Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Sitting: Paul W. Green, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 14, 2004
AFFIRMED
In this interlocutory appeal, Kurt Garrison ("Garrison") challenges the trial court's order dismissing his application for mandamus, prohibition, and temporary injunction. The trial court's order was based on its finding that the appellees' plea to the jurisdiction was meritorious. Although Garrison presents five issues for review, we limit our discussion to the jurisdictional issue presented to the trial court because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring opinions to be brief as practicable in addressing issues necessary to final disposition of appeal).
Garrison filed a suit against the appellees for various causes of action relating to actions allegedly taken in the prosecution of a traffic ticket against him. Garrison subsequently filed an application for mandamus, prohibition, and temporary injunction (the "Application"). In his Application, Garrison basically requested that the trial court enjoin or prohibit any further prosecution or proceedings in the criminal case involving the traffic ticket and any further proceedings in any other criminal matter that could possibly be brought against him.
The appellees filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that the trial court could not grant the relief sought because it would result in a court with civil jurisdiction interfering with the enforcement of a penal statute. The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the Application.
We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). A civil court has jurisdiction to enter orders relating to a pending criminal matter in a different court only if the complainant attacks the constitutionality of the statute being enforced with specificity and urges that its enforcement would irreparably injure vested property rights. Cornyn v. Akin, 50 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2001, no pet.); see also State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). "If either of these requirements are not satisfied, then the trial court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the proceeding." Cornyn v. Akin, 50 S.W.3d at 737. In other words, if either of the requirements are not met, a trial court does not have "jurisdiction in a civil suit to enjoin or restrict the enforcement of, or declare the constitutionality of, a penal statute." In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d 327, 337 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).
In his written objection to the City's plea, Garrison states that he "has never plead at any time an allegation ... that any Texas Statute is unconstitutional." In his reply brief, Garrison reiterates that he "has not attacked the constitutionality of a Texas statute." For this very reason, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant Garrison the relief he sought in his Application. See Morales,, 869 S.W.2d at 942; In re Cornyn, 27 S.W.3d at 337; see also Martinez v. Thaler, 931 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (trial court has mandamus jurisdiction only to enforce its jurisdiction).
Accordingly, the trial court's order is affirmed.
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice