COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
JEFFREY JAY SNYDER, )
) No. 08-02-00022-CR
Appellant, )
) Appeal from the
v. )
) 219th District Court
THE STATE OF TEXAS, )
) of Collin County, Texas
Appellee. )
) (TC# 219-80623-01)
)
O P I N I O N
Jeffrey Jay Snyder appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, to wit: methamphetamine in an amount more than one gram but less than four grams. Following a bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty and assessed punishment of 2 years= imprisonment, probated for 5 years. In two issues, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency to demonstrate his guilty knowledge of illegal drugs. We reverse the trial court=s judgment.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On January 29, 2000, between midnight and 1 a.m., Detective Scott Stowers, a patrol sergeant with the Wylie Police Department, was on routine traffic patrol in Collin County when he saw a vehicle without an operating license plate light pass by his stationary position. The vehicle was a 1989 Honda two-door hatchback. After passing Detective Stowers, the vehicle continued eastbound, stopped in the roadway, and then turned into a long driveway or alleyway leading to a closed business. Detective Stowers followed the vehicle down the driveway and once it came to a stop, Detective Stowers pulled in behind it and initiated a traffic stop.
Stowers testified that one of the reasons he stopped Appellant was for the
non-functioning license plate light, which is a traffic violation. Detective Stowers approached the vehicle, stated that he was a police officer, and asked the driver, later identified as Appellant, for his driver=s license. Appellant and his female passenger gave Detective Stowers their driver=s licenses. Detective Stowers ran both licenses and found that each had outstanding warrants. Appellant had an outstanding traffic warrant with the Plano Police Department. At this point, Detective Stowers determined that he had reason to arrest both of the individuals in the vehicle and took them into custody.
Detective Stowers then called a tow truck to tow the vehicle and proceeded to conduct an inventory search pursuant to departmental policy. Detective Stowers placed Appellant in handcuffs and asked Appellant a question about the contents of the vehicle.[1] At the time, Detective Stowers was concerned for his safety because the female passenger was still in the vehicle. A back-up officer then arrived and Detective Stowers began his inventory of the vehicle. Inside the vehicle, Detective Stowers found a box, some auto parts, and several tools in the hatchback section. Inside the box, Detective Stowers found a Marlboro 100 cigarette box, which contained a glass pipe, a clear straw, two balls of steel wool, three Q-tips, and a small, clear plastic baggie containing a white powdery substance that Detective Stowers believed to be methamphetamine. Detective Stowers explained to the trial court that the vehicle is a two-door hatchback that has two bucket seats in the front and a small back seat. From the backseat, one can reach over the seat into the trunk area. This area of the vehicle is visible through a window in the hatchback section. Detective Stowers testified that the box itself was in plain view. Later, Detective Stowers took the substance, which he believed to be methamphetamine, and logged it into evidence.
On cross-examination, Detective Stowers stated that during Abook-in,@ he observed that Appellant had Marlboro Lights on his person and that the female passenger had Marlboro 100=s. Upon questioning by the court, Detective Stowers testified that he determined the ownership of the vehicle. To Detective Stowers= knowledge, Appellant was the owner and had advised Detective Stowers that he had bought it from a friend. The registration, however, showed that it was owned by someone else. With respect to its location in the vehicle, Detective Stowers stated that the substance[2] was in an area that could be reached from sitting inside the passenger compartment. This area could not be reached from the outside if the vehicle was locked.
DISCUSSION
Legal Sufficiency
In Issue One, Appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to show guilty knowledge of illegal drugs because the State presented no evidence to demonstrate that he knew or should have known about the methamphetamine hidden in the vehicle. Further, Appellant argues that evidence showed that the passenger, not Appellant, was later found to be in possession of the same brand of cigarettes as the cigarette box that contained the methamphetamine and paraphernalia.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). We do not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact. See Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Lucero v. State, 915 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1996, pet. ref=d). Rather, our duty is to determine whether both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421-22. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
Possession of a Controlled Substance
A person commits the offense of possession of methamphetamine if he knowingly or intentionally possesses the controlled substance. See Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. '' 481.102(6), 481.115 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Possession is defined as Aactual care, custody, control, or management.@ Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. ' 481.002(38). To support a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, and management over the contraband, and (2) the accused knew the substance he possessed was contraband. See Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 651 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref=d). When the defendant is not in exclusive possession or control of the place where the contraband is found, the State must prove independent facts and circumstances affirmatively linking him to the contraband. Hackleman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.App.--Austin 1996, pet. ref=d, untimely filed). An affirmative link generates a reasonable inference that the accused knew of the contraband=s existence and exercised control over it. See Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747; Menchaca, 901 S.W.2d at 651. By either direct or circumstantial evidence, the State Amust establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused=s connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous.@ Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747.
Courts have articulated various factors for determining whether evidence at trial affirmatively links a defendant to the contraband. These affirmative links may include: (1) the contraband was in plain view; (2) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (3) the accused was the owner of the place where the contraband was found; (4) the accused was the driver of the automobile in which the contraband was found; (5) the contraband was found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting; (6) the place where the contraband was found was enclosed; (7) the contraband emitted a strong odor; (8) paraphernalia to use the contraband was in view of or found on the accused; (9) conduct by the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (10) the accused had a special connection to the contraband; (11) occupants of the automobile gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; (12) the physical condition of the accused was compatible with recent consumption of the contraband found in the car; (13) traces of the contraband were found on the accused; (14) affirmative statements connect the accused to the contraband; and (15) the accused possessed other contraband when arrested. See Nguyen v. State, 54 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2001, pet. ref=d); Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1998, pet. ref=d); De La Paz v. State, 901 S.W.2d 571, 583-84 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref=d). The number of factors present is less important than the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense. Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref=d).
Here, the evidence admitted at trial provides few affirmative links between Appellant and the contraband. Appellant was the driver of the vehicle in which the contraband was found, but he was not in close proximity to the contraband nor was it conveniently accessible to him. Appellant was seated in the front of the vehicle, as was presumably the female passenger, while the contraband was most accessible from the backseat by reaching over the top of that seat into the rear hatchback area. Detective Stowers testified that Appellant stated he was the owner of the vehicle, but the vehicle was not registered in Appellant=s name. The contraband found during the inventory search was not in plain view, but rather enclosed in a cigarette box within a box in the rear of the vehicle. Besides evidence of his ownership and his status as driver, there is no other admitted evidence linking Appellant to the contraband that would support a reasonable inference that he knew of the contraband=s existence and exercised control over it. See Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747. While Appellant may have made incriminating statements during his arrest, the trial judge ruled that Appellant=s statements were inadmissible with the exception of the ownership claim. After reviewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we simply cannot conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain Appellant=s conviction such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue One is sustained. Given that Appellant=s Issue One is dispositive on appeal, we do not reach Appellant=s other issue for review.
We reverse the trial court=s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.
September 25, 2003
DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Justice
Before Panel No. 2
Barajas, C.J., McClure, and Chew, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
[1] The trial judge sustained Appellant=s objections to Detective Stowers= testimony as to Appellant=s alleged statements during the arrest.
[2] At trial, the substance identified as methamphetamine was admitted into evidence through the testimony of Andrew Macey, a drug chemist for the Texas Department of Public Safety. Mr. Macey testified that he analyzed the substance and determined that it was methamphetamine and weighed an aggregate 1.36 grams including adulterants and dilutants.