IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
DECEMBER 21, 2001
______________________________
VICTOR L. JACKSON , APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 338TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY;
NO. 838752; HONORABLE ELSA ALCALA, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
On May 19, 2000, appellant Victor L. Jackson pled guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery without an agreed recommendation as to punishment. After a pre-sentence investigation was conducted, the court assessed punishment on July 31, 2000, at ten years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant gave timely notice of appeal from that conviction.
Appellant's appointed counsel has now filed a motion to withdraw together with an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). In that brief, she certifies that, after careful examination of the record, she has concluded that appellant's appeal is without merit. Along with her brief, she has attached a copy of a letter informing appellant of her intent to withdraw and of his right to file a pro se brief. Appellant filed several motions for extension of time to file his brief, and the last extension gave appellant 30 days from June 11, 2001, to file a brief. No such brief was ever filed, and the State has waived any remaining time in which to file its brief.
In considering federal constitutional matters of this type, we face two interrelated tasks as we consider counsel's motion to withdraw. We must satisfy ourselves that the attorney has provided the client with a diligent and thorough search of the record for any arguable claim that might support the client's appeal, and then we must determine whether counsel has correctly concluded the appeal is frivolous. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 100 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978).
Appellant waived the right to have a court reporter record his plea of guilty, so the only record before us shows that appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to trial by jury and pled guilty to the offense. The record also indicates he was properly admonished. Furthermore, at the sentencing hearing, appellant's counsel called several witnesses to the stand in an attempt to obtain probation for appellant. However, the court assessed punishment at ten years confinement, which was within the authorized range of punishment for the charged offense. Thus, we have made an independent examination of the record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support the appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Finding none, we are in agreement with counsel that the appeal is without merit and is therefore frivolous. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974).
Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.
John T. Boyd
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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NO. 07-10-00177-CV, 07-10-00178-CV, 07-10-00179-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
DECEMBER 10, 2010
KENNETH GLENN WEBB, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
NOS. 11,994-B, 18-617-B, 18-618-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
By order of this Court, dated May 27, 2010, each of the referenced causes were abated and remanded to the trial court for a period of 180 days to allow appellant, Kenneth Glenn Webb, time to take such action as necessary to establish that the appeals were not prematurely filed or to obtain final, appealable orders. To date, Webb has not established that the appeals were not prematurely filed nor has this Court been provided final, appealable orders. Consequently, we conclude that the notices of appeal filed by Webb in these causes were not appeals of final judgments or orders, that no statutory authority would permit Webb to file interlocutory appeals on these causes, and that we, therefore, lack jurisdiction to hear these appeals.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeals in the referenced causes are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice