in Re R Wayne Johnson, Relator

NO. 07-07-0048-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

MARCH 14, 2007

______________________________

IN RE: R. WAYNE JOHNSON, RELATOR

______________________________

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

OPINION

Relator R. Wayne Johnson has filed a petition requesting issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Honorable Charles Chapman, Judge of the 39^th District Court of Haskell County, to rule on a motion for discovery sanctions in a pending civil suit filed by relator in that court. We dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.

Relator cites Government Code section 22.221(b) as the source of our authority to issue the writ requested. ⁽¹⁾ That statute provides courts of appeals may issue writs of mandamus, "agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs," against judges of district or county courts "in the court of appeals district[.]" Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.221(b) (Vernon 2004). The 39^th Judicial District encompasses four counties, one of which, Kent County, is within the seventh court of appeals district. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 24.141 (39^th judicial district composed of Haskell, Kent, Stonewall and Throckmorton counties); 22.201(h) (seventh court of appeals district includes Kent County). But Haskell County, in which relator's underlying proceeding is pending, is not in our court of appeals district. Cases from Haskell County are appealed to the eleventh court of appeals. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.201(l) (Vernon Supp. 2006).

Application of the geographical restriction on our jurisdiction under section 22.221(b) must take into account the county in which relator's underlying proceeding is pending. Cf. Turtur v. Lee, 702 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1986, orig. proceeding) (applying statute before 1987 amendment). ⁽²⁾ We find we have no jurisdiction to address relator's petition seeking mandamus relief in a pending case over which a sister court of appeals will have appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, relator's petition is dismissed.

James T. Campbell

Justice

1. We agree our writ authority under Government Code section 22.221(a), which authorizes our issuance of writs necessary to enforce our jurisdiction, is not implicated by relator's petition.

2. The court in Turtur considered the geographical limits to the appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeals among the "principles of law regulating" issuance of writs. 702 S.W.2d at 311.

hat an attempt to invoke that right would have resulted in adverse consequences, appellant failed to preserve his first issue for review. See Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 6-8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that to preserve a claim founded upon the right against self-incrimination, one must either 1) invoke the right or 2) be faced with circumstances suggesting that invocation of the right would result in some form of punishment). So, we overrule it.

Issue Two - Conditions of Parole

Next, appellant complains of the trial court's effort to require the payment of attorney's fees and court costs as conditions of his parole. ⁽¹⁾ We sustain the complaint.

A trial court has no authority to order conditions to appellant's parole. Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (stating that a trial court has no authority to require restitution as a condition of parole); Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (stating that the trial court may not order payment of attorney's fees as a condition of parole). And, the State concedes as much. So, in ordering appellant to "pay court costs, attorney [sic] fees, fines, and restitution as a condition of parole," the trial court erred, and we delete those conditions from the judgment. See Garcia v. State, 773 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no pet.) (deleting the unauthorized condition from the judgment).

The judgment is reformed to delete from it that paragraph ordering the payment of court costs, attorney's fees, fines and restitution as conditions of parole. As reformed, the judgment is affirmed.

Brian Quinn

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

1. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay fines and restitution as a condition of his parole. Yet, appellant does not complain about these. Nonetheless, our adjudication of the dispute will encompass these conditions as well.