In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-04-00017-CR
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DAMON EARL LEWIS, Appellant
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V.
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THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 8th Judicial District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 0216854B
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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
            Damon Earl Lewis appeals from his conviction by a jury for the offense of aggravated sexual assault on a child. Four cases were tried together. The jury assessed his punishment at ninety-nine years' imprisonment for the count in this case. The trial court sentenced Lewis consistent with the jury's verdict, with the sentences to run concurrently. The cases have been appealed separately and have been briefed together.
            Because the briefs and arguments raised therein are identical in all four appeals, for the reasons stated in Lewis v. State, No. 06-04-00016-CR, we likewise resolve the issues in this appeal in favor of the State.
            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III
                                                                                    Chief Justice
Date Submitted:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â October 27, 2004
Date Decided:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â November 15, 2004
Do Not Publish
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In The
Court of Appeals
                       Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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                                               ______________________________
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                                                            No. 06-11-00046-CR
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                     CHRISTOPHER CHARLES MEADOWS, Appellant
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                                                               V.
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                                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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                                         On Appeal from the County Court at Law #1
                                                            Gregg County, Texas
                                                        Trial Court No. 2010-0886
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                                         Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
                                             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
                                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION
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           In the early morning hours in Kilgore, Texas, Kilgore Police Officer Joseph Harrison saw a vehicle driven by Christopher Charles Meadows turn off of Stone Road and use a roadway that the officer believed was a private driveway (the Roadway) to reach Utzman Street.  Believing that Meadows failed to stop in the Roadway, Harrison turned on his overhead flashing lights to initiate a traffic stop. However, Meadows did not stop, but continued to drive until he reached his nearby home. After seeing signs that Meadows was intoxicated, Harrison arrested him. Meadows refused a breathalyzer test, so Harrison obtained a search warrant for a sample of Meadows blood. Because the hospital in Kilgore was closed, Harrison transported Meadows to a hospital in Longview, where his blood was drawn.  Tests revealed that Meadows was legally intoxicated, and he was charged by information with DWI, second offense, and fleeing from a police officer. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence gained from the stop and search, Meadows pled guilty to both charges.[1]
           Meadows appeals from his conviction for DWI, second offense, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because:  (1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, as the Roadway was a public road; (2) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him, as Meadows could have stopped in the Roadway; and (3) the blood draw exceeded the officerÂs geographic jurisdiction.
           We affirm the judgment of the trial court because:  (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the Roadway was a parking lot, driveway, or private road; (2) the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Meadows failed to stop while traversing the Roadway; and (3) a city police officer may execute a valid search warrant anywhere in the county.
           Because the issues raised in each appeal are identical, for the reasons stated in our opinion dated this day in Meadows v. State, cause number 06-11-00045-CR, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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                                                                       Jack Carter
                                                                       Justice
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Date Submitted:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â October 19, 2011
Date Decided:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â November 15, 2011
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[1]There is a companion case to this (our cause number 06-11-00045-CR) which regards the charge of fleeing. Â Meadows was tried for both cases in a single proceeding.