NO. 07-07-0253-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
APRIL 24, 2008
______________________________
CURTIS LEE THOMPSON, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
NO. 18888-C; HONORABLE ANA ESTEVEZ, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is appellant’s motion to dismiss his appeal pursuant to Rule 42.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 42.2 states that at any time before the appellate court’s decision, the court may dismiss an appeal upon the appellant’s motion. Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). The appellant and his attorney must sign the written motion to dismiss. Id.
All of the requirements of Rule 42.2(a) have been satisfied. The Court has considered appellant’s motion and concludes the motion should be granted and the appeal should be dismissed.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. No motion for rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith.
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
OPINION
Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Bryan Thomas Blevins, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child. Punishment was assessed by the trial court at confinement for life. In presenting this appeal, counsel has filed an Anders brief in support of a motion to withdraw. We grant counsel’s motion and affirm.
In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his opinion, the record reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling authorities, the appeal is frivolous. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has also demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Appellant, (2) notifying him of his right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, and (3) informing him of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408. By letter, this Court granted Appellant thirty days in which to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should he be so inclined. Id. at 409 n.23. Appellant did not file a response. The State filed a letter acknowledging the Anders brief.
By the Anders brief, counsel raises four possible points of error and then demonstrates why no reversible error exists. Counsel’s points are: (1) the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred by allowing outcry testimony of Victoria Hansen, an investigator for Child Protective Services; (3) the trial court erred by allowing expert witness testimony of Dr. William E. Hoke; and (4) the evidence was factually insufficient to support the verdict.
We have independently examined the entire record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues which might support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that there are no plausible grounds for appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.