NO. 07-02-0352-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 21, 2002
______________________________
DAVID MCKAY,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE 31ST DISTRICT COURT OF LIPSCOMB COUNTY;
NO. 1026; HON. STEVEN EMMERT, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Before QUINN, REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.
David McKay (appellant) appeals from an order revoking his community
supervision. He had originally been convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
via a plea bargain and plea of guilty. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced
to five years imprisonment. However, the sentence was suspended, and appellant was
placed on five years probation. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke probation.
Appellant pled true to various grounds stated in the motion and denied the others. The
trial court granted the motion, revoked appellant’s probation, and sentenced him to five
years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Appellant timely noticed his appeal, and counsel was appointed. Appellant’s
counsel then moved to withdraw, after filing a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and representing that he had searched
the record and found no arguable grounds for reversal. The motion and brief illustrated
that appellant was informed of his rights to review the appellate record and file his own
brief. So too did we inform appellant that any pro se response or brief he cared to file had
to be filed by November 14, 2002. To date, appellant has filed no pro se response or brief.
In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel discussed
four potential areas for appeal. Each concerned the courts decision to revoke his
community supervision. However, in posing the arguments, counsel also illustrated why
each was without merit.
Moreover, we conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether
there existed reversible error and found none. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring us to conduct an independent review). The record
illustrated that no appeal was taken within 30 days from the date of appellant’s guilty plea
and conviction complaining of error occurring at that time; thus, we have no jurisdiction
over any purported error arising from or prior to the plea hearing. Manuel v. State, 944
S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001). Furthermore, finding that any one ground warranting revocation existed,
the trial court was entitled to revoke his community supervision. Moore v. State, 605
2
S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). Here, appellant pled true to two of the four
grounds contained in the motion to revoke. Standing alone, a plea of true is sufficient to
support the trial court's order of revocation. Hatten v. State, 71 S.W.3d 332, 335 n.2 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). Thus, the appellate record contained evidence supporting the decision
to revoke probation. Furthermore, the punishment levied was within the range provided
by statute and agreed to by the parties.
Accordingly, counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Brian Quinn
Justice
Do not publish.
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