In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-06-00044-CV
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IN RE:
PRINCE BROWN
Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Prince Brown has filed with this Court a petition for writ of mandamus. Brown seeks to compel the trial judge for the 71st Judicial District to "[r]estrain [a]gent, or [a]gents of the State from destruction and, or, theft of Brown's property now in custody of the State and to [o]rder the review of said property to prevent the destruction and, or, sale to cover up theft, which Brown alleges has already occurred."
Brown has supplied no record from the trial court. He does attach a letter from the Harrison County District Attorney's Office, advising that a seizure case, styled State v. $1,757.05 In U.S. Currency, et al, is set for trial April 5, 2006. In the body of his petition for mandamus relief, Brown states that he has not been to trial on this matter and that he has not received notice of any rescheduling.
Brown's petition fails to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3. He supplies no table of authorities or contents; no identity of parties and counsel; no statement of the case or jurisdiction, and no record of proceedings in the trial court relevant to this petition. His failure to supply a record is fatal to this petition. One seeking mandamus relief must accompany his or her petition with an appendix, including a "certified or sworn copy of . . . [the] document showing the matter complained of." Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(j)(1)(A).
Further, Brown has not demonstrated that the trial court has been asked to do something and refused such request. Such is required of any party seeking mandamus relief. O'Connor v. First Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Tex. 1992).
We deny Brown's request for mandamus relief.
Donald R. Ross
Justice
Date Submitted: April 25, 2006
Date Decided: April 26, 2006
uidroz objected to several portions of the PSI report. As it relates to his appeal, Guidroz objected to the report's inclusion of results from a "Static 99" test. The results from the Static 99 test suggested Guidroz posed a "high risk" for committing another sexual offense in the future.
The trial court overruled Guidroz' objections to the Static 99 test, and presumably considered it when sentencing Guidroz. On appeal, Guidroz contends the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by admitting the results of the Static 99 test during the punishment phase of the trial. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review,
the record must show that: (1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that: (A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context . . . .
Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). For example, objecting to a witness' testimony on the basis of hearsay will not preserve for appeal a Confrontation Clause objection. Paredes v. State, No. 74,293, 2004 WL 57432 (Tex. Crim App. Jan. 14, 2004).
In his objection to the trial court, Guidroz did not assert the Static 99 test violated his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. And from the context of the ensuing testimony from Isles, it is clear Guidroz' attack on the Static 99 test being admitted into evidence was not based on a Fifth Amendment violation, but instead based on Isles' reliance on the police report in determining the proper answers that would ultimately contribute to Guidroz' "high risk" score. Thus, Guidroz' generalized objection in the trial court was insufficient to preserve his appellate claim of constitutional error.
Moreover, Article 42.12, Section 9A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to order a report that evaluates a proposed course of conduct or rehabilitation.
If the defendant is a sex offender, the judge shall direct a supervision officer approved by the community supervision . . . department . . . to evaluate the appropriateness of, and a course of conduct necessary for, treatment, specialized supervision, or rehabilitation of the defendant and to report the results of the evaluation to the judge. The judge may require the evaluation use offense-specific standards of practice adopted by the counsel and may require the report to reflect those standards. The evaluation shall be made after conviction and before entry of the final judgment, or, if requested by the defendant, after arrest and before conviction.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 9A(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
In this case, Isles used the Static 99 test as one component of her multifaceted case evaluation in making a rehabilitation recommendation to the trial court. An offender's likelihood of recidivism is relevant when considering an appropriate course of rehabilitation. As such, the trial court did not err by adhering to the statutory requirements of Article 42.12, Section 9A and considering the results of the Static 99 test.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: March 31, 2004
Date Decided: April 1, 2004
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