell County, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 169TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 176,316-C, HONORABLE SUE LYKES, JUDGE PRESIDING

For tax years 1998 and 1999, appellee the Tax Appraisal District of Bell County sought delinquent taxes, penalties and interest for unpaid personal property taxes on a truck owned by appellant Bobby E. Haley.⁽¹⁾ Following a bench trial, the district court signed a judgment in favor of the district for the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest for both years and foreclosed the tax lien on the property. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 32.01(a), (d) (West Supp. 2000) (lien attaches each January 1 to secure payment of taxes, penalties and interest imposed and is perfected upon attachment). Haley appeals. We will affirm.

When, as here, there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law and no reporter's record, we presume that all the facts necessary to support the judgment have been found. $7,687.00 U.S. Currency v. State, 963 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1997, no pet.). Without findings of fact or a reporter's record, there is little basis for review. Carns v. Carns, 776 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1989, no writ). Unless there is fundamental error or the district court exceeded its jurisdiction, the appellate court presumes the judgment is supported by the evidence. Id. Haley proceeded in the district court and proceeds in this Court pro se.⁽²⁾

Haley argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is composed of two elements: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court; and (2) if amenable to the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff must validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant. Ex parte Bowers, 886 S.W.2d 346, 350 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Haley admits that he is a resident of Bell County. The record also contains the sheriff's return of citation by personal service indicating the date and time the sheriff obtained personal service on Haley. Thus, the district court had personal jurisdiction over Haley. A suit for delinquent taxes must be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction for the county in which the tax was imposed. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.41(a) (West Supp. 2000); Valero Transmission Co. v. Hays Consol. ISD, 704 S.W.2d 857, 863 n.4 (Tex. App.--Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The district court has exclusive jurisdiction for suits to collect delinquent taxes, penalties and interest and for foreclosure of tax liens. International Paper Co. v. State, 380 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Haley admits the property at issue is in Bell County. The district brought their collection lawsuit in Bell County district court. Thus, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. We overrule this issue.

Without a reporter's record or findings of fact, we must presume that the appraisal district presented the district court with the appropriate proof of the delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 33.47(a) (West Supp. 2000). Once the appraisal district proved its prima facie case, Haley was then required to present a defense. In a suit for collection of delinquent taxes to enforce personal liability for the tax, the only affirmative defense is lack of ownership. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(b)(1) (West 1992). We presume, as we must, that Haley failed to offer probative evidence of the defense of lack of ownership.

Haley also argues that the district's delinquent tax collection procedures violate his right to privacy, that the lien on his personal property was obtained by fraudulent means and without due process of law, and that the chief appraiser for the district conspired with the district judge to take his property. Haley failed to raise these matters in the district court and cannot raise them for the first time on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Oxford Finance Cos., Inc. v. Velez, 807 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991, writ denied). Even if these issues were properly before us, without a reporter's record there is nothing for us to review. Moreover, these allegations do not constitute fundamental error. The issues are overruled.

Haley also seeks various forms of relief which this Court cannot consider.⁽³⁾ To the extent these requests for relief are issues on appeal, they are overruled.

Haley also filed a motion styled "Notice of Default/Motion to Quash/Motion to Dismiss." In this motion Haley asserts he is a sovereign and not subject to law. In addition, he asserts that the chief appraiser's failure to "define the charges" against Haley, subjects the chief appraiser to default. He further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction because the chief appraiser failed to file a verified complaint and proof of jurisdiction. Given our disposition of the merits of Haley's appeal, we overrule this motion.

Having overruled all of Haley's issues, we affirm the district court's judgment.

Lee Yeakel, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, Yeakel and Jones^*

Affirmed

Filed: January 11, 2001

Do Not Publish

^* Before J. Woodfin (Woodie) Jones, Judge (former), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(a)(1) (West 1998).

1. The Tax Appraisal District of Bell County collects taxes for the City of Temple, Temple Independent School District, Temple Junior College and the County of Bell.

2. Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with applicable rules of procedure: "Neither is [the right of self-representation] a license not to comply with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). As stated by the Texas Supreme Court:

There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves. Litigants who represent themselves must comply with the applicable procedural rules, or else they would be given an unfair advantage over litigants represented by counsel.

Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 378-79 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1999, pet. denied), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1557 (April 3, 2000).

3. Haley styles his brief as a brief, a petition, a verified complaint, a demand, and a judgment. The brief also purports to be an affidavit. Haley requests relief under the 4th and 5th Amendments of the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 18 U.S.C. § 241, 242, and another United States Code provision for which he did not cite the title and which we are unable to locate. Haley also requests that this truck be returned within ten days with all liens removed, seeks damages for personal and emotional harm and to have his credit cleared. In addition, Haley demands over four million dollars in damages from the district and the chief appraiser for "Attempted Genocide []destroying a family, their way of earning a living under color of law and pretended law to be paid under United States code 1091."

, Haley was then required to present a defense. In a suit for collection of delinquent taxes to enforce personal liability for the tax, the only affirmative defense is lack of ownership. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(b)(1) (West 1992). We presume, as we must, that Haley failed to offer probative evidence of the defense of lack of ownership.