Darrion L. Sheppard v. State

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NO. 07-07-0459-CR


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL D


SEPTEMBER 2, 2008


______________________________



DARRION L. SHEPPARD,


                                                                                                 Appellant


v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS,


                                                                                                 Appellee


_________________________________


FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;


NO. 2007-415,250; HON. CECIL G. PURYEAR, PRESIDING


_______________________________


Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________



Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

          Darrion L. Sheppard appeals his conviction for possessing a controlled substance (cocaine) in an amount of at least four grams but less than 200 grams with intent to deliver in a drug free zone. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that he possessed the controlled substance. We affirm the judgment.

          We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standards discussed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979) and Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We refer the parties to those cases.

          To prove the offense, the State had to show that appellant not only knowingly exercised care, custody or control over what he knew to be a controlled substance but also did so with the intent “to transfer [the substance], actually or constructively, to another . . . .” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §481.002(8) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Evidence may consist of such things as 1) the accused’s presence when the search was conducted, 2) the location of the evidence and its visibility, 3) whether the accused owned or exercised control of the premises where the substance was located, 4) the accessibility and proximity of the drugs to the accused, 5) the presence of drug paraphernalia on or about the accused, 6) the nature of the location at which the accused was arrested, 7) whether the accused attempted to flee, 8) the quantity of contraband involved, 9) the manner of packaging, 10) the accused’s possession of large amounts of cash, and 11) the accused’s status as a drug user. See Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (discussing the links to show possession); Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (discussing the factors that can be considered to determine the intent to deliver). With that said, we turn to the record before us.    

          After a confidential informant had conducted three police-supervised purchases of cocaine from appellant within the month of January 2007 at a residence located at 1913 17th Street in Lubbock, the police executed a search warrant at that address on February 2, 2007. They discovered appellant and another man and woman in the residence. They also found cocaine on the floor in a bedroom. Appellant contends that because a bill found at the residence indicated that the household utilities were in the name of the woman, the cocaine was found in a bedroom in which women’s clothing was found, and appellant was not in the bedroom at the time police entered the residence, there is no evidence or insufficient evidence that he was in possession of the drugs.

          However, the record also shows: 1) appellant listed that address as his residence at the time he was arrested, 2) the confidential informant had made three purchases of cocaine from appellant at that address in January 2007 with the other male occupant of the home acting as a doorman, 3) the confidential informant had tried to make other purchases in January but was unable to do so because appellant was not at the residence although the other man and woman were present, 4) in the thirty minutes prior to the execution of the search warrant, an officer observed several persons engaging in conduct indicative of drug sales, 5) an officer testified that drug users will often allow a dealer to make sales out of their home in exchange for drugs, 6) appellant was the only person in the residence who had any money ($93) on him at the time of the raid, 7) when the police entered the house, appellant was observed walking from the hall where the bedroom was located into the kitchen, 8) the quantity of drugs discovered in the bedroom would not normally be laying on the floor in the open, 9) the drugs were of an amount that would be used in conducting sales, and 10) appellant resisted the orders of the officer at the time of the raid. This evidence is some evidence from which a rational jury could find, beyond reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and we cannot say that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to undermine our confidence in it or too weak to support that decision.

          Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

           

                                                                           Brian Quinn

                                                                          Chief Justice

 

Do not publish.

 

 

            

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NO. 07-11-00145-CR

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

AT AMARILLO

 

PANEL A

 

MAY 18, 2011

 

 

EX PARTE SAMUEL BRAXTON

 

 

 

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

 

  Samuel Braxton, appearing pro se, has filed an original proceeding in this Court, requesting relief with regard to actions of the 364th District Court of Lubbock County.  We will dismiss the proceeding for want of jurisdiction.

It is only with difficulty that we ascertain the relief Braxton seeks.  By his primary pleading, it appears he requests that we aid his attempt to file post-conviction proceedings with the 364th District Court.  To the degree it expresses a prayer for relief, it asks that we “review” his claim, “forward it to someone who can review it,” or provide him an address to which he should send it.  With his primary pleading, Braxton has submitted copies of correspondence and other documents, including a completed State Bar of Texas grievance form regarding his appointed counsel, Braxton’s letter to Governor Perry, correspondence to and from the Lubbock Regional Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center, and a partially completed form from the State of Indiana concerning habeas corpus relief.[1]   

The documents Braxton submits contain mentions of several convictions, including burglary of a building, driving while intoxicated, criminal mischief, evading arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  However, none of the documents submitted are from any court proceeding, nor do any of them bear evidence of having been filed in any court. 

Some of the documents refer to Cause No. 2009-423891.  In an effort to ascertain the nature of the relief Braxton seeks, we have obtained from the Lubbock County District Clerk a copy of the judgment signed February 18, 2010 in that cause, by which Braxton was convicted, on his guilty plea, of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, third or more.  The focus of Braxton’s complaint to us appears to be his dissatisfaction with his appointed attorney and another person.  He asserts these two individuals lied to him, leading him to plead guilty. 

            No appeal was brought to this Court from the February 18, 2010 judgment.  Post-conviction writs of habeas corpus brought after a final felony conviction are governed by article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (West 2007).  Such writs are returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. This Court has no jurisdiction over post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings under article 11.07.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.05; 11.07 (West 2007). 

            If Braxton’s pleading could be read to seek relief we have jurisdiction to grant, his documents nonetheless are entirely insufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to relief.  The documents he has filed satisfy none of the requirements of a petition commencing an original proceeding.  See Tex. R. App. P. 52 (governing original proceedings).  As noted, the documents consist simply of copies of correspondence and other documents.  Under the rules that govern proceedings in this Court, we could not take action on his pleading as presented.

Concluding that Braxton’s pleading has not invoked our limited jurisdiction, we dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.  

 

                                                                                                James T. Campbell

                                                                                                            Justice

 

 

Do not publish.

 

           


 


[1] Because they seemed to involve post-conviction relief, on March 9, 2011, we forwarded Braxton’s documents to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  The Court of Criminal Appeals returned them to us, advising that Braxton has no appeal or other matter pending before that Court.