Ralph O. Douglas v. Floyd F. James










In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


______________________________


No. 06-05-00088-CV

______________________________



RALPH O. DOUGLAS, Appellant

 

V.

 

FLOYD F. JAMES, Appellee



                                              


On Appeal from the 280th Judicial District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2002-51054



                                                 




Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter



MEMORANDUM OPINION


            Ralph O. Douglas appeals the dismissal of his legal malpractice suit against Floyd F. James. We affirm the judgment because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the cause.

Factual Background

            Douglas is an inmate within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The underlying lawsuit is based on legal malpractice claims arising out of a prior civil suit in which James represented Douglas. In his petition, Douglas claims James should have returned a portion of the fee which he paid to James to conduct that lawsuit. Douglas filed this lawsuit as an inmate with an affidavit of inability to pay costs.

            After reviewing the pleadings, the trial court could not discern the legal basis for Douglas' lawsuit. The trial court issued an order requiring a statement of facts from both Douglas and James to help illuminate the nature of Douglas' claims. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed Douglas' entire lawsuit.

No Error In Dismissal

            In his sole point of error, Douglas contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit and further erred by dismissing his lawsuit pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 13.001 (Vernon 2002).

            We overrule this sole point of error.

            Douglas asserts that his underlying claim is governed by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because he is an inmate who filed an affidavit of inability to pay costs. He is correct in this assertion. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002 (Vernon 2002). However, he is incorrect in his contention that the trial court dismissed his lawsuit pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

            The order of dismissal shows the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The order states in part, "[P]ursuant to Section 14.003 of the Texas Civil Practice And Remedies Code, this entire case is DISMISSED." The order of dismissal does not contain a reference to Chapter 13. Therefore, we find this portion of Douglas' claim meritless.

            Now, we must consider whether the trial court's dismissal under Chapter 14 was proper. We review a trial court's decision to dismiss an inmate's claim subject to Chapter 14 under an abuse of discretion standard. To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show that the trial court's actions were arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. We must ask whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. See Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 735–36 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).

            As noted above, the trial court dismissed Douglas' case pursuant to Section 14.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. That section allows the trial court to dismiss a claim if the court finds the claim is frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003 (Vernon 2002). In deciding whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court may consider:

(1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight;

(2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact;

(3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or

(4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts.


Id.

            The court may also take into consideration the requirements imposed by Section 14.004. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2002); Bishop v. Lawson, 131 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

            Section 14.004 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:

(a)An inmate who files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs shall file a separate affidavit or declaration:

 

(1)identifying each suit, other than a suit under the Family Code, previously brought by the person and in which the person was not represented by an attorney, without regard to whether the person was an inmate at the time the suit was brought; and

(2) describing each suit that was previously brought by:

                                                (A)      stating the operative facts for which relief was sought;

 

(B)listing the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought;

 

(C)identifying each party named in the suit; and

 

(D)stating the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious under Section 13.001 or Section 14.003 or otherwise.

 

(b)If the affidavit or unsworn declaration filed under this section states that a previous suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious, the affidavit or unsworn declaration must state the date of the final order affirming the dismissal.

 

(c)The affidavit or unsworn declaration must be accompanied by the certified copy of the trust account statement required by Section 14.006(f).


Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004. Section 14.006(f) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:

 

(f)The inmate shall file a certified copy of the inmate's trust account statement with the court. The statement must reflect the balance of the account at the time the claim is filed and activity in the account during the six months preceding the date on which the claim is filed. The court may request the department or jail to furnish the information required under this subsection.


Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.006(f) (Vernon 2002).

            Douglas filed an affidavit listing eight separate suits which he had brought. Each listing follows the same format. For example:

Douglas v. Porter, Cause No. 200155507, Pending in the 127th District Court of Harris County, Texas;

Douglas v. Kings, Cause No. 200157519, Pending in the 190th District Court of Harris County, Texas . . . .


            These listings fail to state the operative facts for which relief was sought and fail to identify each party named in each suit as required by subsections (a)(2)(A) and (C) of Section 14.004. Therefore, Douglas' affidavit is inadequate because it does not comply with the requirements of Section 14.004. When the inmate does not comply with the affidavit requirements of Section 14.004, the trial court is entitled to assume the suit is substantially similar to one previously filed by the inmate and, therefore, frivolous. Obadele v. Johnson, 60 S.W.3d 345, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).

            Further, Douglas' affidavit is not accompanied by a certified copy of his trust account statement as required by subsection (c) of Section 14.004. Douglas offers no explanation for either of these deficiencies.

            Douglas' affidavit fails to comply with the requirements of Section 14.004. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Douglas' lawsuit. See Thompson v. Rodriguez, 99 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Accordingly, we overrule Douglas' sole point of error.

            We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                        Justice

 

Date Submitted:          January 11, 2006

Date Decided:             January 13, 2006


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In The

  Court of Appeals

                        Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

 

                                                ______________________________

 

                                                             No. 06-10-00106-CR

                                                ______________________________

 

 

 

                                             IN RE:  STEPHEN CLAY JOHNSTON

 

 

                                                                                                  

 

                                                                                                                            

                                                     Original Mandamus Proceeding

 

                                                                                                  

 

 

 

 

                                          Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

 

                                                                             

                                                                             


                                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

            While incarcerated in the Lamar County Jail for a third DWI conviction, Stephen Clay Johnston filed a “Motion for Access of Courts” requesting the trial court “grant defendant access to courts by allowing him to utilize the law library provided by the county” in order to prepare future small claim lawsuits for filing and prosecute a pending small claim.  Johnston filed this petition for writ of mandamus complaining that the trial court “has refused to answer this motion.” 

            Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when no other adequate remedy by law is available.  State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. 1984).  Due to the nature of this remedy, it is Johnston’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to the mandamus relief.  See generally Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding); Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”).

            As the sole document included in his record, Johnston attached a file-marked copy of his motion, which contained a certificate of service requesting a copy of the motion be sent to the district judge.  Consideration of a motion that is properly filed and before the court is a ministerial act.  State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  However, Johnston must show that the trial court received, was aware of, and was asked to rule on the motion.  In re Grulkey, No. 14-10-00450-CV, 2010 WL 2171408, at *1 (Tex. App.––Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2010, orig. proceeding) (citing In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.––Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding)).  “Filing something with the district clerk’s office does not mean the trial court is aware of it; nor is the clerk’s knowledge imputed to the trial court.”  Id. (citing Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d at n.2); see also In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.––Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) (“Showing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court’s attention or presented to the trial court with a request for a ruling.”).   

            We deny Johnston’s petition for writ of mandamus.

                                                           

                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                        Justice

 

Date Submitted:          June 17, 2010

Date Decided:             June 18, 2010

 

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