07-06-0283-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
OCTOBER 15, 2007
______________________________ROY BULLOCK, JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE _________________________________
FROM THE 123RD DISTRICT COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY;
NO. 05CR-16434, 05CR-16435; HONORABLE GUY GRIFFIN, JUDGE _______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Roy Bullock, Jr., appeals from the trial court's determination to proceed with adjudication of two charges of indecency with a child and assessment of 10 and 18 year sentences of confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm.
Background
On July 11, 2005, appellant was indicted by separate indictments for the offenses of indecency with a child by exposure and indecency with a child by contact. On October 28, 2005, in accordance with a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudication on both charges for a period of 10 years. No appeal was taken from the order deferring adjudication. On December 9, 2005, the State filed a Motion to Proceed with an Adjudication of Guilt alleging three violations of the terms and conditions of appellant's community supervision. On March 10, 2006, the trial court heard the matters and adjudicated appellant guilty of both charges. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on punishment and sentenced appellant to 10 years confinement for the offense of indecency with a child by exposure and 18 years confinement for the offense of indecency with a child by contact. Each sentence is to run concurrently.
Appellant presents the following four issues: (1) did appellant violate the terms of his probation merely by attending church, (2) was the evidence legally sufficient to support appellant's convictions, (3) were the terms of appellant's probation so overbroad and not narrowly tailored as to violate appellant's constitutional rights, and (4) was appellant's sentence so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Because we lack jurisdiction to address appellant's first three issues, we will discuss them together.
Appellant's First Three Issues
Appellant's first two issues challenge the trial court's determination to proceed to adjudication. However, article 42.12, section 5(b), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may not appeal from a trial court's determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005); (1) Hogans v. State, 176 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Our authority to review issues relating to the revocation of deferred adjudication probation is limited to post-adjudication proceedings, including the assessment of punishment. § 5(b). Thus, consideration of appellant's first two issues is foreclosed by statute. As we lack jurisdiction to address these issues, nothing is presented for our review.
Appellant's third issue challenges the terms and conditions of the order initially placing him on deferred adjudication community supervision. Appellant contends that, if he violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision by attending church, then the terms and conditions of his community supervision were overly broad and not sufficiently tailored. To the extent that appellant's third issue would require us to review the basis for the trial court's determination to proceed to adjudication, we are without authority to do so. See § 5(b); Hogans, 176 S.W.3d at 832. In the alternative, to the extent that appellant's third issue challenges the terms and conditions of his community supervision, appeal of issues relating to the original deferred adjudication proceeding must be appealed when the deferred adjudication is imposed. See Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 884-85 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Because appellant did not appeal the terms and conditions of his community supervision at the time that they were imposed, our jurisdiction to address the merits of appellant's third issue has not been invoked. See White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001).
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
While we do not have authority to review a trial court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, we do have authority to review post-adjudication proceedings, including the assessment of punishment. § 5(b). Appellant contends that, in the present case, the punishment assessed by the trial court was so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant was sentenced to 18 years incarceration for the second degree felony of indecency with a child by contact and 10 years for the third degree felony of indecency with a child by exposure. The applicable ranges of punishment for these offenses are two to 20 years and two to 10 years, respectively. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.34 (Vernon 2003). Thus, neither sentence exceeds the punishment range set by statute. Such punishment is not unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. See Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973); Hill v. State, 493 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). Thus, we overrule appellant's fourth issue.
Conclusion
We dismiss appellant's first three issues for want of jurisdiction. We overrule appellant's fourth issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
1. Further references to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure will
be by reference to "section __" or "§ __."
NO. 07-09-0264-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
MARCH 5, 2010
______________________________
ARMANDO BARRERA, JR.,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_______________________________
FROM THE 110TH DISTRICT COURT OF DICKENS COUNTY;
NO. 2367; HON. WILLIAM P. SMITH, PRESIDING
______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Armando Barrera, Jr. (appellant) appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Through two issues, he contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm for the reasons discussed below.
Background
Around 10:00 a.m., the morning of September 27, 2007, appellant was found alone, unconscious, and behind the steering wheel of his vehicle. The vehicle was stopped on a country road, running, and in gear. Its doors were locked, and appellant was in a semi-reclining position. A traveler who encountered appellant yelled, banged on the car door, and honked his horn in effort to awaken him. Yet, appellant remained asleep. Eventually, law enforcement and emergency medical personnel succeeded in gaining his attention.
According to at least one witness, appellant was very disoriented. It also appeared as if he could not control his motor skills as illustrated during his attempt to unlock the car door. Appellant would try to do so but instead continued to fall backward in the seat. So too were his eyes roll[ing] and his hands shak[ing]. And, once the door was open and appellant removed from the car, those present had to help him from the vehicle onto the stretcher since he could not perform that task on his own.
Appellant testified that before falling asleep on the road he was completely burned out. So too did he disclose that 1) he had been injecting himself with methamphetamine, 2) had done so at least nine times during the three days before he was found unconscious in his car, 3) had accidentally disposed of the remainder of the drug in his toilet the night before, 4) grew extremely tired, 5) was unable to sleep at his house, and 6) decided to drive his car out to a country road so he could get some uninterrupted rest.
The methamphetamine alluded to by appellant had not left his blood. Indeed, testing disclosed an extremely high quantity of the drug within his blood according to a Texas Department of Public Safety forensic scientist. This same witness also explained for the jury the effects methamphetamine had on the human body. She said that it not only causes one to feel euphoric but also extreme fatigue [or] sleepiness as its stimulating effects wear off. [A]t some point in time youre just going to be wiped out, and thats due to the drug, she continued.
Standard of Review
As previously mentioned, appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. His complaints on appeal focus upon the sufficiency of the evidence illustrating that he was actually operating the vehicle while intoxicated.[1] In assessing the accuracy of those complaints, we apply the standards of review enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In other words, we view the evidence appearing of record through the window framed by those cases and element of the crime at issue. Since the element in question here involves appellants operation of a vehicle (again, he was found unconscious in a non-moving car), it seems relevant to determine of what operating a vehicle consists. Pertinent authority reveals that such conduct occurs when circumstances demonstrate that the accused took action to affect the functioning of his vehicle in a manner that would enable its use. Barton v. State, 882 S.W.2d 456, 459-60 (Tex. App.Dallas 1994, no pet.); see also Freeman v. State, 69 S.W.3d 374, 376 (Tex. App.Dallas 2002, no pet.) (wherein the court examined the totality of the circumstances to determine if appellant exerted personal effort in a manner that shows intentional use of the vehicle for the intended purpose). Finally, we note that a person is intoxicated when he loses the normal use of his mental or physical faculties because of the introduction of alcohol, drugs or a controlled substance (or a combination thereof) into his body. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2)(A) (Vernon 2003).
Analysis
No one disputes that appellant was taking methamphetamine for three days before being found unconscious in his car on the road. No one disputes that once he disposed of the remainder of the drug he became very tired or that, while experiencing that condition, he decided to drive his car to a secluded country road to get some sleep. Nor is it disputed that appellant was found behind the steering wheel of a running vehicle. To those circumstances we add that evidence describing the effect methamphetamine has on the human body once its stimulation begins to wane, appellants inability to be easily awakened, his inability to walk on his own to the stretcher or operate a door lock, and his leaving the car in gear. Together, that constitutes some evidence from which a factfinder can rationally infer, beyond reasonable doubt, not only that appellant lacked the normal use of his mental and physical faculties as he drove to the spot where he stopped his car but also that his condition resulted from the introduction of methamphetamine (a controlled substance) into his body. Moreover, there is nothing manifestly unjust in so concluding given the state of the evidence. It may well be as appellant suggested; he was not operating the vehicle when he was found unconscious. Yet, that is not something we need decide; there is more than ample evidence to show that he had lost the normal use of his physical and mental skills due to his prior ingestion of methamphetamine as he drove to the location where others eventually found him. See Hearne v. State, 80 S.W.3d 677, 680 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for driving while intoxicated where defendant was found in drivers seat of truck, truck registered to defendant, the truck was parked in a moving lane of traffic, and no other people were around the scene); Pope v. State, 802 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. App.Austin 1991, no pet.) (evidence showing a defendant found asleep in a truck on a remote road, with the engine running and the lights on, sufficient to support conviction for driving while intoxicated).
Therefore, we overrule appellants issues challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and affirm the judgment.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
[1]One commits the crime of DWI if he "is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place." Tex. Penal Code Ann. §49.04(a) (Vernon 2003).