NO. 07-02-0439-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
SEPTEMBER 3, 2003
______________________________
SHANON LEE THOMAS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF ARMSTRONG COUNTY;
NO. 2538; HONORABLE HUGH REED, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1
In presenting one question of law for our decision, appellant Shanon Lee Thomas
contends his conviction of the Class C Misdemeanor offense of speeding must be
reversed. His complaint and challenge are based upon the State’s failure to file a formal
1
John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
complaint before trial de novo in the County Court of Armstrong County. Disagreeing that
reversal is required, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The underlying facts and the procedural history of this case are undisputed. On
December 24, 2001, appellant was driving on a public highway in Armstrong County when
he was stopped by a Department of Public Safety Trooper. As a result of the stop, the
trooper issued a citation, charging that appellant was driving 95 miles per hour in an area
with a posted speed limit of 70 miles per hour.
In the justice court, appellant appeared by counsel, who filed a written nolo
contendere plea. Contemporaneously with the plea, counsel filed an appeal bond seeking
appeal to the Armstrong County Court. When the case was called for trial in the county
court, appellant unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the prosecution on the basis that the
State had never filed a complaint or information meeting the requirements of article 45.019
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). At trial, the only testimony produced was
that of the trooper. At the conclusion of the bench trial, appellant was assessed a fine of
$200 and court costs.
In support of his sole point of error, appellant initially cites article 27.14(d) of the
Code. That article provides that for a misdemeanor offense for which the maximum
punishment is a fine, written notice of an offense “serves as a complaint to which the
defendant may plead ‘guilty,’ ‘not guilty,’ or ‘nolo contendere.’” However, the article goes
on to provide that if the defendant pleads not guilty, “a complaint shall be filed that
2
conforms to the requirements of Chapter 45 of this Code, and that complaint serves as an
original complaint.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 27.14(d) (Vernon Pamph. 2003).
Appellant argues that because of his not guilty plea in the county court, the requirement of
a complaint meeting the requirements of Chapter 45 became operative. In responding, the
State concedes that the county court erred in proceeding to trial without a complaint
meeting Chapter 45 requirements, but it contends the error was harmless
In support of his proposition that reversal is required, appellant cites two cases,
namely, State v. Campbell, 820 S.W.2d 44 (Tex.App.–Austin 1991, pet. ref’d), and State
v. Shaw, 822 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.App.–Austin 1992, no pet.). That reliance requires a
discussion of the two cases. In each case, the State was appealing a dismissal by the
county court at law of a speeding charge upon which the appellant had been found guilty
in the justice court. In Campbell, the county court at law had reversed and dismissed the
cause because of perceived deficiencies in the justice court’s judgment. In reversing that
dismissal, the appellate court held that when Campbell appealed the justice court judgment
against him, he “stood before the county court at law as if the prosecution began in that
court, unaffected by what might have happened in the justice court.” Thus, the justice court
judgment was a nullity and any deficiencies in that judgment did not matter. 820 S.W.2d
at 45.
In Shaw, the defendant moved for dismissal of the de novo trial in the county court
at law on the basis that no complaint meeting the requisites of the progenitor of present
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Chapter 45 of the Code2 had been filed in the justice court at the time the defendant pled
nolo contendere in that court. The appellate court reversed the dismissal because
“appellee (the defendant) pleaded no contest, the requirement that a formal complaint was
never triggered . . .” 822 S.W.2d at 809.3 Thus, the Shaw court’s relevant holding here
was that the procedure concerning the necessity for a complaint in the justice court carried
forward to the trial de novo in the county court. Neither of these decisions support
appellant’s argument and indeed militate against it.
We agree with the interpretation given the statute by the Austin court. By filing his
nolo contendere plea, appellant obviated the necessity for the filing of a formal complaint
by the State. Therefore, under this record, there is no reversible error.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
John T. Boyd
Senior Justice
Do not publish.
2
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1977).
3
But see, Tex. Atty Gen.Op. JM-869 (1988).
4