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MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-08-00336-CR
Alfredo Murillo CHAVEZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 112th Judicial District Court, Sutton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1950
Honorable Royal Hart, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
Steven C. Hilbig, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2008
AFFIRMED
Alfredo Murillo Chavez was convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation. Chavez
contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction and legally
insufficient to support the jury’s finding of true to the offense used to enhance Chavez’s sentence.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-08-00336-CR
BACKGROUND
Margarita Solis, a housekeeper for Mary Balch, arrived at Balch’s home and discovered a
broken window. Solis saw an axe on the bed of the room that had the broken window. Solis called
Balch, who called her daughter and the police. While waiting for the police to arrive, Solis saw a
green car with two occupants drive slowly past the house, turn, and drive past the house a second
time. On cross-examination, Solis denied telling the police in her statement that she recognized the
car as belonging to Trina Galvan.
Mary Balch testified that she and an employee left her home, which has an attached office,
around 1:30 p.m. Balch drove to her ranch; however, she returned to her home upon receiving
Solis’s call. Balch testified that a 37-inch screen television had been moved from a television
cabinet to the floor of the den. Balch began preparing a list of the missing items, including
televisions, VCRs, telephones, a computer, a printer, pens and pencils, decorator items, jewelry,
cameras, etc. Sometime later, an officer called and requested that Balch identify a computer that had
been recovered. Balch went to the police station and identified the computer. Balch subsequently
also went to an apartment and identified numerous objects that had been taken from her home
including a photograph of her grandson. Balch denied giving Chavez permission to enter her home
or take items from her home. Balch testified that Solis told her who owned the green car, and Balch
conveyed that information to the police.
Mary Balch’s daughter, Anita Hudson, discovered that the ornament in which a key had been
hidden outside her mother’s home was missing. Hudson later identified the ornament among the
items in an apartment to which she was summoned by officers. Hudson also recognized numerous
other items in the apartment that had been taken from her mother’s home. Hudson testified that
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several of the stolen items were heavy. Hudson stated that the television left on the den floor at her
mother’s home would require two people to carry it.
Trinidad Sentena, Jr., a cousin of Trina Galvan, testified that he believed Galvan and Chavez
were married because they lived together on and off like they were married. Galvan had been
offering to sell Sentena a computer for several months. On the day of the offense, Sentena went to
Galvan’s apartment around 4:30 p.m. and purchased a computer. Both Galvan and Chavez were
present when Sentena purchased the computer, but Sentena mainly spoke with Chavez. Sentena was
contacted by a police officer shortly after he purchased the computer, and he later relinquished the
computer to the police. Sentena testified that Galvan owned a green Mustang.
Rachel Harwell lived next door to Galvan. Harwell stated that she thought Chavez and
Galvan were married because Chavez would routinely spend time at Galvan’s apartment. On the day
of the offense, Harwell saw a green Mustang parked in front of Galvan’s apartment with the trunk
and driver’s side door open. Harwell saw Chavez pulling electronic items out of the car around 3:00
p.m.
Diane Reiner, the secretary at the school Chavez’s daughter attended, testified that Chavez
arrived at the school on the day of the offense to pick up his daughter around 4:00 p.m. Chavez’s
daughter had already been picked up by her grandmother, and Reiner testified that Chavez rarely
picked up his daughter so she thought it was unusual.
Officer Mike Routh responded to the dispatch to Balch’s home. Officer Routh entered the
home through the broken window to ensure that the scene was secure. Balch made a list of 76 items
that were missing. Based on information he gathered, Officer Routh, who knew Galvan owned a
green car, put out a description of the car and obtained a search warrant for Galvan’s apartment.
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Items that were stolen from Balch’s house were located in the apartment. Pictures of the items were
introduced into evidence.
Officer Bryn Thomas Humphrey stopped Galvan’s car around 5:37 p.m. on the day of the
offense. Galvan was driving, and Chavez was a passenger. After speaking with Galvan, Officer
Humphrey called Sentena about the computer Galvan sold to him. The computer, which Officer
Humphrey subsequently retrieved from Sentena, belonged to Balch. Galvan and Chavez were
arrested, and Officer Humphrey transported Chavez to jail. During the course of the transport,
Chavez said, “The bitch better not rat me out.” When Officer Humphrey returned to Balch’s home
to gather evidence, he noticed a very large television on the floor that had been moved from a stand.
The Sony emblem from the television was missing and was later found in Galvan’s apartment. The
television was so heavy that it required two officers to lift it.
Officer Tyrone Fincher testified that Galvan weighed 105 pounds, and her hands “are pretty
much crippled” from a birth defect. Officer Fincher stated that he thought Galvan had “one finger
on each hand.”
Carol Pope, Balch’s neighbor, testified that on the day of the offense, she observed a green
car driving very slowly by Balch’s home around 4:20 p.m. Two occupants were in the car, and she
described the driver as being an Anglo male with medium, spiky blond hair.
DISCUSSION
In his first two issues, Chavez challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction. In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
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Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). Our standard of review accounts for the factfinder’s ability to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In analyzing legal sufficiency, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based
upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict. Id.
In conducting a factual sufficiency review, this court views all of the evidence in a neutral
light and sets aside the verdict only if: (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong
and manifestly unjust; or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “[D]ue deference must be
accorded the fact finder’s determinations, particularly those determinations concerning the weight
and credibility of the evidence,” and a reviewing court’s disagreement “with the fact finder’s
determination is appropriate only when the record clearly indicates such a step is necessary to arrest
the occurrence of a manifest injustice.” Id. at 9.
The lack of direct evidence is not dispositive of the issue of a defendant’s guilt. Guevara v.
State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Guevara, 152 S.W.3d
at 49. Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish guilt. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778;
Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. The standard of review on appeal is the same for both direct and
circumstantial evidence cases. Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49.
The evidence in this case establishes that Chavez and Galvan lived together in Galvan’s
apartment at least on a sporadic basis. Solis saw two people suspiciously driving by the scene of the
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offense in a green car. Harwell observed Chavez removing items that appeared to be electronic
equipment from Galvan’s green car while it was parked in front of Galvan’s apartment on the day
of the offense. Chavez and Galvan sold Sentena a computer stolen from Balch’s home, and Sentena
primarily interacted with Chavez during the transaction. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718,
725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting a defendant’s unexplained possession of property recently stolen
in a burglary permits an inference that the defendant is the one who committed the burglary).
Numerous other items stolen from Balch’s home were located in Galvan’s apartment. A large
television had been moved from a stand to the floor at Balch’s home. The television required more
than one person to move, and the emblem from the television was located in Galvan’s apartment.
In addition to the fact that the television required more than one person to lift it, evidence was
presented regarding the “crippled” nature of Galvan’s hands. After being arrested and as he was
being transported to jail, Chavez stated, “The bitch better not rat me out.”
In view of the aforementioned evidence and the reasonable inferences the jury was entitled
to draw from that evidence, we find the evidence is legally sufficient to support Chavez’s conviction.
The only evidence presented by the defense was a neighbor’s testimony that an Anglo male with
blond hair was driving a green car in the neighborhood on the afternoon of the offense. Deferring
to the jury’s determination with regard to the weight and credibility of the evidence, the evidence is
not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, nor is the verdict against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Chavez’s first and second
issues.
Chavez next challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish the prior conviction
relied upon by the State to enhance his punishment range. To establish that a defendant has been
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convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) a prior
conviction exists; and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d
919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these
two elements. Id. While evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a
preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of these elements in a number of different
ways, including (1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation; (2) testimony by a person who was
present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can identify the defendant as that
person; or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contains sufficient information to
establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person
convicted. Id. at 921-22. Any type of evidence, documentary or testimonial, might suffice. Id. at
922. “Just as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there is more than one way to prove a prior
conviction.” Id.
In this case, the State sought to prove that Chavez was previously convicted of the offense
of failure to appear. A certified copy of a judgment was introduced into evidence establishing that
Alfredo Chavez had been convicted of the offense of failure to appear in Tom Green County in
August of 2000 and was sentenced to four years in prison. Trooper Donald Van Zandt testified that
Chavez had been tried on a charge in Tom Green County and “sent to four years in the penitentiary
for failure to appear.” Chavez’s father also stated that Chavez had been incarcerated in San Angelo
for failure to appear. Finally, Galvan testified that Chavez had been in the penitentiary twice. The
foregoing evidence is legally sufficient to link Chavez to a prior conviction for failure to appear.
Chavez’s third issue is overruled.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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