IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
FEBRUARY 1, 2005
______________________________
ARTHUR RAY WILLIAMS, APPELLANT
V.
REGIONAL ISLAMIC CHAPLAIN TALIB, ET AL., APPELLEES
_________________________________
FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
NO. 48692-C; HONORABLE PATRICK A. PIRTLE, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONAppellant Arthur Ray Williams an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, initiated legal action on July 3, 2000, against appellees for, among other causes, civil rights violations. Williams filed and signed numerous pleadings; however, as early as September 14, 2000, inmate Herbert Feist began signing pleadings for Williams. On December 6, 2004, this Court received a notice of appeal signed by Feist complaining of the trial court's order of dismissal for want of prosecution dated August 18, 2004. On December 27, 2004, this Court received a letter from Feist referencing a second attempt to appeal. This Court notified Feist by letter dated January 5, 2005, that the notice of appeal appeared untimely and requested a response. Feist responded insisting that a timely notice had been filed on November 8, 2004. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
A review of the clerk's record filed on January 5, 2005, does not contain a notice of appeal allegedly filed on November 8, 2004. However, it does contain a notice of appeal signed by Williams and filed on February 13, 2003, complaining of the trial court's order to appear on January 24, 2003, noting that failure to appeal would result in dismissal. Rule 27.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal. Thus, we conclude our jurisdiction was invoked by Williams's premature notice.
This appeal is now being pursued by Feist. A person who is not a licensed attorney is not permitted to represent anyone other than himself. 7 Tex. Jur.3d Attorneys At Law § 108 (1997). The Texas Legislature mandates that a person who is not a member of the State Bar may not practice law. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 81.102(a) (Vernon 1998). However, section 81.102(b) provides that the Supreme Court of Texas may promulgate rules for the limited practice of law by (1) attorneys licensed in another jurisdiction; (2) bona fide law students; and (3) unlicensed graduate students who are attending or have attended a law school approved by the Supreme Court. The Legislature defines the practice of law, among other things, as the preparation of a pleading or other document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court. § 81.101(a).
On March 19, 2001, Feist filed a motion to intervene in Williams's suit contending he was a necessary party as the unit Islamic leader. However, there is no order from the trial court granting his request. Feist has not demonstrated he was a party to the underlying case nor that he falls within any of the categories of persons who are permitted to practice law. As such, he has no authority to pursue this appeal on Williams's behalf. See Jimison by Parker v. Mann, 957 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ) (per curiam); see also Magaha v. Holmes, 886 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.13 (Vernon 1977) (providing that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be signed by any person).
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
" Name="Emphasis"/>
NO. 07-10-00457-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 16, 2010
VANESSA ORNELAS, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 60,409-D; HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On June 10, 2010, appellant, Vanessa Ornelas, was convicted of committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in a drug-free zone, and sentenced to incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, for a period of five years. On November 4, 2010, appellant filed her notice of appeal with the trial court.[1] We dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Unless a defendant timely files a motion for new trial, a defendant must file a written notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within 30 days after the date sentence is imposed. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a). Therefore, appellants notice of appeal was due on July 12, 2010. Because appellants notice of appeal was filed 114 days after it was due, this Court is without jurisdiction over this appeal. See Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Because this Court is without jurisdiction to address the merits of this appeal, we have no authority to take any action other than to dismiss the appeal. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
Accordingly, the purported appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.[2]
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
[1] Appellant filed a letter addressed to the Honorable Don R. Emerson that indicates that appellant desires to appeal and that complies with the requirements of a notice of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(c). This Court has deemed this letter to be a notice of appeal.
[2] Appellant may have recourse by filing a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for consideration of an out-of-time appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2010).