IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
JULY 27, 2006
______________________________
LESLIE C. CHEW, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________
FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2006-411688; HONORABLE BRADLEY S. UNDERWOOD, JUDGE _______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINIONPursuant to a plea of guilty, appellant Leslie C. Chew was convicted of theft, in an amount less than $1,500, enhanced by two prior convictions, and punishment was assessed at 18 months incarceration in a state jail facility. Proceeding pro se, appellant filed notice of appeal challenging the conviction.
We have received a certification of right of appeal by which the trial court certified that the underlying case was a plea-bargain case with no right of appeal. By letter, dated June 1, 2006, this Court notified appellant that the certification indicated that he had no right of appeal. In this letter, we further notified appellant that the appeal was subject to dismissal unless he provided this Court with an amended certification providing that he has the right of appeal or otherwise demonstrates that there exists other grounds for continuing the appeal by June 16, 2006. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); Stowe v. State, 124 S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.). No amended certification reflecting a right to appeal has been filed and appellant has failed to demonstrate other grounds for continuing the appeal. (1)
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
1. Appellant did file a letter with this Court requesting that the appeal be continued. However, this letter fails to identify any appellate issues relating to matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial nor did it identify any efforts by the appellant to obtain the trial court's permission to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). A pro se defendant is held to the same standard as any attorney who represents a defendant. See Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
been disturbed. Yet, investigation revealed black pry marks on a back door by the locks, and a pry bar or tire iron was found on the front seat of appellant's truck. The bar had "black all over it" according to the prosecutor who warned others against handling it excessively. So too had the tip of the tool been modified, according to an officer, in a way to give it more bite when used as a prying device.
The owners of the residence were out of town at the time of the incident but returned later that same day. They discovered that someone had indeed been in their house and that a Visa debit card and several checks were missing. The homeowner also testified that he had engaged both the dead bolt and door knob lock before leaving but that only the door knob lock was engaged when he returned home.
None of the items missing from the house were found on appellant or in the truck. Nonetheless, someone charged items to the debit card later that day and at a time when appellant was in jail. The person who made the charges went unidentified.
Assault on a Public Servant
We initially address whether the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction for assaulting a public servant. The thrust of appellant's complaint focused on whether he knew the person he was assaulting was a police officer. We overrule the issue.
The record contains evidence illustrating that Ponder wore a shirt with a police emblem on it and carried a badge on his belt at the time he initially encountered appellant. Further, the area of the initial encounter was well lit, according to the officer. The officer also testified that while he was being assaulted by appellant, he identified himself as an officer; this did not dissuade appellant for the assault continued both when the two grappled while afoot and when appellant (when sitting in the truck) grabbed the officer's arm and threatened to "cut" him.
One is presumed to know that he assaulted a public servant if the victim was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating the person's employment as a public servant. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §22.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 2007). While Officer Ponder was not adorned in the standard or stereotypic police uniform at the time, the emblem on his shirt coupled with the presence of his badge and service weapon could reasonably be likened to distinctive items identifying him as an officer. To this we had the evidence that he identified himself to appellant as an officer while being assaulted. Combined, this is some evidence from which a rational factfinder could conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant knew he was assaulting an officer.
Though appellant contradicted much of what Ponder said and proclaimed that he did not know that Ponder was an officer, that simply raised credibility and factual issues for the factfinder to resolve. We cannot say that the manner in which they were resolved was so against the great weight of the evidence or supported by weak evidence as to undermine our confidence in that finding. Consequently, the verdict had the support of both legally and factually sufficient evidence.
Burglary of a Habitation
Next, we address the conviction for burglarizing a habitation. According to appellant, he believed the evidence was deficient since it did not place him within the home. While resolution of this issue is more problematic, we, nonetheless, overrule it.
That burglary can be proven solely through circumstantial evidence is a well-settled proposition. Gilbertson v. State, 563 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). It is also true that the element of entry can be established by inference. Blevins v. State, 6 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, pet. ref'd).
Here, we have evidence that the debit card and checks were present when the homeowners left on vacation and were missing when they returned. To this we add appellant's admission that he was in need of money to buy gas for his truck, that he drove through the area and down the particular alley in search of gas to steal or items from which gas could be obtained. And, though he initially suggested that he was willing to ask people he encountered while going through the area for money, he ran from the only person he met. Moreover, he was cognizant of the art of burglarizing homes given his prior conviction for the same. (1) So too did he have a tool that could be used to gain entrance through locked doors readily available on (rather than under or behind) the seat of his truck and that tool had been modified to facilitate forced entry. Most importantly, the tool had a black substance on it that apparently left black residue, and black residue was found in the pry marks (which marks were not present when the homeowners left). Finally, no one else was found at the scene.
Appellant's having a need for money, his picking a particular area for the purpose of committing some theft late at night, his possession of a pry bar or tire iron suitable and adapted for committing burglary, his presence at the scene when the burglar alarm sounded, the evidence that the burglar alarm was set to trigger when someone entered through a door or window, the similarity in color between the residue emitted from the tire iron and found in the pry marks, his attempt to flee when confronted, the absence of evidence indicating that anyone else was present, and the absence of items from the house constitute some evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant entered the abode.
That none of the missing items were found on his person or in the truck is troubling, as is the evidence that the debit card was used by someone while appellant sat in jail and that the doors were locked. (2) While this suggests that someone other than appellant acquired at least one of the stolen items, it does not necessarily disprove his entry into the abode. Indeed, it could be that during the chase appellant was discarding the items taken and that the debit card was later found by someone else. Admittedly, this possibility went undeveloped at trial. So too was it possible that someone else was with appellant at the time for Officer Ponder stated that such a person would have had enough time to leave while the officer gave chase and fought with appellant. Be that as it may, neither proposition finds support in the record; yet because they are potential logical explanations of how someone other than appellant was using the card, we cannot say that evidence of someone else using it requires one to infer that someone other than appellant committed the burglary. Use of the card by a third party is a piece of the puzzle that does not readily fit but it does not prevent a viewer from nonetheless recognizing the picture displayed by the remaining pieces.
Nor can we say that the fact that the doors were locked causes great concern. Testimony appears of record indicating that though a door is pried open, it can often be closed and locked after the forced entry. And, while appellant contradicted much of what Officer Ponder said, that simply raised questions of fact and credibility for the factfinder to resolve. In toto, we cannot say these circumstances were of such import so as to undermine our confidence in the verdict, especially in view of appellant's possessing burglary implements, his avowed need for money and intent to commit theft, his effort to flee, his presence at the scene and near the time the alarm sounded, and the similarity between the residue on the door and on the tire tool. Thus, we conclude that the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction of burglary of a habitation.
Having overruled appellant's issues, we affirm the judgments.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
1. While evidence of prior bad acts or convictions cannot normally be used to support an inference of
guilt, this testimony came in without objection. And, when that occurs, the evidence is deemed admitted for
all purposes. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
2. An officer testified that the usual modus operandi for burglars was to leave doors open when they
left the scene.