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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAMEK HASAN HYNSON
Appellant No. 559 EDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000946-2010
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2015
Appellant, Shamek Hasan Hynson, appeals pro se from the order
entered January 20, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
which denied his PCRA1 petition. We affirm.
On December 18, 2012, Appellant entered a guilty plea to first degree
murder and criminal conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. Appellant filed a timely
PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel. Counsel subsequently
filed a petition to withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter. The PCRA
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1
Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition;
Appellant filed a response thereto. The PCRA court then dismissed
Appellant’s petition and granted appointed counsel permission to withdraw.
This timely pro se appeal followed.3
Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition for post-
conviction relief is as follows. We must examine whether the record
supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s
determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d
619, 628 (Pa. Super. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed
unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See
Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Our
scope of review is limited by the parameters of the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Appellant argues on appeal that the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Specifically,
Appellant claims that trial counsel failed to investigate an ongoing internal
affairs investigation involving the lead detective in his case, that counsel
induced Appellant into pleading guilty with false promises regarding a federal
sentence he was serving concurrent to the state sentence, and that counsel
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3
Appellant’s appeal is timely pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423 (Pa. 2007), and Smith v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996).
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pressured him into entering his guilty plea despite Appellant’s assertions of
innocence.
“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea
process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d
365, 369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “Allegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a
basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d
136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters
his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we note that “[t]he law
does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision
to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to
plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”
Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea colloquy
must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what
the plea connoted and its consequences. Once the defendant has
entered a guilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what
he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon
him. Competence to plead guilty requires a finding that the
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defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused,
is able to cooperate with his counsel in forming a rational
defense, and has a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.
Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
The PCRA court explained its reasons for rejecting Appellant’s claim
that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness rendered his guilty plea involuntary as
follows.
Prior to entering into his plea, Appellant completed a
written plea colloquy. Prior to accepting his plea, the [c]ourt
engaged in an on-the-record colloquy. Under oath, and in his
written colloquy, Appellant admitted committing the crime of
first degree murder and to shooting and killing Omar Reid. N.T.
12/18/12, p. 5; Guilty Plea Colloquy, pp. 2, 5. He acknowledged
that the crime of first degree murder carried with it a mandatory
minimum sentence of life in prison or death. Guilty Plea Colloquy
¶ 37. Under oath [Appellant] stated that he was satisfied with
his lawyers’ representation, N.T. 12/18/12, p. 2, and agreed with
his lawyer’s statement that they had met at least sixty times to
discuss the case. N.T. 12/18/12, pp. 16-17. Appellant stated
that he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up the
right to file certain motions, including a motion to suppress
evidence. Guilty Plea Colloquy ¶ 19; N.T. 12/18/12, pp. 3-4.
Appellant acknowledged that he did not need to enter into the
guilty plea, and specifically agreed that no force or threats had
been used against him in order to get him to enter into his plea.
Guilty Plea Colloquy p. 6. He agreed that the decision to plead
guilty was his own, Guilty Plea Colloquy ¶ 49, and responded
affirmatively to the [c]ourt’s question as to whether he was
entering into his plea voluntarily. N.T. 12/18/12, p. 11.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/16/15 at 3-4.
The PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record. Appellant
clearly admitted to committing the crimes to which he plead guilty in both
the written and on-the-record guilty plea colloquies and acknowledged the
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accuracy of the facts underlying those crimes as presented in the
agreement. “Appellant is bound by these statements, which he made in
open court while under oath, and he may not now assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements.” Willis, 68 A.3d at
1009 (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super.
2007). Appellant likewise acknowledged that he was not offered any
promises or other inducements in return for his voluntary guilty plea. We
therefore find no evidence to support Appellant’s contention that trial
counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea with false promises regarding a
federal life sentence he was serving concurrent to the sentence imposed for
first degree murder.
We further note that, despite Appellant’s assertion that he would have
filed a motion to suppress evidence had he known that the lead detective in
his case was the subject of an unrelated internal affairs investigation for,
inter alia, evidence tampering, Appellant presents no evidence that the
detective engaged in impropriety in his case. Although Appellant baldly
alleges fabrication and tampering of evidence, he does not support this claim
with anything other than mere speculation. Accordingly, we find no
evidence that the fact of the internal affairs investigation, if known to
Appellant, would have persuaded Appellant to alter his plea.
As we have found no evidence to support Appellant’s contention that
his guilty plea was unknowingly or involuntarily entered or otherwise
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rendered invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we find no error in
the PCRA court’s dismissal of the PCRA petition without a hearing.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/8/2015
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