NO. 07-02-0001-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
DECEMBER 3, 2002
______________________________
LEE ROY SANCHEZ, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
NO. B12346-9604; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ. and BOYD, S.J.*
Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant Lee Roy Sanchez was convicted of criminal
solicitation and punishment was assessed at five years confinement and a $750 fine,
suspended for five years. Upon the State’s motion, community supervision was revoked
for violations of conditions and terms thereof, and the original punishment was assessed.
*
John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.
In presenting this appeal, counsel has filed an Anders1 brief in support of a motion to
withdraw. Based upon the rationale expressed herein, the motion to withdraw is granted
and the judgment is affirmed.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel has certified that he has diligently
reviewed the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no reversible error or grounds
upon which an appeal can be predicated. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87
S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Thus, he concludes the appeal is frivolous and without
merit. In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), counsel
has discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there is no error in the court's
judgment. Counsel has also shown that he sent a copy of the brief to appellant, and
informed appellant that, in counsel's view, the appeal is without merit. In addition, counsel
has demonstrated that he notified appellant of his right to review the record and file a pro
se brief if he desired to do so. Appellant did not file a pro se brief; however, he did file a
“Motion for New Appointed Counsel.” The State did not favor us with a brief.
Appellant was convicted of criminal solicitation and placed on community
supervision in 1996. In 1998, upon the State’s motion to revoke, the trial court entered an
order continuing appellant’s community supervision to seven years with modifications to
the conditions thereto. On October 30, 2001, the State again filed a motion to revoke
alleging that appellant had failed to (1) report to his community supervision officer; (2)
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Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
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advise his community supervision officer of the correct address of his residence and place
of employment; (3) pay restitution; and (4) complete community service at the rate of at
least eight hours per month.
At the hearing on the State’s motion appellant plead true to the first allegation and
true to the second allegation only to instances after March 2001 and plead not true to the
third and fourth allegations. After being properly admonished, the trial court found that
appellant’s pleas of true were freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made. Appellant’s
community supervision officer testified that he had failed to report as directed since March
2001 until the date of the hearing held on December 10, 2001. She further testified that
he was delinquent in the amount of $400 in restitution payments and $320 in arrears in his
probation fees. Regarding the eight hours per month minimum of community service, the
officer testified that appellant had failed to complete eight hours for various months since
August 1998 through October 2001. On cross-examination, defense counsel showed
discrepancies in the community service hours performed.
Appellant testified and explained that after hearing the testimony of his community
supervision officer regarding restitution payments, he agreed with her figures
notwithstanding his plea of not true. He testified that due to personal problems and some
difficult times, he did not comply with the required conditions of community supervision
since March 2001. Following appellant’s testimony, the trial court revoked his community
supervision based on his pleas of true and the evidence presented.
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When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole question before
this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d
303, 305 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that appellant violated a condition of community
supervision. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993). Although one
sufficient ground for revocation supports the trial court’s order, Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d
924, 926 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980), a plea of true standing alone is sufficient to support the trial
court’s revocation order. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979).
Appellant’s community supervision officer presented evidence of the alleged
violations of community supervision and appellant plead true to two of the allegations. He
also testified that he agreed with the evidence presented establishing he was in arrears in
restitution payments. Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in revoking appellant’s community supervision and imposing the original
sentence.
The assistance of counsel is only guaranteed if this Court determines, after its own
separate inquiry, that nonfrivolous issues are presented in this appeal. See Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). Having found no nonfrivolous
issues after an independent examination of the entire record, we have reviewed the merits
of the appeal without the assistance of new counsel and find that the appeal is frivolous
and without merit. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974); Lacy v. State, 477
4
S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972). Thus, appellant’s pro se motion for appointment of
new counsel is overruled.
Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is hereby granted and the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
Do not publish.
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