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MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-08-00619-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Adam Joshua TRIANA,
Appellee
From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. A-08-160
Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 15, 2009
AFFIRMED
Adam Joshua Triana was indicted for the offense of possession of a controlled substance in
the amount of over one gram but less than four grams. The trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing
on Triana’s motion to suppress, which was granted. The State appeals, arguing the trial court erred
in granting Triana’s motion to suppress as the search was not invalid because no evidence was
obtained in violation of any provisions of the constitutions or laws of the state or nation. We affirm
the trial court’s ruling.
04-08-00619-CR
BACKGROUND
On January 26, 2008, an officer received information from a confidential informant that
Triana may have been selling drugs from a hotel room at a certain hotel. On January 28, 2008,
Triana was arrested for Driving while License Suspended and Possession of Marihuana. While
Triana was in jail, two investigators went to the hotel where Triana was living with his girlfriend,
Amanda Hoffman. The investigators did not have a warrant. When they approached the room from
the parking lot, Hoffman was speaking with someone outside the room. They observed Hoffman
sight the investigators, stop her conversation, and then proceed into her hotel room, leaving the door
open. The investigators approached the door and claimed to hear the toilet flush. They immediately
entered the room and performed a warrantless search, pulling a bag of crack cocaine out of the toilet.
In the room, the investigators also found marihuana and information identifying Triana as a possible
occupant.
Triana was indicted for the offense of possession of a controlled substance in the amount of
over one gram but less than four grams. The trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing on Triana’s
motion to suppress, which was granted. This appeal followed.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In one issue, the State argues the trial court erred in granting Triana’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained during the search of Triana and Hoffman’s residence. The State contends the
search was not invalid because no evidence was obtained in violation of any provisions of the
constitutions or laws of the state or nation.
While the search of a residence without a warrant is presumptively invalid, some
circumstances exist which justify a warrantless search. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586
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(1980). Examples of these circumstances include when the police have probable cause coupled with
an exigent circumstance, when they have obtained voluntary consent, or when the search is
conducted incident to a lawful arrest. Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (citing McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In these situations,
the Fourth Amendment endures a warrantless search. Id.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review, giving almost complete deference to the trial court’s findings of historical fact supported by
the record and reviewing de novo the trial court’s application of the law of search and seizure.
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The Court of Criminal Appeals recently summarized the approach to be
taken when examining the validity of a warrantless search:
To validate a warrantless search based on exigent circumstances, the State must
satisfy a two-step process. First, there must be probable cause to enter or search a
specific location. In the context of warrantless searches, probable cause exists “when
reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer
on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that the
instrumentality . . . or evidence of a crime will be found.” Second, an exigency that
requires an immediate entry to a particular place without a warrant must exist. . . .
If the State does not adequately establish both probable cause and exigent
circumstances, then a warrantless entry will not withstand judicial scrutiny.
Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685-86 (citations omitted). The State opines the investigators had probable
cause to conduct the search based on information received from a confidential informant, coupled
with the exigent circumstance of Hoffman quickly entering the residence upon sight of the
investigators and the subsequent sound of a flushing toilet.
As noted above, probable cause exists “when reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances
within the knowledge of the officer on the scene would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe
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that the instrumentality . . . or evidence of a crime will be found.” See id. The same facts which give
rise to probable cause may also be relevant to an analysis of exigent circumstances. See Parker v.
State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 600-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The State argues the investigators had
knowledge of several facts supporting probable cause, including their awareness that Triana lived
at the location, that he was a known drug dealer and/or user, and that Hoffman was his girlfriend or
common-law wife. The State also notes the investigators’ training and experience in these types of
investigations led them to believe Hoffman’s actions in suddenly stopping a conversation and
entering her hotel room after spotting the officers, and the subsequent toilet flushing, provided both
the probable cause and exigent circumstances needed to enter the room without a warrant.
We find the State’s argument unpersuasive. One of the investigators testified that at the time
they visited the hotel, they did not have probable cause to search Triana’s room and were hoping to
gather more information so that a search warrant could be obtained. In addition, while their
suspicions centered around Triana, the investigators knew Triana was in custody at that time.
Testimony revealed the investigators had no specific information regarding Hoffman possessing
drugs that would have given them probable cause to enter the room and conduct a search.
Consequently, the investigators failed to establish the requisite probable cause necessary to
necessitate a warrantless search. Because probable cause was not present, we need not reach the
second prong of the test requiring an exigent circumstance. The trial court did not err in granting
Triana’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of Triana and Hoffman’s
residence. The State’s issue is overruled.
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CONCLUSION
The State failed to establish the trial court erred in suppressing evidence gathered during a
warrantless search. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Publish
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