IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
JUNE 20, 2006
______________________________
CAROLYN PACE, APPELLANT
V.
BAPTIST ST. ANTHONY'S HOSPITAL CORPORATION, D/B/A BAPTIST ST. ANTHONY'S HEALTH SYSTEM-BAPTIST CAMPUS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 90,563-C; HONORABLE PATRICK PIRTLE, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a jury trial, appellant Carolyn Pace appeals from a judgment that she take nothing against Baptist St. Anthony's Hospital Corporation, d/b/a Baptist St. Anthony's Health System-Baptist Campus, for personal injuries. By a single point of error, she contends the trial court erred in granting judgment and overruling her motion for new trial because questions on cross-examination regarding a prior lawsuit constituted harmful error and resulted in the rendition of an improper verdict. We affirm.
In 1999, Pace was injured in an automobile collision. During the course of her treatment, Pace was referred to Baptist St. Anthony's for testing. While exiting the testing facility, Pace fell and fractured her right femur. She subsequently filed a premises liability action against Baptist St. Anthony's to recover personal injury damages. At the time of trial, Pace was also involved in another lawsuit for personal injury damages against the driver who collided with her automobile.
Prior to commencement of the trial, Pace presented a motion in limine seeking to exclude, among other things, the following:
- Any mention Plaintiff was involved in other suits.
- Any mention of Plaintiff's claims against other Defendants in other lawsuits.
At a hearing preceding voir dire, Pace maintained that under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence, testimony regarding the existence of the prior suit would cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, and mislead the jury. After considering arguments from both counsel, the trial court granted Pace's motion on the condition that the parties approach the bench as the information became relevant and necessary. The court concluded by noting "I am sure that leave will be granted to go into those areas."
Prior to cross-examining Pace, counsel for Baptist St. Anthony's approached the bench as instructed and both parties renewed their arguments with respect to the motion in limine. Balancing the nature of the testimony against the possibility of confusion, the trial court found evidence of Pace's involvement in another suit to be relevant and admissible. Counsel for Baptist St. Anthony's then proceeded to cross-examine Pace on the prior lawsuit. Pace did not object to the questions asked by opposing counsel.
By her point of error, Pace alleges opposing counsel's questions were clearly calculated to inflame the jury and could not have been cured by an instruction to disregard. As such, she claims the questions constituted reversible error. We disagree.
In order for us consider a point on appeal, the record must show the complaint was preserved by a timely request, objection, or motion and that a ruling was obtained from the trial court. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Here, however, Pace failed to object to the questions by opposing counsel. A motion in limine does not preserve error concerning the improper admission of evidence. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 637 (Tex. 1986). The complainant must still object when his opponent offers the evidence. Id. Otherwise, the trial court is denied the opportunity to make a curative instruction or ruling. Id. Because Pace's point of error was not preserved, it presents nothing for review and is overruled.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
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NO. 07-09-00371-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
JANUARY 6, 2011
JOSE ANGEL CORDOVA, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY;
NO. B14880-0303; HONORABLE EDWARD LEE SELF, JUDGE
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Jose Angel Cordova, entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance, less than one gram, and as part of a plea agreement, was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for two years. Eventually, appellant was adjudicated guilty and he was placed on straight probation. On October 22, 2009, appellants probation was revoked and he was sentenced to two years in a State Jail Facility. Appellant has perfected his appeal of the judgment. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Appellants initial plea, on September 22, 2003, was to two years deferred adjudication community supervision. The State filed an original and amended motion to proceed to adjudication. The amended motion was ultimately dismissed without prejudice on May 23, 2005. Later, on August 25, 2005, the State filed another motion to proceed. This motion was heard by the trial court on December 28, 2006, and appellant was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to three years community supervision. On August 26, 2009, the State filed a motion to revoke appellants community supervision. The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to revoke on October 22, 2009, and revoked appellants community supervision, sentencing him to two years in a State Jail Facility.
Appellant has perfected his appeal and brings forth three issues. Two of appellants issues contend that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate appellant guilty on December 28, 2006, or to revoke appellants community supervision on October 22, 2009. Appellants other issue contends that the judgment of the trial court revoking appellants community supervision was void. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jurisdiction of Trial Court
The contentions of appellants brief contest the jurisdiction of the trial court to act on two different occasions. We will address those contentions separately.
Motion to Proceed
Appellants initial contention is that on December 28, 2006, when the trial court conducted a hearing on the States motion to proceed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over appellants case. According to appellant, this is because this hearing was held outside of the initial two year period during which appellant was on deferred adjudication community supervision. Under appellants theory, the State should have obtained a hearing and the trial court should have adjudicated appellant guilty by September 22, 2005. Further, appellant contends that, since the order adjudicating appellant guilty and placing him on community supervision occurred more than one year after the expiration of the term of appellants deferred adjudication community supervision, the placement of appellant on community supervision for a period of three years was void for lack of jurisdiction.
However, we must first address the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court to act on December 28, 2006. Remembering that appellant initially received two years deferred adjudication on September 22, 2003, appellants deferred adjudication was scheduled to expire on September 22, 2005. However, the State filed a motion to adjudicate on August 25, 2005, prior to the expiration of the deferred adjudication. The record reflects that, on that same day, an order for a capias was issued to take appellant into custody. Further, the record shows that appellant was served with the warrant on September 6, 2005.
Appellants initial deferred adjudication was granted pursuant to section 5 of article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 42.12, § 5 (West Supp. 2010).[1] Article 42.12, § 5(b) provides that, upon a violation of one of the terms and conditions imposed under subsection (a), a defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in section 21 of article 42.12. See art. 42.12, § 5(b). The provisions of section 21 make it clear that, at any time during the period of community supervision, a judge may issue a warrant for a defendant and detain the defendant until a hearing is held. See art. 42.12, § 21(b). When interpreting this statutory scheme against an allegation of loss of jurisdiction because the hearing was held after the probationary period expired, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that so long as the motion to revoke or proceed is filed and the warrant to arrest is issued before the expiration of the community service period, the trial court retains jurisdiction to act upon the community supervision. See Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231, 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Bender v. State, No. 07-03-0235-CR, 2005 Tex.App. LEXIS 4335, at *1 (Tex.App.Amarillo June 7, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, appellants contention that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion to proceed is overruled.
However, appellant is connecting this argument with a reading of article 42.12, § 22, to conclude that the trial court lost jurisdiction. Section 22(c) provides that:
A court may extend a period of community supervision under this section at any time during the period of supervision or, if a motion for revocation of community supervision is filed before the period of supervision ends, before the first anniversary of the date on which the period of supervision ends.
See art. 42.12, § 22(c). According to appellants argument, when the trial court adjudicated his case on December 28, 2006, the trial court, in effect, continued or modified his community supervision. Therefore, according to appellants theory, this continuation or modification occurred after the first anniversary date on which appellants community supervision ended. Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to so act.
Appellants argument has several flaws. Initially, we can find nothing in the record that would be construed as a continuation of or modification to appellants initial deferred adjudication community supervision. Quite the contrary, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty and placed him on community supervision. An adjudication of appellants guilt precluded the trial court from continuing or modifying appellants deferred adjudication. Therefore, art. 42.12, § 22, does not even apply to appellant. Next, we note that appellant has not cited this Court to any authority that has followed appellants reasoning nor have we found any cases that support appellants contentions. The only case that appellant can direct this Courts attention to is Judge Meyers dissenting opinion in Connolly v. State, 983 S.W.2d 738, 746 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In Connolly, the issue was the appellants right to appeal a finding that the State used due diligence in apprehending the appellant after a motion to adjudicate had been filed. Id. at 739. The issue was not about the one year time frame for the trial court to conduct a hearing on continuation or modification of an appellants community supervision after the primary term had expired. In fact, the Connolly court affirmed an adjudication of guilt where the motion to proceed and capias was filed during the deferred adjudication period but the adjudication was not entered until a year and four months after the expiration of the deferred adjudication period. See id. at 739. Thus, because the Connolly court would be required to address its lack of jurisdiction if appellants contention was correct, Connolly actually supports the trial courts actions in the present case. Accordingly, we overrule appellants first issue.
Motion to Revoke
Appellants next contention is that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to revoke appellants community supervision on October 22, 2009. According to appellant, this is so because the hearing was held outside of the statutory maximum time limit of appellants community supervision. To arrive at this conclusion, appellant asks this Court to ignore cases of other Courts of Appeal that have held that, in calculating the maximum amount of time an appellant may be ordered to serve on community supervision, the courts do not aggregate the deferred adjudication community supervision periods with the traditional community supervision periods. See Slaughter v. State, 110 S.W.3d 500, 502-03 (Tex.App.Waco 2003, pet. refd); Villarreal v. State, No. 04-95-0073-CR, 1996 Tex.App. LEXIS 1564 at *3 (Tex.App.San Antonio Apr. 24, 1996, pet. refd) (not designated for publication) (citing McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166, 177 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978)). We agree with our sister courts in holding that the periods of supervision under regular community supervision and deferred adjudication supervision are not aggregated to determine the total period of supervision allowable under the terms of article 42.12. See art. 42.12, § 15(b) (setting forth the maximum period for state jail felony community supervision at five years with the right to extend state jail felony community supervision up to a ten year maximum). Appellant was adjudicated guilty on December 28, 2006, and he was placed on standard community supervision for a period of three years. This term of community supervision did not exceed the maximum amount of time appellant could be placed on community supervision for a state jail felony offense. Therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction over appellants case and subsequently revoked appellants community supervision and assessed a sentence of confinement in a State Jail Facility for two years. Accordingly, we overrule appellants second issue.
We need not address the contention in appellants third issue because that issue is predicated upon our sustaining either appellants first or second issue. Having overruled both appellants first and second issues, we do not reach the third issue.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
[1] Further reference to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will be by reference to Article __ or art. ___.