IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
APRIL 14, 2005
______________________________ROBERT W. PAIGE, M.D.,
Appellant
v.
SPROUSE, SMITH & ROWLEY, P.C. F/K/A SPROUSE, MOZOLA, SMITH & ROWLEY, P.C. AND JOHN MOZOLA,
Appellees _________________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 88,858-E; HON. ABE LOPEZ, PRESIDING _______________________________
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
_______________________________
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J. (1)
Kent Ries, trustee for the bankruptcy estate of appellant Robert W. Paige, M.D., and Sprouse, Smith & Rowley, P.C., f/k/a Sprouse, Mozola, Smith & Rowley, P.C., and John Mozola, appellees, by and through their attorneys, have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal with prejudice because the parties have fully compromised and settled all issues in dispute and neither desire to pursue the appeal. Without passing on the merits of the case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2) and dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at the parties' request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.
Brian Quinn
Justice
1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
hideWhenUsed="true" DefSemiHidden="true" DefQFormat="false" DefPriority="99" LatentStyleCount="267">
NO. 07-09-00395-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
SEPTEMBER 8, 2010
NORMAN CECIL DONOVAN, APPELLANT
v.
DANIEL R. BECK, ET AL, APPELLEES
FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2009-548,685; HONORABLE LESLIE HATCH, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Norman Cecil Donovan, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial courts December 3, 2009 order of dismissal of his claims as frivolous, pursuant to chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. We dismiss.
On January 13, 2010, Donovan filed a document with this Court entitled Plaintiffs Appellant Deprivation of Due Process Laws Day in Court on Discriminatory Laws, in which Donovan made no citations to the record and cited no legal authority. Because of the documents numerous deficiencies, it was not construed by this Court to be Donovans appellate brief. As such, by letter dated May 13, 2010, this Court notified Donovan that his appellate brief was past due and directed him to file his brief on or before May 24, 2010. On May 24, 2010, Donovan filed a duplicate of the January 13, 2010 document. Upon realizing that Donovan intended this document to be his appellate brief, by letter dated May 27, 2010, this Court notified Donovan that his brief was deficient[1] and directed him to correct the deficiencies and re-file his brief on or before June 25, 2010. When Donovan failed to comply with the June 25 deadline, this Court notified Donovan of his failure and informed him that his corrected brief must be filed by August 9, 2010, or his appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution. See id. at 42.3(b). Despite two notices and a reasonable time in which to comply with this Courts directive, Donovan has failed to file a corrected brief or in any way respond.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with a deadline set by the Clerk of this Court. See id. at 42.3(b)(c).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
[1] The Courts May 27, 2010 letter identified the deficiencies in Donovans brief as follows:
The brief is deficient in that it wholly fails to include the following:
a. Identity of parties and counsel;
b. Table of contents;
c. Index of authorities;
d. Statement of the case;
e. Issues presented;
f. Statement of facts; and
g. Prayer.
See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (j). Further, the brief does not include any references to the record nor does it include any citations to authority. See id. at 38.1(d), (g), (i). Finally, the argument is indecipherable and appellant does not clearly state the nature of the relief sought. See id. at 38.1(i), (j).