in Re Timothy Hembree

NO. 07-05-0320-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

SEPTEMBER 23, 2005

______________________________

IN RE TIMOTHY HEMBREE, RELATOR

_______________________________



Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

By this original proceeding, relator Timothy Hembree, acting pro se, (1) seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the judge of the 31st District Court of Gray County to dismiss a detainer filed against relator with the Oklahoma Corrections Department, resulting from relator's indictment in cause number 6444 in the 31st District Court of Gray County, Texas. We dismiss the petition.

Rule 52.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure prescribes the mandatory contents of a petition for mandamus. Specifically, relator has failed to comply with subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h) and (j) of Rule 52.3.

Thus, because relator has not complied with the requirements of Rule 52 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this proceeding. (2)





Mackey K. Hancock

Justice





1. -

2. Further, while relator makes reference to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.] art. 51.14 (Vernon 1979), neither the facts recited in his petition nor the uncertified documents appended to it reflect that he has complied with the requirements of that Act. In fact, one of the exhibits appended to relator's petition appears to be a memorandum to relator, dated August 12, 2005, from a correctional officer of the Oklahoma institution in which he apparently is incarcerated, in which the officer offers to assist him with the "paperwork" required under the Act. For that reason, also, relator has not demonstrated entitlement to the writ he seeks from this court. See Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).

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NO. 07-08-0454-CR

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

AT AMARILLO

 

PANEL B

 

FEBRUARY 25, 2010

 

_________________________

 

JAMES MICHAEL FIELDS, APPELLANT

 

V.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 

_________________________

 

FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;

 

NO. B17234-0705; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE

 

___________________________

 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

 

 

MEMORANDUM  OPINION

 

 

A jury convicted appellant, James Michael Fields, of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child.1  On each count, it sentenced him to sixty years in prison and a $10,000 fine.  The sentences are concurrent.  Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.  His court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw from representation supported by an Anders2 brief.  We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

            In the Anders brief supporting his motion to withdraw, appellant’s court-appointed counsel analyzed the evidence adduced at trial.  He advanced a potential legal and factual sufficiency issue but concluded after reviewing the entire record and conducting research the case presents no reversible error and in his opinion the appeal is frivolous.  Attached to counsel’s motion to withdraw was a copy of a letter from him to appellant transmitting the motion to withdraw and the Anders brief and notifying appellant of the right to file a pro se response.  The letter also notified appellant how to obtain a copy of the record.  See Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641, 646-47 (Tex.App.–Waco 1994, pet. refused), modified in part by Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.App.–Waco 1997, no pet.).  This court also advised appellant by letter of his right to file a response to counsel’s Anders brief.  Appellant did not file a pro se response.

            When court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw and a brief in which he concludes no arguable grounds for appeal exist, we review the entire record and make an independent determination.  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400 (the appellate court, and not counsel, after full examination of the record, determines whether the case is “wholly frivolous”); accord Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Mitchell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).  If, from our review of the entire record, we find arguable grounds for appeal, we will abate the appeal, remand the case to the trial court, and allow withdrawal of court-appointed counsel. Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826-27; Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 156.  If we determine from our review of the entire record that the appeal is wholly frivolous, we may affirm the trial court’s judgment by issuing an opinion explaining that we reviewed the record and found no arguable grounds for appeal.  Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826-27; Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 156.  An appellant may challenge a court of appeals’ finding of no arguable grounds for appeal by a petition for discretionary review filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827 & n.6; Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 156.

            After reviewing counsel’s Anders brief, we reviewed the entire record.  We find no arguable grounds for appeal.  Accordingly, the motion of appellant’s counsel to withdraw is granted3 and the judgments are affirmed.

            It is so ordered.

 

                                                                                                James T. Campbell

                                                                                                            Justice

 

 

Do not publish.

 

 

 

 

 



1 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2009).

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (sole purpose of Anders brief is to explain and support counsel’s motion to withdraw).

3 Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send his client a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with notification of the defendant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4.