in Re: Allstate Insurance Company

6-96-028-CV Long Trusts v. Dowd

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-05-00051-CV

______________________________

IN RE: ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Connie Young sued Allstate Insurance Company on the underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage Allstate issued to Young, alleging Allstate (a) owed her on the UIM coverage, (b)Â breached her insurance contract, (c) violated Texas Insurance Code Article 21.21, (d) violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and (e) handled her claim in bad faith. The trial court overruled Allstate's motion for severance of the coverage claim from the others and abatement of the othersâitems (b), (c), (d), and (e)âinstead ordering the trial bifurcated, so the coverage claim would be tried first, then the others, if Young succeeded on her coverage claim. Allstate petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus to require the trial court to grant Allstate's motion to sever and abate. We decline.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Allstate argues that, because they tendered an offer of settlement to Young, severance is mandated by Texas caselaw. Allstate contends that, if the matters are not severed, Young will be able to present the jury with evidence of Allstate's proffer of settlement, unfairly prejudicing Allstate.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to sever claims into separate cases. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh'g.); In Â re Â Koehn, Â 86 Â S.W.3d Â 363, Â 366 Â (Tex. Â App.âTexarkana Â 2002, Â orig. Â proceeding). Â Tex. Â R. Civ. P. 41 grants the trial court "broad discretion in the matter of consolidation and severance of causes." McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1968). Severance is proper when (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed claim is one that would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that it involves the same facts and issues. Id. The controlling reasons for a severance are to do justice, to avoid prejudice, and to further convenience. Tex. R. Civ. P. 174(b); Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Mandamus will lie only to correct a clear abuse of discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Further, there must be no adequate remedy at law. Id. An appellate court will not interfere with a trial court's exercise of discretion except in rare circumstances. For mandamus relief to be appropriate, the trial court must have clearly abused its discretion, issuing a decision without basis or guiding principle in law. Cf. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). The relator, seeking mandamus, must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839â40.

We will reverse a trial court's determination regarding severance only if we find an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, when all the facts and circumstances of the case unquestionably require a severance to prevent manifest injustice, there is no fact or circumstance supporting or tending to support a contrary conclusion, and the legal rights of the parties will not be prejudiced, there is no room for the exercise of discretion. In that situation, the trial court has a duty to order a severance.

Koene, 86 S.W.3d at 366 (citations omitted). "[C]lear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Allstate argues that Liberty Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1996), requires severance of Young's claims, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in denying Allstate's motion. In Akin, the insurer tendered payment on the part of the insured's claims which were not in dispute. The insurance company then moved the trial court to sever the insured's coverage claim from the bad faith claim. Id. at 628.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Akin does not require severance in each case in which a settlement offer is tendered. In fact, Akin denies severance. Writing for the majority, Justice Cornyn acknowledged that there may be bad faith cases in which severance is required, such as cases in which the insurer has made a settlement offer on a disputed contract claim. It is true, as Allstate points out, that the court agreed with certain intermediate appellate courts ordering severance. We conclude, however, that neither those cases, nor Akin, mandate severance in this case.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Allstate directs us to State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.âHouston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). In Wilborn, the insured sued, alleging State Farm denied coverage under the policy and acted in bad faith. See id. at 260â61. In that case, there was specific evidence before the trial court about the amount of the settlement offer; and the plaintiff-insured testified regarding why she alleged the insurer was in bad faith. Id. The record in the case before us lacks such evidence.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Allstate also directs us to United States Fire Ins. v. Mallard, 847 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App.âHouston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding). In Mallard, the insurance company had made several offers of settlement, before and after suit was filed. The court followed Wilborn's reasoning in finding the particular facts before the trial court left no legal option but severance. Id. at 673. The Mallard court, however, had those particular facts in its record.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â After reviewing the cases cited by Allstate and the record before us, we find the trial court acted within its discretion. Allstate has not provided this Court with evidence of what settlement offer was tendered, if any. Instead, Allstate directs us to a section of its motion to sever. The only factual allegation therein is as follows: "Plaintiff will undoubtedly offer evidence of the settlement demands, post-litigation settlement offers, if any, reserves and evaluations as proof of Allstate's alleged bad faith." Allstate simply provides no evidence to this Court of what specific settlement offers, if any, were actually tendered, nor their nature, nor whether the plaintiff rejected them. The conclusory allegations in Allstate's petition for mandamus relief and pleadings below do not demonstrate that the trial court acted contrary to the only rational decision that court could have made. Cf. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839â40. As the Akin court noted, "evidence of this sort [in the cases cited by the insurance company] simply does not exist in this case. In the absence of a settlement offer on the entire contract claim, or other compelling circumstances, severance is not required." Akin, 927 S.W.2d at 630. Akin's reasoning addresses concerns that the insurer not be prejudiced by admission of evidence of settlement offers, unless and until such evidence would become relevant and admissible, i.e., on a finding of coverage under the insurance policy and a subsequent trial on the other claims. Here, bifurcating the issues into two trials allows for the necessary protections for each party within the trial court's discretion.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling, we deny Allstate's petition for writ of mandamus.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Josh R. Morriss, III

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Chief Justice

Date Submitted:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â May 11, 2005

Date Decided:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â May 12, 2005

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In The

Court of Appeals

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ______________________________

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â No. 06-10-00004-CV

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ______________________________

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â GIANNA DRIVER, Appellant

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â V.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â JAMES G. CONLEY, SR., Appellee

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Harrison County, Texas

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Trial Court No. 01-0416

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â O P I N I O N

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â James G. Conley, Sr., has previously been convicted of, and is serving time for, sexual assaults against Gianna Driver.^{^[1]}Â For those torts, Driver obtained a civil money judgment against Conley.Â As part of DriverÂs efforts to collect that judgment, she appeals from the denial of her request for a turnover order^{^[2]} on a house and lot that Conley claims as his homestead.Â Driver argues that Âsomeone who intentionally commits criminal acts of sexual assault within a home against a minor child may [not] be entitled to claim continuing homestead exemptionÂ since Âimprisonment in a new residenceÂ should be deemed abandonment of homestead.Â Because we hold that ConleyÂs imprisonment for his crimes does not constitute abandonment of his homestead, we affirm the trial courtÂs denial of DriverÂs request for a turnover order concerning the house and lot in question.^{^[3]}

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â ÂHomestead rights have historically enjoyed great protection in our jurisprudence.ÂÂ Florey v. Estate of McConnell, 212 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. App.ÂAustin 2006, pet. denied) (prisoner who murdered his wife was entitled to claim homestead exemption).Â Our Texas Constitution provides that Â[t]he homestead of . . . a single adult person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debtsÂ not specifically enumerated within.Â Tex. Const. art. XVI, Â§ 50.Â Â Homestead rights are liberally construed to prevent citizens from losing their homes.Â Florey, 212 S.W.3d at 443.Â The party seeking a turnover order must prove that the property is not exempt.Â Hanif v. Clarksville Oil & Gas Co., No. 06-09-00110-CV, 2010 WLÂ 2105936, at *3 (Tex. App.ÂTexarkana May 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. Â§ 31.002(a)(2), (b)(1) (Vernon 2008); Tanner v. McCarthy, 274 S.W.3d 311, 322 (Tex. App.ÂHouston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We review the granting or denial of a turnover order for an abuse of discretion. Â Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Tanner, 274 S.W.3d at 320. Â A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner. Â Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985). Â A trial courtÂs issuance of a turnover order, even if predicated on an erroneous conclusion of law, will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion if the judgment is sustainable for any reason. Â Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 226. Â A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the decision. Â Tanner, 274 S.W.3d at 321Â22.Â DriverÂs points of error question whether there was Âsome evidenceÂ supporting the trial courtÂs conclusion that Conley did not Âabandon his homestead Property.ÂÂ

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â All parties agree that the property in question was the homestead of Conley at some point.Â ÂOnce acquired, homestead rights are not easily lost.Â Property may lose its homestead character only by the claimantÂs death, abandonment, or alienation.ÂÂ Duran v. Henderson, 71 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Tex. App.ÂTexarkana 2002, pet. denied). Â Driver argues that ConleyÂs incarceration constituted an abandonment of his homestead.Â ÂAbandonment of a homestead requires both the cessation or discontinuance of use of the property as a homestead, coupled with the intent to permanently abandon the homestead.ÂÂ Womack v. Redden, 846 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex. App.ÂTexarkana 1992, writ denied). Â Evidence relied on as establishing Âabandonment of a homestead must make it undeniably clear that there has been a total abandonment with an intention not to return and claim the exemption.Â Â Id.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â DriverÂs first argument is that ConleyÂs homestead was abandoned due to his long-term imprisonment.Â Driver had the burden of proving abandonment with legally and factually sufficient evidence.Â Florey, 212 S.W.3d at 446.Â Conley was married and divorced several times.Â The home was purchased as his separate property in 1985.Â He testified, ÂIÂve lived there ever since.Â I have supported it fully.Â I have not abandoned it or anything of that type . . . .Â I have never left my home with the intention of not going back.ÂÂ Records from the appraisal district list the property as ConleyÂs homestead.Â On advice of counsel, Conley filed for bankruptcy after the civil judgment in DriverÂs favor.Â He declared the property as his homestead in that bankruptcy.Â ConleyÂs responses to discovery establish that his books and records are still kept at his home and that his daughter lived in the home from time to time.^{^[4]}Â Conley testified he planned on living in the home on his release from incarceration.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Abandonment of a homestead must be voluntary.Â Id. at 444 (citing King v. Harter, 70 Tex. 579, 8 S.W. 308, 309 (1888)).Â ÂAn act of necessity is not a voluntary abandonment of the homestead.ÂÂ R.B. Spencer Co. v. Green, 203 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.ÂEl Paso 1947, no writ).Â While Conley voluntarily committed the crime, he did not voluntarily change his residence.Â A homestead is not abandoned merely because a person does not occupy the home during a prison sentence.Â Florey, 212 S.W.3d at 447.Â We conclude that there was some evidence to support the trial courtÂs finding that ConleyÂs homestead was not abandoned.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Driver did not attempt to contest ConleyÂs claims that he considered the home as homestead and planned to return to it when released from incarceration.Â Instead, Driver complained that Âimmediate transfer of [nonexempt] propertyÂ to pay legal fees was conducted in bad faith with the design of keeping Driver from collecting on her judgment.Â We are unsure of how transfer of nonexempt property to pay legal fees could affect ConleyÂs homestead status.Â The trial courtÂs finding of fact was that nonexempt property was transferred to pay legal fees and was not conducted in bad faith.Â We will not disturb this finding, which has no bearing on the issue of abandonment of homestead.^{^[5]}

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Driver next argued that the filing of a Âsham bankruptcyÂ recommended to Conley by counsel, coupled with his assertion that he may have been married according to common law, suggested that Conley Âshould be stopped from making such an exemption claim.Â^{^[6]}Â The trial court found, based on ConleyÂs uncontested testimony, that bankruptcy was filed on advice of counsel and that Conley was unsure of the status of his relationship with Moncoda.Â Again, DriverÂs contentions and the evidence presented to support them did not establish that Conley abandoned his homestead and voluntarily left without intention to return.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because there was some evidence supporting the trial courtÂs denial of DriverÂs motion for turnover, we overrule DriverÂs remaining points of error.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We affirm the trial courtÂs judgment.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Josh R. Morriss, III

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Chief Justice

Date Submitted:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â July 27, 2010

Date Decided:Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â August 11, 2010

^{^[1]}Conley was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault, three counts of sexual assault, and four counts of indecency with a child.Â He was sentenced to thirty-five yearsÂ incarceration on both counts of aggravated sexual assault and twenty yearsÂ incarceration on all remaining counts, all to be served concurrently.

^{^[2]}To try to collect on the judgment, Driver filed with the trial court a motion for turnover order asking the court to order Conley to turn over his home and lot along with other unimproved lots, all in Harrison County.Â While the trial court ordered turnover of the unimproved lots, it agreed with Conley that the property containing his home remained his homestead.Â

^{^[3]}Driver also claims that Conley was improperly bench warranted to allow for his presence at the turnover hearing.Â We do not address the merits of that claim because that issue was waived.Â ÂAs a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show thatÂ a Âcomplaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion.Â Â Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.Â ÂA ÂtimelyÂ objection is one interposed at a point in the proceedings which gives the trial court the opportunity to cure any alleged error.ÂÂ Solomon v. Steitler, 312 S.W.3d 46, 58 (Tex. App.ÂTexarkana 2010, no pet.).Â Moreover, Âa party will not be allowed to complain on appeal of an action or ruling which she invited or induced.Â Boufaissal v. Boufaissal, 251 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. App.ÂDallas 2008, no pet.).Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â At an earlier attempted hearing on the turnover motion, the question of notice to Conley was addressed.Â After a short discussion, the trial court suggested, Â[L]etÂs . . . see whether or not we can bench warrant [Conley] backÂ for the hearing.Â DriverÂs counsel replied, ÂOkay.Â That would certainly be easier for me, because I donÂt represent him.ÂÂ At the hearing, counsel agreed to, and did, send a letter to Conley advising him that the court was issuing a bench warrant for his appearance at the next hearing date.Â No objection to the courtÂs decision to issue a bench warrant was made. Â Only after the trial court ruled Conley was entitled to exercise his homestead exemption did DriverÂs counsel file a motion to reconsider, raising an objection to the issuance of the bench warrant for the first time. Â This point of error was waived.Â It is also worth noting that issuing a bench warrant is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.Â See In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 164 (Tex. 2003).

^{^[4]}We also note that a major point of contention in this case was ConleyÂs claim that he was common-law married to Marta Moncoda.Â Â The Constitution currently provides that Â[a]n owner or claimant of the property claimed as homestead may not sell or abandon the homestead without the consent of each owner and the spouse of each owner.ÂÂ Tex. Const. art. XVI, Â§ 50(b).Â Because Conley could make his homestead claim as a single adult, we need not address the issue of whether he was common-law married.

^{^[5]}In any event, Âit is well settled that a conveyance of exempt property may not be attacked on the ground that it was made in fraud of creditors.ÂÂ Duran, 71 S.W.3d at 842Â43 (emphasis added).

^{^[6]}For the first time on appeal, Driver contends Conley has Âunclean handsÂ because Â[i]t is unconscionable for a party to claim the benefit of a homestead exemption while using the very home at issue to commit sexual assaults of a minor.ÂÂ This issue was not presented to the trial court, and we need not consider it.

in Re: Allstate Insurance Company

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