IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JULY 11, 2003
______________________________DAVID LLOYD CECIL,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee _________________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 45515-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING _______________________________
Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.
Appellant David Lloyd Cecil appeals his conviction of aggravated sexual assault. His court-appointed counsel has moved to withdraw after filing a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and representing she has searched the record and found no arguable grounds for reversal. The motion and brief indicate that appellant was informed of his rights to review the appellate record and file his own brief. So too did we inform appellant that any pro se response or brief he cared to file had to be filed by June 30, 2003. To date, appellant has filed no pro se response or brief.
In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel discussed one potential area for appeal which concerned the denial of appellant's motion to suppress his statement because it was involuntary. The statement was taken at a mental health facility (the Pavilion) after appellant had told his wife and his daughter that he had been having inappropriate sexual contact with his granddaughter and had also acted in a manner which caused his wife to fear he was suicidal. However, counsel explained that there is nothing in the record to indicate that he was threatened or promised anything by law enforcement officers in return for his confession or that his statement was anything other than voluntary. There was also a determination that he was competent to stand trial.
So too have we conducted an independent review of the record to determine whether there existed reversible error and found none. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring us to conduct an independent review). A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine that the child victim could testify via closed circuit television, and there was evidence that the procedure was necessary to protect the welfare of the child, the child would be traumatized by facing her grandfather in the courtroom as opposed to the courtroom generally, and the emotional distress suffered by the child would be more than mere nervousness. See Dufrene v. State, 853 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). There were also no objections to the jury charge, and we have found no egregious harm. Further, the punishment assessed was within that prescribed by law, and the law permits the cumulation of appellant's sentence in this cause with that for another offense arising out of the same criminal episode. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §3.03(b)(2)(A) (Vernon 2003).
Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Brian Quinn
Justice
Do not publish.
rthermore, the standard of review on appeal is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Id.
A person commits the offense of money laundering if he knowingly acquires or maintains an interest in, receives, conceals, possesses, transfers, or transports the proceeds of criminal activity. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 34.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2005). "Criminal activity" means any offense classified as a felony under Texas or federal law or any offense under the laws of another state punishable by confinement for more than one year. § 34.01(1). In the case before us, the indictment alleged appellant knowingly possessed proceeds of criminal activity, to-wit: possession or delivery of a controlled substance or marijuana, and that the value of said funds was $3,000 or more but less than $20,000.
Analysis
At the time of the detention, appellant exhibited an extreme state of nervousness before the request for permission to search the vehicle was granted. Further, the record shows that appellant had, in his possession, currency of the value of $6,100. Officers testified that possession of marijuana with a street value of $6,100 would be a felony. Appellant's explanation for possession of the cash was that he had just sold a vehicle, yet when asked, appellant could not provide documentation of the sale. Additionally, two officers testified that the currency emitted a strong odor of marijuana and was packaged, based upon their experience and training, in a manner consistent with proceeds of a drug transaction. A K-9 officer testified that the drug dog used in this case was trained to alert to the presence of several drugs including marijuana, and that the dog did, in fact, alert on the currency.
Although, all of the evidence regarding the currency's origin was circumstantial, that evidence is sufficient to prove an actor guilty of the offense alleged. Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49. Based upon this evidence we cannot say that a rational jury could not have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Ross, 133 S.W.3d at 620. Accordingly, appellant's issue is overruled.
ConclusionHaving overruled appellant's sole issue, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.