in the Matter of the Marriage of Gregory T. Brickhouse and Jeanette L. Brickhouse, and in the Interest of A.B., E.B. and C.B., Children

NO. 07-07-0307-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL D


NOVEMBER 27, 2007


______________________________

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JEANETTE LYNE BRICKHOUSE,

AND GREGORY T. BRICKHOUSE AND IN THE INTEREST OF

A.B., E.B. AND C.B., CHILDREN

________________________________


FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY;


NO. 217,740-D; HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE

_______________________________



Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant Gregory Brickhouse filed a notice of restricted appeal from orders entered on December 27, 2006 in connection with a final divorce decree and child support obligations. The reporter’s record was filed in this Court on July 25, 2007, and the clerk’s record, on August 6, 2007.

           By letter of September 27, 2007, this Court reminded appellant that his appellate brief was past due. The letter notified appellant that his appeal was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution unless his brief was filed, along with a motion for extension of time, by October 8, 2007. On October 2, appellant filed a motion to dismiss his appeal, but the motion was not accompanied by a certificate of conference or the required filing fee. Tex. R. App. P. 5, 10.1(a)(5). By letter dated October 23, 2007, we notified appellant that until these defects were corrected, we would not consider the motion. We also reminded appellant that his appeal remained subject to dismissal for want of prosecution.  

          An appellate court may dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution if an appellant fails to timely file a brief unless the appellant reasonably explains the failure and the appellee is not significantly injured by the failure. Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1). On its own motion, with ten days notice to the parties, an appellate court may dismiss a civil appeal for want of prosecution or failure to comply with a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(b),(c). Here the record reveals appellant Brickhouse has not filed a brief or a motion for extension by the date specified by the Court, despite notice that his failure to do so would subject the appeal to dismissal. We further find the Court has given the parties the required ten days notice.

          Accordingly, we now dismiss Brickhouse’s appeal for want of prosecution and failure to comply with a notice from the Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b),(c).

 

                                                                James T. Campbell

                                                                           Justice





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NO. 07-10-0167-CR

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

AT AMARILLO

 

PANEL D

 

AUGUST 4, 2010

 

 

SHANNON ROSS WEAVER,

 

                                                                                         Appellant

v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 

                                                                                         Appellee

_____________________________

 

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF LAMB COUNTY;

 

NO. 15,983; HONORABLE WILLIAM A. THOMPSON JR., PRESIDING

 

 

Anders Opinion

 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

            Shannon Ross Weaver was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced after a jury trial to sixty days confinement in the county jail and a fine of $1,000.  Appellant appealed.

            Appellant’s appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, together with an Anders[1] brief, wherein he certified that, after diligently searching the record, he concluded that the appeal was without merit.  Along with his brief, appellate counsel attached a copy of a letter sent to appellant informing him of counsel’s belief that there was no reversible error and of appellant’s right to file a response or brief pro se.  By letter dated July 1, 2010, this court also notified appellant of his right to file his own brief or response and set July 26, 2010, as the deadline to do so.  To date, appellant has filed neither a response, brief, nor a request for an extention of time.

            In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, counsel discussed several potential areas for appeal.  They include 1) the validity of the search warrant used to obtain a blood sample from appellant, and 2) the admission of evidence regarding whether appellant took a portable breath test.  However, appellate counsel explained why each argument lacks merit.

            We have also conducted our own review of the record to assess the conclusions of appellate counsel and to uncover any reversible error pursuant to Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  That review has failed to reveal reversible error. 

            Accordingly, the motion to withdraw is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.[2]

 

                                                                                    Brian Quinn

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Do not publish.



[1]Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). 

[2]Appellant has the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review from this opinion.