UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-31338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
VERSUS
ISIDRO FRANCISCO SANTIAGO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
October 17, 2002
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Isidro Francisco Santiago pleaded guilty to count 1 of an
indictment charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine, reserving the right to appeal the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Santiago
was sentenced to a 50-month term of imprisonment and to a four-year
period of supervised release. Santiago now appeals the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
BACKGROUND
On August 22, 2000, Louisiana State Police Trooper Ted Raley
was conducting safety inspections of commercial vehicles on
Interstate 20 in Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Trooper Raley
testified that at some time just prior to 9:00 a.m.,1 his attention
was drawn to a red sport-utility vehicle that was approaching from
the west. Raley claims that what drew his attention to the vehicle
was a flashing light that emanated from the dash of the vehicle
directly below the rear-view mirror. Raley was unable to determine
what the source of the light was as the vehicle passed because the
vehicle’s windows were tinted. Raley, believing that the flashing
light posed a hazard to oncoming traffic, decided to pursue the
vehicle. Just prior to pulling the vehicle over, Raley testified
that he noticed the vehicle was only going 50 miles-per-hour and
that the speed limit was 70.2 Prior to exiting his cruiser, Raley
testified that he noticed some “trinkets” hanging from the rear-
view mirror.
After pulling the vehicle over, Raley asked the driver, Isidro
Santiago, to exit the vehicle. Also present in the car were
Santiago’s two daughters and a woman, Josefina Vasquez. Trooper
Raley asked Santiago for his driver’s license and testified that
Santiago’s hands were shaking when he handed over the license and
that he believed Santiago exhibited “extreme nervousness.” Raley
told Santiago why he had been stopped and was able to identify the
object hanging from the mirror as a beaded chain with two golf-ball
sized crystal balls hanging from either end. Raley informed
Santiago that it is illegal in Louisiana to have objects hanging
from a car’s rear-view mirror.
1
Though Raley initially testified that he first noticed the vehicle at approximately 7:00
a.m., he later conceded that the traffic stop was logged at 8:53 a.m.
2
Raley also testified, however, that he believed the vehicle slowed to 50 m.p.h. after he
began his pursuit. At no time did Raley believe the vehicle was speeding and Raley made it clear
when he testified that his sole purpose for pulling the vehicle over was to investigate the flashing
light.
2
Raley then entered into a brief dialogue with Santiago.
Noticing that Santiago had a California driver’s license and the
vehicle had California plates, Raley testified that he had concerns
about whether or not Santiago was trying to travel straight through
to his destination as many travelers try to do on such long trips.
He therefore asked Santiago why he was driving so slow, referring
to the 50 miles-per-hour that Santiago was going. Santiago told
Raley that he did not realize he was driving slowly. Raley then
asked Santiago where he was going and what he would be doing there.
Santiago told Raley that they were heading to Atlanta, Georgia, for
one week to vacation before his daughters started back at school.
Trooper Raley testified that he found this odd because school had
already started in Louisiana but Santiago told him that school did
not start until September 6th where they lived.
Trooper Raley asked Santiago whether the car belonged to him,
and Santiago said that it was his car. Trooper Raley then asked
whether the registration was in the glove box, and Santiago said
that it was. Trooper Raley asked who the young woman in the
passenger seat was and what her name was. Santiago stated that she
was his wife, but hesitated before telling Raley her name.
Finally, he pointed his right index finger at Trooper Raley and
said “‘Josefina.’” Trooper Raley testified that, “it was almost as
if he had remembered it suddenly and was glad he did.”
Trooper Raley told Santiago to wait by the front of his
cruiser as he went to the passenger window of Santiago’s vehicle to
check the registration and to look at the object hanging from the
rear-view mirror. Raley asked the passenger for her driver’s
license and for the vehicle registration. She stated that Santiago
had the registration. Raley stated that Vasquez seemed flustered
while she was digging through her purse looking for her license.
3
Her driver’s license identified her as Josefina Vasquez, not
Josefina Santiago, which led Raley to ask her whether she was
Santiago's wife. She stated that she was.
Trooper Raley told Vasquez to remain in the vehicle with the
children as he returned to Santiago and told Santiago that Vasquez
had stated that Santiago had the registration. Santiago
volunteered to go to the vehicle to get the registration. Upon
receiving the registration, Trooper Raley noted that the vehicle
was registered to Santiago and to another woman, Justina Orochco.
Trooper Raley returned to his cruiser to run checks on the
drivers’ licenses. Trooper Raley explained that, although Vasquez
had stated that they were headed to Atlanta for a vacation, she
said they would be in Atlanta for two or three weeks. This
statement contradicted Santiago’s statement that the family
intended to vacation in Atlanta for one week and led Raley to have
some “uneasy feelings” about the situation. Raley testified,
however, that he had no specific suspicion that Santiago was
transporting drugs, though he hadn’t ruled out the possibility, but
was concerned that the car might be stolen or that the children
were abducted, and therefore called for backup. Driver’s-license
and criminal-history checks were then run on Santiago and Vasquez,
but the checks came back negative.
Trooper Raley then walked up to Santiago and asked him who
Justina Orochco was, referring to the other name listed on the
car’s registration. Trooper Raley stated, “it looked almost as if
I had hit him over the head with a sledgehammer. His eyes got big
and he kind of hesitated and he said, ‘That’s my other wife.’”
Santiago explained that Vasquez was his ex-wife and the mother of
his two children. Trooper Raley testified that he found this
explanation unconvincing and believed at that point that Santiago
4
and Vasquez were trying to conceal something. Raley testified that
he had three main concerns during the stop: 1) that the children
may have been abducted; 2) that the car may have been stolen; and
3) that the couple may have been transporting illegal narcotics.
Once the criminal history check came back negative, Raley testified
that he had satisfied himself that his first two concerns were not
a problem, but he was still concerned about the narcotics. Raley
stated, “I didn’t know - you know, I knew it wasn’t a stolen
vehicle, I knew it wasn’t the children, but I - that leads me on
into the narcotics phase or weapons phase.”
Trooper Raley told Santiago that he should remove the object
from his mirror before leaving, but before he let Santiago go, he
told Santiago that a lot of illegal contraband was being smuggled
down the interstate highways. Trooper Raley noted that Santiago
was from Santa Ana, which was relatively near the border and which
he knew to be a major source of methamphetamine, and also noted
that Santiago’s destination, Atlanta, was known to be a major
distribution point of narcotics.
Trooper Raley then asked Santiago whether he had any illegal
contraband on his person or in the vehicle. Santiago stated that
he did not, and Raley asked Santiago if he minded whether he
searched the vehicle to make sure. Santiago stated that he did not
mind. Trooper Raley produced a Louisiana-consent-to-search form in
Spanish, which Santiago signed after apparently reading it.
Trooper Jeff White then arrived at the scene, and Santiago and
Vasquez were frisked for weapons. Trooper Raley told them to stand
with the children near his cruiser with Trooper White as he
searched the front of the vehicle. Finding nothing in the front,
he then opened the rear hatch and immediately noticed that the
floor was too high. He also noticed that the plastic molding
5
around the sides had been cut, leading him to believe that there
was something beneath the floor.
Trooper Raley removed the molding and attempted to pull up the
carpet. The carpet was glued to the floor, which is not typical
and Raley concluded that there was a compartment beneath the floor.
Trooper Raley then called Trooper Bruce Vanderhoeven, who had a
drug dog, and asked him to come to his location. The dog alerted
to the inside and outside of the vehicle. The vehicle was taken to
state police Troop G headquarters, where a hatch, secured with
Bondo, was found in the wheel well. Inside a compartment under the
false floor, the troopers found eight to nine packages containing
21 pounds of cocaine.
Santiago pleaded guilty to count 1 of an indictment charging
him with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine,
but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress evidence. Santiago was sentenced to a 50-
month term of imprisonment and to a four-year period of supervised
release. Santiago now appeals the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress.
DISCUSSION
Did the initial stop of Santiago’s vehicle violate the Fourth
Amendment?
Santiago contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress. In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress,
this court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear
error and the court’s ultimate conclusions on Fourth Amendment
issues drawn from those facts de novo. Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). The court reviews all of the evidence
introduced at a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, in this case the Government. United States
6
v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999).
Santiago argues that the initial stop of his vehicle violated
his right against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. “Evidence obtained by the government in
violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights may not be used
to prove the defendant’s guilt at trial.” United States v. Thomas,
12 F.3d 1350, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994). The standard for evaluating
traffic stops is provided by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Id.
In Terry, the Court held that limited searches and seizures
are not unreasonable when there is a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that a person has committed a crime. 392 U.S. at 21.
“Thus, if the detaining officer can ‘point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the search and seizure],’ the
intrusion is lawful." Thomas, 12 F.3d at 1366 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 21); United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 758
(5th Cir. 1999) (“Officers must base their reasonable suspicion on
‘specific and articulable facts,’ not merely ‘inarticulate hunches’
of wrongdoing.”). “Any analysis of reasonable suspicion is
necessarily fact-specific, and factors which by themselves may
appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion.” Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 759.
The magistrate judge credited Trooper Raley’s testimony
finding that Trooper Raley had probable cause to investigate
whether Santiago’s vehicle was in violation of a state statute
which prohibits flashing lights except on authorized emergency
vehicles.3 Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded, the
3
Under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 32:327(C) (West 2002), “Flashing lights are prohibited
except on authorized emergency vehicles, school buses, or on any vehicle as a means of indicating
7
initial stop was supported by probable cause.
We agree with the magistrate’s conclusion. Trooper Raley
testified that his attention was drawn to Santiago’s vehicle
because he saw a bright flashing light emitting from the dash area
of the vehicle. Trooper Raley characterized the light as brighter
than the strobe lights on the top of a police cruiser, “almost like
a camera flash.” Trooper Raley articulated specific facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that Santiago was in violation of
the state statute prohibiting flashing lights in non-emergency
vehicles. See Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 758. Therefore, the
traffic stop was justified at its inception.
Santiago also contends, however, that Trooper Raley should
have permitted him to leave after discovering that Santiago was not
in violation of 32:327(c). Trooper Raley testified that he
realized at the time he exited his cruiser that there was something
hanging from Santiago’s rear-view mirror. He stated that he
determined that the crystals were the light source when he went to
the vehicle to speak with Vasquez. Although the crystals hanging
from the mirror did not violate 32:327(c), Trooper Raley stated
that he believed they violated another state statute which
prohibited drivers from attaching items to their windshield. He
also stated that the crystals presented a road hazard to Santiago
and to other drivers.
Under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 32:361.1(B) (West 2002), “no person
may operate a motor vehicle with any object or material placed on
or affixed to the front windshield or to front side windows of the
vehicle so as to obstruct or reduce the driver's clear view through
a right or left turn, or the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care in
approaching, overtaking or passing.”
8
the front windshield or front side windows . . . .” Santiago
argues that Trooper Raley could not reasonably have believed that
the crystals violated the state statute because they did not
obstruct or reduce Santiago’s clear view.
In United States v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1995),
this Court held that an initial traffic stop was valid because the
defendant repeatedly veered onto the shoulder of road, which
“arguably was a violation” of a state statute requiring drivers to
keep their vehicle within a single lane of traffic. Trooper Raley
stated that he understood the statute to prohibit affixing any
object to a car’s windshield, unless otherwise permitted by law.
Although it is doubtful whether Santiago could have been convicted
for violating 32:361.1(B) because the object did not obstruct
Santiago’s vision, Santiago arguably was in violation of the
statute. Therefore, Raley was justified in continuing to detain
Santiago for violating 32:361.1(B).
Did the detention extend beyond the valid reason for the stop?
Santiago contends that he was detained longer than was
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. A
search and seizure must be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the stop in the first place. United
States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2001); Terry, 392
U.S. at 19-20. The officer should use the least intrusive means
reasonably available to verify or dispel his or her suspicion in a
short period of time. Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398.
During a traffic stop, an officer can request a driver’s
license, insurance papers, and vehicle registration; he or she may
also run a computer check and issue a citation. United States v.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993). The officer may detain
9
and question the subjects of a traffic stop during the time a
computer check is being conducted. United States v. Dortch, 199
F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1999), opinion corrected on other grounds,
203 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, this court usually does
not scrutinize the particular questions asked during a stop so long
as they tend to relate to the purpose of the stop. United States
v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001); see also
Shabazz, 993 F.3d at 436 (“[A] police officer’s questioning, even
on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop, is itself [not]
a Fourth Amendment violation.”).
However, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when the
detention extends beyond the valid reason for the stop. Dortch,
199 F.3d at 198. Once a computer check is completed and the
officer either issues a citation or determines that no citation
should be issued, the detention should end and the driver should be
free to leave. Id. In order to continue a detention after such a
point, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion supported by
articulable facts that a crime has been or is being committed.
United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398 (“[O]nce an officer’s suspicions have been
verified or dispelled, the detention must end unless there is
additional articulable, reasonable, suspicion.”).
Trooper Raley stated that he had satisfied himself that the
vehicle was not stolen and that the children had not been abducted
once the license and registration check came back negative. He
stated that, because of Santiago’s and Vasquez’ nervousness and
conflicting statements, he intended to determine whether the
vehicle contained narcotics or weapons. He then asked for and was
given consent to search the vehicle.
10
Because the traffic stop was valid initially and because a
violation of another state statute arguably became apparent after
the initial stop, Trooper Raley was permitted to ask for Santiago’s
license and registration and to run a computer check thereon.
Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198. Trooper Raley’s original justification
for the stop ended, however, at the time the computer check was
completed. Id. at 200. At that point, there was no reasonable or
articulable suspicion that Santiago was trafficking in drugs, but
Raley nonetheless continued his interrogation after the original
justification for the stop had ended. Id. at 199-200 (finding that
conflicting stories from the driver and passenger about from where
they traveled and the fact that neither were listed as authorized
drivers on the rental agreement and the driver’s nervousness did
not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to
support a continued detention after the completion of a computer
check); see also Valadez, 267 F.3d at 396-99 (holding that once the
officer determined that the registration sticker and window tint
were valid, which were the reasons for the stop, there was no
reasonable suspicion to further detain the driver, even to run a
computer check for his criminal history); Jones, 234 F.3d at 241-42
(finding that discrepancies between the driver and passenger’s
explanations about their destination and the nature of their
business, the fact that the car had been rented by the diver’s
mother but neither he nor the passenger were listed as authorized
drivers, and the driver’s admission that he previously had been
arrested for crack-cocaine possession did not support a finding of
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Therefore it was
unreasonable for Trooper Raley to continue to detain Santiago after
the records check was completed and the extended detention violated
Santiago’s Fourth Amendment rights.
11
Was Santiago’s consent to search valid?
Santiago contends that the district court erred by determining
that he voluntarily consented to Trooper Raley’s search of the
vehicle. “Consent to search may, but does not necessarily,
dissipate the taint of a fourth amendment violation.” United
States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993). A
two-pronged inquiry is used to determine whether consent following
a Fourth Amendment violation is valid: (1) whether the consent was
voluntarily given, and (2) whether it was an independent act of
free will. Id. Santiago does not contend that his consent to the
search was not voluntarily given. Instead, he contends that it was
not an independent act of free will.
“Even though voluntarily given, consent does not remove the
taint of an illegal detention if it is the product of that
detention and not an independent act of free will.” Chavez-
Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127-28. “To determine whether the causal
chain was broken, [this Court considers]: (1) the temporal
proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the presence
of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of
the initial misconduct.” Id. at 128. The Government has the
burden of showing admissibility. Id.
Trooper Raley testified that Santiago was being detained on
the traffic stop. Trooper Raley testified that, after he completed
the records checks, he returned to Santiago and confronted him with
the fact that a name other than Vasquez’ name was on the vehicle
registration. Immediately after Santiago explained the
discrepancy, Trooper Raley mentioned the fact that the interstate
highway was used for narcotics trafficking and asked for permission
to search the vehicle. The record does not reflect that Trooper
12
Raley had returned Santiago’s and Vasquez’ driver’s licenses and
the vehicle registration.4 See Dortch, 199 F.3d at 202 (noting,
similarly, that the fact that an officer had not returned the
defendants license and rental papers was a relevant factor as to
the voluntariness of the consent). Nor does the record reflect
that Trooper Raley had told Santiago that he was free to go. In
fact, Trooper Raley testified that he intended to determine whether
the vehicle contained contraband.5 The consent to search,
therefore, was contemporaneous with the constitutional violation,
and there was no intervening circumstance. Chavez-Villarreal, 3
F.3d at 128; United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 801-02 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1155 (2001); Dortch, 199 F.3d at 202-
03 (citing the fact that no intervening circumstances occurred
between the illegal detention and the consent as a factor in
finding that consent was not voluntary). Thus, under the
circumstances of this case, the consent to search was not an
independent act of free will, but rather a product of the
4
It is unclear from the record whether Trooper Raley handed back the vehicle registration
as he testified that he received the registration but also stated that he did not seize the registration.
However, there is no evidence in the record that Raley handed back the driver’s licenses.
Additionally, at oral argument, counsel for both sides were asked whether the licenses were
returned and what evidence was in the record indicating such. Neither side could recall the
presence of any evidence indicating that the licenses were returned. As we have already stated
above, however, the burden was upon the government to show the admissibility of evidence
procured by the search, i.e. that the search and seizure were Constitutional and that the consent
was voluntary. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127-28.
5
Raley testified that he had three main concerns: 1) that the children may have been
abducted; 2) that the car may have been stolen; and 3) that the couple may have been smuggling
illegal narcotics. Raley testified that once the criminal background checks came back negative, he
had eliminated his first two concerns, but still believed that he should proceed to ask about
narcotics. Raley testified that this was in his mind when he asked Santiago about the other name
on the registration, Justina Orochco.
13
unlawfully extended detention.
CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the record of this case and the
parties’ respective briefing and for the reasons set forth above,
we conclude that the district court erred in denying Santiago’s
motion to suppress. We therefore REVERSE the denial of the
suppression motion, VACATE the conviction, and REMAND with
instructions to suppress.
14