IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
NOVEMBER 2, 2007
______________________________
KRYSTLE DANIELLE IVORY, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________
FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 53239-E, 53240-E, 53241-E and 53765-E; HONORABLE ABE LOPEZ, JUDGE _______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Krystle Danielle Ivory, acting pro se, appeals from the trial court's judgment in four companion cases. Finding appellant's notices of appeal are untimely, we dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
On August 8, 2006, appellant pled guilty in four separate cases arising from the same incident. In three cases, appellant pled guilty to aggravated robbery and received a twenty-year sentence in each. In the fourth case, appellant pled guilty to the offense of robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On the same day, the trial court certified that in each case, appellant had no right of appeal and that appellant had waived the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2. Appellant filed her notices of appeal in the trial court on April 26, 2007.
By letter dated October 1, 2007, this Court notified appellant that her notices of appeal appeared late, and advised her that the Court would determine its jurisdiction after October 22, 2007. By the same letter, this Court advised appellant that her appeals were subject to dismissal unless the Court received amended certifications under Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2 providing that appellant has the right of appeal, or she demonstrated other grounds for continuing the appeals, on or before October 22, 2007. Appellant has corresponded with the Court, but her correspondence does not provide information permitting us to conclude we have jurisdiction over the appeals.
In a criminal case, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an appealable order; or within 90 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2. As noted, appellant's notices of appeal from the judgments and sentences imposed in August 2006 were filed in April 2007. (1)
Only a timely notice of appeal invokes the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209-10 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). If an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal, and can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal. Olivio v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Slaton, 981 S.W.2d at 210; Stumpf v. State, 2001 WL 1566655 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
Further, the rules we must follow require us to dismiss an appeal in a criminal case in the absence of certification showing the appellant has the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d).
Because appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider her appeals. Accordingly, they are dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
1. Correspondence provided by appellant makes reference to an out-of-time appeal.
Permission for such a late appeal must be granted by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2007).
21; The trial court did not rule on the motion. Appellant asks this Court to decide “the novel issue of whether a timely-filed pro se motion for shock probation must be ruled on by the trial court.”
Article 42.12, § 6 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court’s jurisdiction in a felony case shall continue for 180 days from the date the execution of the sentence actually begins for the purpose of suspending further execution of a sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 6 (Vernon 2006). This provision, commonly referred to as “shock probation,” allows the trial court to suspend further imposition of sentence after the convicted party has experienced the “shock” of actual incarceration. Subparagraph (c) of this section provides that a judge may deny the motion without a hearing but may not grant the motion without holding a hearing.
Appellant references this Court to Rules 21.8(c)(pertaining to motions for new trial) and 22.4(b)(pertaining to motions in arrest of judgment) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure for guidance. Those rules provide that certain post-judgment motions are “deemed denied” if not timely ruled upon. There is no similar “deemed denied” provision pertaining to article 42.12, § 6.
Appellant contends he is entitled to due process because he followed the requirements of article 42.12, § 6 and he is otherwise eligible for shock probation. According to Appellant, because the Legislature failed to include a “deemed denied” provision in article 42.12, § 6, the trial court continues to have the authority to rule upon such motions. Therefore, Appellant asks this Court to remand the cause to the trial court so that the motion for shock probation may be considered and ruled on.
Initially, we address the jurisdictional conundrum. First, there is no order entered pursuant to article 42.12, § 6 from which to appeal. Second, even assuming an order was entered, an appellate court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order entered pursuant to article 42.12, § 6. See Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). See also Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Finally, notwithstanding the fact that Appellant filed his motion on the 180th day from the date the execution of his sentence began, on the 181st day, the trial court lost jurisdiction to act on the motion. Neugebauer v. State, 266 S.W.3d 137 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2008, no pet.). The statute can have no other construction than that jurisdiction to act ceased when the 180-day period expired. Houlihan, 579 S.W.2d at 219. Thus, even if we were to remand the cause to the trial court, the trial court would have no authority to consider or rule on Appellant’s motion for shock probation.
Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s constitutional due process rights were not violated by the trial court’s failure to consider and rule on his motion for shock probation and we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
Consequently, these appeals are dismissed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.