NO. 07-03-0095-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
APRIL 22, 2004
______________________________
LINDMAN WILLIAMS OPDYKE, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
NO. B11976-9503; HON. ED SELF, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. 1
This is an appeal from the revocation of community supervision (probation) originally
granted appellant Lindman Williams Opdyke. On August 16, 1995, appellant pled guilty to
the offense of robbery and was sentenced to a ten year probated term in the Institutional
Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000. On December
17, 2002, upon his plea of true to the allegations contained in the State’s motion to revoke
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John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment.
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
probation, appellant was sentenced to ten years confinement. From this conviction,
appellant gave a timely notice of appeal.
Appellant’s appellate counsel has now filed an Anders brief with this court in which
he states he has thoroughly examined the trial record and determined the appeal to be
without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d
493 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 809-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Appellant
indicates that he has mailed a copy of the brief to appellant. He has also asked to be
allowed to withdraw from the case.
On November 7, 2003, our clerk notified appellant of our receipt of the Anders brief
and counsel’s motion to withdraw and that appellant had a right to respond to the brief. By
letter dated November 25, 2003, appellate counsel certified that he had forwarded to
appellant his copy of the record and enclosed appellant’s pro se motion for extension of
time within which to file a pro se brief. Appellant’s motion to extend was granted and the
time within which he might file his pro se brief was extended to January 5, 2004. However,
we have not received a pro se brief or any further motions seeking an extension of time
within which to file such a brief.
Before allowing counsel to withdraw, we must first satisfy ourselves that the attorney
has provided the client with a diligent and thorough search of the record for any arguable
claim that might support the client’s appeal, and then we must determine whether counsel
has correctly concluded the appeal is frivolous. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988). We have also
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made an independent examination of the record to determine whether there are any
arguable grounds that might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83, 109
S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991). We have found no such ground and agree with counsel that this appeal is without
merit and is frivolous. Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed and counsel’s motion to
withdraw is granted.
John T. Boyd
Senior Justice
Do not publish.
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