NO. 07-08-0490-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
APRIL 29, 2009
______________________________
CERTAIN PRIMARY UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDâS,
LONDON OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION AND
CERTAIN EXCESS UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDâS, LONDON
OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION , APPELLANTS
V.
HERRING BANK F/K/A HERRING NATIONAL BANK, APPELLEE
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FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 93,282-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
          On April 27, 2009, appellants Certain Primary Underwriters at Lloydâs, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation and Certain Excess Underwriters at Lloydâs, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation filed a motion to dismiss their appeal. According to the motion, the parties reached a settlement. In the motion, counsel for appellants states that he conferred with counsel for appellee and counsel for appellee does not oppose the motion. Appellants further request taxation of appellate costs against them.
          The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellants.
          Having dismissed the appeal at appellantsâ request, we will not entertain a motion
for rehearing and our mandate will issue forthwith.
                                                                James T. Campbell
                                                                           Justice
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NO. 07-10-0158-CR
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                                                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
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                                      FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                                                                AT AMARILLO
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                                                                    PANEL D
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                                                          SEPTEMBER 2, 2010
                                           ______________________________
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                                                      MONICA SASHA JONES,
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                                                                                                           Appellant
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                                                                            v.
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                                                       THE STATE OF TEXAS,
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                                                                                                           Appellee
                                          _______________________________
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                            FROM THE 66TH DISTRICT COURT OF HILL COUNTY;
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                      NO. 32,549; HON. F.B. (BOB) MCGREGOR, JR., PRESIDING
                                          _______________________________
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Memorandum Opinion
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Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
           Appellant Monica Sasha Jones appeals the judgment adjudicating her guilty of endangering a child. Through a single issue, she contends that she was denied due process when the trial court Âre-reviewed the original presentence investigation report. We affirm.
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Issue  Due Process
           Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and denied her due process when it reviewed a presentence investigation report (at the adjudication hearing) that was prepared five years earlier instead of ordering a new one. The record does not disclose where that objection or concern was contemporaneously brought to the attention of the trial court, however, and this is problematic.  Â
           To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complainant must object to the purported error. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that failure to make an objection may waive constitutional error); Nunez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 309, 319 (Tex. App.ÂCorpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that the failure to timely and specifically object at trial may waive even constitutional rights). Furthermore, the objection must be made as soon as the ground for same becomes apparent. House v. State, 909 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.ÂHouston [14th Dist.] 1995), affÂd, 947 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellant did not comply with these directives here. The trial court expressly informed the litigants of its intent to Âre-review the presentence investigation report. No objection was made by appellant. So, she failed to preserve the purported error. See Summers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Tex. App.ÂHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (holding that the appellant waived objection to the failure to order a PSI because the objection was not raised below).[1]
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Accordingly, we overrule her issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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                                                                                   Brian Quinn
                                                                                   Chief Justice
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Do not publish.
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[1]To the extent that appellantÂs issue could also encompass the notion that she was denied opportunity to present evidence on punishment, we again note that no one raised that particular ground below. Thus, it too was waived. See Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.ÂWaco 2005, pet. dismÂd).