IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
MAY 30, 2008
______________________________
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT
V.
CHAPMAN CHILDREN'S TRUST I, APPELLEE _________________________________
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 81106-1; HONORABLE W. F. "CORKY" ROBERTS, JUDGE _______________________________
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
ON JOINT MOTION TO REVERSE AND REMAND
Pending before the Court is the parties' "Joint Motion to Reverse and Remand," by which appellant, the State of Texas, and appellee, Chapman Children's Trust I, advise they have reached an agreed disposition of the appeal. As we understand its description in the joint motion, the parties' agreement is that the default judgment rendered by the trial court against the State is to be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Appellate Rule 42.1(a)(2) provides the means for disposition of a civil appeal by agreement of the parties. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A)-(C). The agreed disposition the parties request by their joint motion does not come within any of those permitted by the rule. Further, the comment to Rule 42.1 in part provides, "[t]he rule[s] does not permit an appellate court to order a new trial merely on the agreement of the parties absent reversible error . . . ." Finding the parties' joint motion seeks relief the Court is not authorized to grant, we deny the motion, without prejudice.
Per Curiam
d. Given this, it can be said that the excluded evidence was cumulative of that admitted, and, consequently, Leslie was not harmed by the trial court's rulings, assuming, of course, that they were inaccurate. See Hooper v. Torres, 790 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1990, writ denied) (holding harmless the decision to exclude particular evidence since the evidence essentially was admitted elsewhere at trial).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Per Curiam