NO. 07-05-0441-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
JANUARY 25, 2006
______________________________
IN RE: YORKSHIRE INSURANCE CO., LTD. AND
OCEAN MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD.
_______________________________
Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relators, Yorkshire Insurance Co., Ltd. and Ocean Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.,
petition this court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Honorable John LaGrone,
Presiding Judge of the 316th District Court, to enter final judgment in a pending cause. For
the reasons stated, we deny relators’ petition.
Relators, through two issues, are complaining that the trial court, by refusing to enter
final judgment, is 1) abusing its discretion and 2) jeopardizing relators’ due process rights.
BACKGROUND
This original proceeding arises out of a death claim filed by the Seger family against
Diatom. During the pendency of the tort claim, the Segers’ filed a declaratory judgment
action against Diatom and relators on the issue of insurance coverage. After the Segers
obtained a judgment against Diatom on the underlying tort claim, the Segers settled with
Diatom and took an assignment of Diatom’s claims against its insurers, the relators in the
present action. The Segers’ declaratory judgment case was then converted to include a
Stowers action.1
Thereafter, relators filed a third-party action against Diatom seeking declaratory
relief or reformation. On August 9, 2004, the trial court heard pending motions for
summary judgment filed by both sides of the third-party action. Ultimately, on December
30, 2004, the trial court granted Diatom’s summary judgment as to relator’s third-party
claims. The trial court then severed relator’s third-party action from the Segers’ declaratory
judgment action, reserving only the issues of entitlement to and amount of attorney fees
for future determination. The relators’ primary complaint centers upon the trial court’s
failure to issue judgment on these attorney fee issues.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus is proper to compel a ministerial act or to correct a clear abuse of
discretion. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992). Whether to consider and
rule upon a motion is not a discretionary act on the part of the trial court. In re Ramirez,
994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex.App–San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding). When a motion is
properly filed and pending before a trial court, the act of considering and ruling on the
motion is ministerial. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.App.–San
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See generally C. H. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544
(Tex.Comm’n.App. 1929, holding approved).
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Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding). However, the trial court has a reasonable time within
which to perform this duty. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). Whether such reasonable time has lapsed is dependent on
the facts and circumstances of each case. Id. There is no bright line for determining this
issue. Neither is there a set formula, rather, there are a number of factors to consider,
such as, 1) the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, 2) the state of the trial court’s
docket, 3) whether there continue to be other legal or factual matters within the case for
the trial court’s continued consideration, and 4) the existence of other judicial and
administrative matters for the trial court’s consideration. See Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d
133, 134 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2001, no pet. h.). This is not an exhaustive list, but is merely
demonstrative. Additionally, this court must remember that the trial court has inherent
power to control its own docket. Ho v. Univ. of Texas at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693-94
(Tex.App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. denied). The power of the trial court to control its own
docket is discretionary in nature, Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 495
(Tex.App–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.), we may not arbitrarily interfere with it.
ANALYSIS
Relators first contend that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to rule and
enter a final judgment. However, in their argument, relators appear to complain that the
court would neither set a hearing nor render a ruling. The record before us demonstrates
that the trial court held a hearing on the issue of attorney fees on August 8, 2005.
Therefore, the only real issue before this court is whether the court has failed to rule on the
issue of attorney fees within a reasonable time. Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426. The party
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seeking a writ of mandamus must furnish this court with a record sufficient to establish their
right to mandamus relief. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837. The record available for our review
in this proceeding provides insufficient evidence that the trial court’s delay in ruling was
unreasonable. The record does not illustrate the state of the court’s docket from August
8, 2005 to the filing of relators’ petition in this matter. The record shows that, during this
period, relators have continued to file matters requiring the court’s consideration.
Additionally, the record is silent as to other legal or administrative matters the trial court
was required to hear or consider during this period. As the relators are responsible for
providing this court with a record sufficient to prove their entitlement to the relief sought and
because they have failed to do so, we cannot say that the trial court has abused its
discretion by failing to rule on the attorney fee issues or by failing to enter a final judgment
in the third-party cause. Therefore, relators are denied mandamus relief on their first issue.
Relators’ next contend that the trial court’s failure to enter final judgment jeopardizes
relators’ due process rights. Relators conclude, without adequate analysis, that the trial
court’s failure to rule is adversely affecting their due process rights in relation to the
severed cause of action and the underlying $38 million judgment. As authority for their
proposition, relators cite this court to a recent Texas Supreme Court opinion dealing with
what relators contend to be a similar fact pattern. See Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Boyd, 48 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 1020, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 605 (August 26, 2005). However, Boyd
is an appeal of a summary judgment that does not address due process concerns and is,
therefore, inappropriate. Because we have determined that the trial court has not failed
to issue a final judgment within a reasonable time, it follows that the delay in issuing
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judgment was not a denial of due process. Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426. Relators have
also cited the court to Baluch v. Miller, 774 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.App–Dallas 1989, orig.
proceeding), for the proposition that the trial court’s refusal to enter a final judgment is itself
a denial of due process. However, a close reading of Baluch reveals that the trial court
refused to set the matter for any type of hearing. This is clearly distinguishable from the
case before this court and, as such, does not control the issue. Accordingly, relators’
second issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Finding relators have failed to prove their entitlement to mandamus relief, we deny
relators’ petition.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
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