UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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Summary Calendar
No. 02-60137
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NATHANIEL GADSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AVONDALE INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
Docket No. 00-CV-579
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September 10, 2002
Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Nathaniel Gadson (“Gadson”) appeals the district court’s
entry of summary judgment dismissing his claims of race discrimina-
tion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The district court held: (1) that Gadson’s
failure to file his complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the occurrence of the
allegedly unlawful employment practice barred his action from
federal court; and (2) that Gadson had failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence his prima facie case under Title VII.
We affirm the judgment of the district court on the latter ground.
On June 5, 1997, Litton Avondale Industries of Gulfport
(“Avondale”) hired Gadson to work in Maintenance Department #40 in
Avondale’s Gulfport facility as a “First Electrician.” Gadson
alleges that Avondale promoted three white employees to the
position of “Lead Electrician” over the subsequent two-and-a-half
year period, one in 1997-98, the next in 1999, and the third in
January 2000. Gadson further alleges that the position served as
a springboard to that of “Foreman.” The position of “Lead
Electrician” was abolished in mid-2000, when the third of these
white employees departed the company’s employ. Gatson filed a
charge of discriminatory employment practices with the EEOC on July
10, 2000. After the charge was rejected, he brought this suit in
federal district court.
To establish his prima facie case Gadson needed to show
(1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he was not
promoted, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that
the position was filled by someone outside the protected class or
that he was not promoted because of his race. See Rutherford v.
Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3rd 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1999).
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The district court concluded that Gadson had failed to
satisfy the last two prongs. The third could not be satisfied, the
court concluded, “because Avondale has established that there was
no position available for a promotional opportunity.” The fourth
was not fulfilled because “Gadson has brought forward no evidence,
other than his subjective beliefs, that he was not selected for a
non-existing promotion based on his race.” Gadson argues on appeal
that these two questions are issues of material fact to be decided
by a jury.
Gadson fails to understand the standards for summary
judgment set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. A successful motion for summary judgment requires only
that the moving party point out, with reference to the record, that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Wallace v. Texas
Tech University, 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996). To survive
a motion the nonmoving party must present specific facts showing
the existence of a genuine dispute. See Hanks v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). See also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Avondale
easily met its standard, convincingly demonstrating that no such
position exists. Gadson equally failed to meet his, making, at
best, conclusory assertions about Avondale’s staffing protocol and
his qualifications vis-a-vis his fellow workers.
In any event, Gadson also failed to articulate a claim
upon which the courts can grant relief. The most that Gadson has
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asserted is that there exists an informal position of “Lead
Electrician,” granting to its holder a salary equivalent to the
inferior “First Electrician” but with training opportunities for
the superior, and more remunerative, position of “Foreman.” All
that might have be0en denied is a distinction that might have
conveyed an opportunity to serve as the foreman’s understudy.
For such deprivations Title VII offers no remedy. Only
ultimate employment decisions, those effecting material changes in
terms or conditions of employment, can constitute adverse employ-
ment decisions under Title VII. As we said in Dollis v. Rubin, 77
F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995), “Title VII was designed to
address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every
decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential
effect upon those ultimate decisions.”
AFFIRMED.
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