Mason P. James v. State










In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


______________________________


No. 06-06-00019-CR

______________________________



MASON P. JAMES, Appellant

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee



                                              


On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court

Harrison County, Texas

Trial Court No. 93-0183 B



                                                 




Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross



MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Mason P. James appeals from the denial of his motion for DNA testing. James was convicted in 1994 of murder based on his plea of guilty, supported by his confession to the crime.

          On December 7, 2001, James filed a request with the trial court that counsel be appointed to assist him in pursuing his motion for DNA testing, and on April 10, 2002, the court appointed Terry Cox. The State responded—evidently deeming that motion to be a motion for DNA testing—on June 25, 2003. A year later, after two letters were written by James, Cox wrote James, informing him that Cox did not represent him and that Kevin McCarter did represent him. The record, however, does not show that McCarter was ever appointed and McCarter has made no appearance in this case. In a February 11, 2005, letter James inquired of the trial court as to who did represent him. There is no indication of any response. In March 2003, James sent to the trial court an additional inquiry concerning his "DNA testing," and another such inquiry in June 2003. On November 30, 2005, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, and denied the request for DNA testing. Thereafter, the court appointed an attorney who now represents James on appeal.

          James contends the trial court erred by rendering the order against him while he was unrepresented by counsel, by denying his request when there was no motion or affidavit filed requesting DNA testing, and that he has, in any event, met his burden to show that he is entitled to DNA testing. We overrule these contentions and affirm the trial court's order.

          In the current version of the statute requiring appointment of counsel, the Texas Legislature has mandated that a trial court provide court-appointed counsel to an applicant pursuing post-conviction DNA testing, but only if, among other things, the trial court finds reasonable  grounds  for  the  application  to  be  filed.  Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  Ann.  art. 64.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Winters v. Presiding Judge of Criminal Dist. Court No. Three of Tarrant County, 118 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (orig. proceeding); James v. State, No. 06-06-00038-CR, 2006 WL 1649034 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).

          However, when the order appointing counsel was signed in this case, in early 2002, a different statute was in place, one that simply required the court, on request, to appoint counsel for an indigent seeking DNA testing. Thus, the record shows that the trial court did appoint counsel as required by the rule then in effect.

          In our review of the documents in this record, we start from the premise that courts must read a pleading for its content rather than its label. See generally Tex. R. Civ. P. 71; State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1980); Moore v. Collins, 897 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). Although the request for appointment of counsel cannot be read as a motion for DNA testing, James' communication to the court's clerk in March 2003, can be understood as such. That communication reads as follows: "I have a DNA testing in your county of Harrison now pending. Please give me any information that would inform me about my court schedule." Even though the communication was not accompanied by the required affidavit, the State did not object and had already filed a response. The trial court considered the matter on its merits. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial court erred in doing so.

          James also contends the trial court erred by denying DNA testing. However, the court found that James had not met the precondition of showing that identity "was or is an issue in the case." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The record shows James had pled guilty and confessed to the commission of the crime. We recognize that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that, where the movant had confessed to the murder, identity is not at issue. Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The contentions of error are overruled.

 

 

 

          We affirm the trial court's order denying DNA testing.

 

                                                                           Donald R. Ross

                                                                           Justice


Date Submitted:      May 19, 2006

Date Decided:         August 30, 2006


Do Not Publish