IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 02-20191
Summary Calendar
__________________________
B JOE THOMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
___________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas, Houston
(No. H-02-MC-4)
___________________________________________________
September 19, 2002
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
The district court issued an order removing B. Joe Thomson
(Thomson) from the federal courthouse in Houston, Texas, and
barring his re-entry without permission. The court entered the
order sua sponte and independent of any pending case or
controversy. Thomson argues on appeal that the order is void
because the court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction
to issue it. He also argues the order violated his constitutional
right to due process and his First Amendment right to free speech.
Thomson further alleges the district court judge abused his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
discretion by not recusing himself because of bias and prejudice.
For the reasons below, we remand for the district court to hold a
hearing for Thomson to show cause why he should not be barred from
the courthouse.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Thomson is a homeless attorney who frequented the law library
and attorney lounge of the federal courthouse in Houston. The
district court, independent of any pending case or controversy,
entered the following order sua sponte:
It is hereby ORDERED that B. Joe Thomson shall not enter the
United States Courthouse located 515 Rusk, Houston, Texas,
unless he first presents to the United States Marshals Service
documentation indicating, written permission to enter signed
by a United States District Judge. He shall then be escorted
by a Deputy United States Marshal or Court Security Officer to
conduct such business as approved by said United States
District Judge. This Order shall be strictly enforced by the
United States Marshals Service....
The order appears as the first item on the docket sheet for a case
captioned Thomson v. No Defendant Named, civil docket number 02-MC-
4. The case was closed on the same day the order was signed.
Thomson learned of the order when three United States marshals
removed him from the courthouse.
Thomson wrote to the court seeking an opportunity to be heard
regarding the order and enumerating the hardships it caused.
The court then requested certificates of good standing from
each of the state bars in which Thomson was licensed to practice
law. Thomson fulfilled the request by submitting a letter from the
2
Supreme Court of Texas showing he was suspended from practicing law
for failure to pay the Texas Attorney Occupation Tax.
Thomson next filed a motion for permission to appeal in forma
pauperis which was initially denied but later granted after
Thomson’s motion to reconsider. Thomson also filed an
“affidavit/unsworn declaration” seeking recusal.
The court then issued a supplemental order containing reasons
for the original order. As the result of a high volume of phone
calls from Thomson, the court further ordered Thomson to not
contact the judge’s chambers or case manager.
Thomson argues the order is void because the district court
lacked both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over him. He
complains the order violated due process because it was entered
without notice. He further argues exclusion from the courthouse
infringes his First Amendment right to free speech. Thomson also
alleges the district court judge was biased and prejudiced.
Specifically, Thomson accuses the judge of entering the order with
the intent to prevent Thomson from using the law library and
computers at the time Thomson was appealing an adverse ruling from
the same judge in an unrelated case.
II. Analysis
Thomson first contends the district court was without
jurisdiction to enter the order barring him from the courthouse.
We disagree. The Supreme Court has noted: “‘Courts of justice are
3
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with
power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence,
and submission to their lawful mandates.’” Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1990)(citations omitted). “These powers are
‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Id.(citations
omitted). The full litany of administrative decisions made by
district judges in their official capacities relating to, inter
alia, facilities, equipment, and security, are unquestionably
within the power of district judges and are not, in the ordinary
situation, even susceptible to appellate review. In re Rini 782
F.2d 603, 606 (6th Cir. 1986).
Thomson claims the lack of procedure surrounding the issuance
of the order violated his right to due process. Few cases address
what process is due to patrons of a courthouse library before they
are barred from the courthouse by judicial order. In a recent
unpublished case from the District of Arizona, Jimenez, plaintiff
in a lawsuit, engaged in harassment and abusive conduct towards the
staff of the clerk’s office. Jimenez v. Coca-Cola Co., 2001 WL
1654802 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2001). Consequently, the chief deputy
clerk issued a memorandum placing four conditions on Jimenez’s
contact with the court. After further abusive behavior, the court
ordered Jimenez to show cause why he should not be permanently
4
barred from personally visiting the courthouse or making telephone
calls to the clerk’s office. After witnesses testified of the
abusive conduct, the court, relying on Chambers, ultimately barred
Jimenez from the courthouse. Jimenez demonstrates that Thomson is
entitled to a hearing before being barred from the courthouse by
judicial order.
This court reviews the denial of a motion for recusal for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. MMR Corp., 954 F.2d 1040,
1044 (5th Cir. 1992)(28 U.S.C. § 144); United States v. Harrelson,
754 F.2d 1153, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985)(28 U.S.C. § 455). Motions
brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 are substantively similar
and both require recusal only for “personal, extrajudicial bias.”
MMR Corp., 954 F.2d at 1045-46. Thomson has not shown any
extrajudicial bias on the part of the district judge, and as a
consequence, has not shown that the judge abused his discretion in
denying the motion to recuse or the motion for reconsideration.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we remand for the district court to
order Thomson to show cause why he should not be barred from the
courthouse in the future.
5