NO. 07-03-0307-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
MAY 2, 2005
______________________________
MABEL WALTER ROGERS, LARRY FRANK WALTER, co-trustee, ROBERT
WAYNE VEIGEL, co-trustee, DOROTHY ANN VEIGEL OSWALD
and JO ANN VEIGEL EUDY,
Appellants
v.
IN RE: ARDELLA VEIGEL INTER VIVOS TRUST NO. 2,
AMARILLO NATIONAL BANK, AMARILLO, TEXAS, co-trustee,
Appellees
_________________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 84,743-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING
_______________________________
On Motion for Rehearing
_______________________________
Before JOHNSON, C.J., and QUINN and REAVIS, JJ.
Pending before us is the motion for rehearing of Mabel Walter Rogers, Larry Frank Walter, co-trustee, Robert Wayne Veigel, co-trustee, Dorothy Ann Veigel Oswald, and Jo Ann Veigel Eudy (collectively referred to as the Veigels). Though the Veigels asserted several grounds in their motion, we address only one. It concerns our holding that consideration of §114.061(b) of the Texas Property Code was moot. We so held because the provision encompassed trusts, not life estates, and the wills in question created life estates. Yet, on rehearing, the Veigels contend that they were also attempting to recoup trustee's fees received by the bank from various inter vivos trusts. While this may have been true when the parties were in the trial court, it is not true at bar. Their first issue discussed §114.061(b) in relation to the testamentary trust supposedly created by Charles Veigel. Nothing was said about the inter vivos trusts. Having omitted that argument from their appellants' brief, they cannot now raise it on rehearing. Story Services, Inc. v. Ramirez, 863 S.W.2d 491, 505-06 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied) (holding that new issues or points of error cannot be raised on a motion for rehearing).
Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is denied.
Per Curiam (1)
1.
coration: underline">Anders brief and motion to withdraw and appropriately advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response in this matter. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). The court has also advised appellant of his right to file a pro se response. Appellant has in fact filed a response and further filed a document he denominates as an application for writ of habeas corpus.
We have made an independent review of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support an appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We have found no such grounds.
Additionally, we have reviewed appellant’s pro se response and other documents appellant has filed in connection with this case. All of the purported arguable grounds put forth by appellant would have this court go behind the governor’s warrant. The record before us contains no irregularities and, as such, is prima facie proof to the allegations contained therein. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S. Ct. 530, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1978). There was no contest at the writ hearing about the identity of appellant as the person named in the governor’s warrant. Appellant alleges that he was not timely brought before the trial court, alleging that more than 90 days transpired before the hearing on the writ was conducted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.07 (Vernon 2006). However, appellant failed to take into consideration the provision that allows a person, once released on bond under provisions of article 51.07, to be subsequently arrested upon the issuance of a governor’s warrant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.08 (Vernon 2006). The record affirmatively reflects that the above procedure was followed. Accordingly, we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous.
Therefore, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order of the trial court.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.