State v. Miguel Gonzales Torres

NO. 07-04-0106-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS



FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS



AT AMARILLO



PANEL B



APRIL 2, 2004

______________________________



THE STATE OF TEXAS,



Appellant



v.



MIGUEL GONZALES TORRES,



Appellee

_________________________________



FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;



NO. B14340-0202; HON. ED SELF, PRESIDING

_______________________________



Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and CAMPBELL, JJ.

Appellant The State of Texas, by and through its attorney, has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal because the State has no right to appeal since it had already been dismissed on the State's motion. Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2) and dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at appellant's request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Brian Quinn

Justice

Do not publish.

NO. 07-09-0209-CR

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

AT AMARILLO

 

PANEL B

 

JULY 21, 2010

 

 

EUGENE THOMAS,  

 

                                                                                         Appellant

v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 

                                                                                         Appellee

_____________________________

 

FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

 

NO. 57,836-A; HONORABLE HAL MINER, PRESIDING

 

 

Anders Opinion

 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL  and HANCOCK, JJ.

            Eugene Thomas was convicted, after a jury trial, of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated.  His punishment was enhanced by a prior conviction, and he was sentenced to confinement for nine years. 

            Appellant’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with an Anders brief,[1] wherein he certifies that, after diligently searching the record, he has concluded that appellant’s appeal is without merit.  Along with his brief, he has filed a copy of a letter sent to appellant informing him of counsel’s belief that there was no reversible error and of appellant’s right to file a brief or response pro se.  By letter dated January 8, 2010, this court also notified appellant of his right to file his own response by February 8, 2010, if he wished to do so.  Appellant timely filed a response in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not letting him testify at trial[2] and in failing to object to testimony of the State’s main witness.

In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel discussed several potential areas for appeal.  They include:  1) the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, 2) the effectiveness of trial counsel, 3) the excessiveness of appellant’s punishment, and 4) possible error in the admission of a trial exhibit.  However, counsel discussed the applicable law and represented that he analyzed the facts of this case within the context of that law and determined that no reversible error existed.                  

We have also conducted our own review of the record to assess the accuracy of appellate counsel’s conclusions and to uncover any reversible error pursuant to Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), along with appellant’s response, and concluded the same.

 

 

 

Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is granted and the judgment is affirmed.[3]

 

                                                                                    Brian Quinn

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Do not publish.



[1]See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

[2]Appellant testified at trial, outside the presence of the jury, that he had discussed with his counsel whether he should testify and that he (appellant) felt like “it’s best for me not to testify.” 

[3]Appellant has the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review from this opinion.