COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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MARCOS MARTINEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
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No. 08-01-00501-CR Appeal from the 112th District Court of Crockett County, Texas (TC# 2097) |
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Marcos Martinez appeals his conviction for possession with intent to deliver more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams of heroin. A jury found Appellant guilty and assessed punishment at a fine of $20,000 and imprisonment for a term of twenty (20) years. We affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Officer DuWayne Castro, a certified peace officer, is employed by the Rio Concho Drug Task Force. On October 25, 2000, Castro stopped a 2000 Toyota Camry for speeding on Interstate 10 in Crockett County. The vehicle was traveling 89 miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour zone. Castro first contacted the driver, Ovidio Martinez, and then the two passengers, Rolando Garcia and Appellant. Castro spoke to them in Spanish because none of them understood English. Castro obtained driver's licenses from all three men and the rental agreement for the car. All three driver's licenses showed Miami, Florida addresses. The rental agreement showed that Ovidio had rented the car. Castro knew that a large amount of contraband is distributed from Miami throughout the United States and that Interstate 10 is utilized by drug traffickers. He also knew that rental cars are commonly used for drug trafficking because rental cars, unlike personal cars, cannot be seized. Castro asked Ovidio, who had exited the vehicle, where they were going. He replied that they were going to Albuquerque, New Mexico to paint the exterior of a Motel 6. Castro walked back to the car and asked the same question of the two passengers. They also told him they were going to Albuquerque to paint. They did not have any painting equipment in the Camry. Ovidio explained that the equipment had already been sent to Albuquerque by "the company." Later in the conversation, he said that ENA was his company and they had been painting the motel for two months. He did not have a business card and did not know the address of the motel. Castro then returned to his patrol unit to run a driver's license check through the Department of Public Safety to ensure that their licenses were valid and they were not wanted in any other jurisdiction. Castro waited several minutes for the returns on the license checks. Castro noted that it commonly takes longer to obtain a return on Florida inquiries. Officer Nick Richter, who is also employed by the Rio Concho Drug Task Force, arrived at the scene and waited with Castro in his patrol car. Richter, who was watching Ovidio as he stood in front of the patrol car, noticed a large bulge in his pants pocket. Castro exited the patrol car to speak with Ovidio. Richter does not speak Spanish so he remained in the patrol car to complete the license check and to also run a "pipeline" check through El Paso Intelligence (EPIC) to determine whether there were any ongoing investigations involving the men. (1)
Castro asked Ovidio for consent to search the car and he voluntarily consented. Before searching Ovidio's person, Castro asked him whether he had any weapons. At first, Ovidio said that he did not have any weapons but then admitted that he had two knives when Castro told him that he was going to do a pat-down search for weapons. Castro felt the outside of Ovidio's pockets and determined that he had a large wad of money in his pocket. Castro asked him how much he had. Ovidio first told Castro that he did not know how much he had, but subsequently said he had $10,000. He then said that Castro could count it if he wanted. Castro counted the money and confirmed that it was $10,000. Ovidio told Castro that the money in his pocket was not for Garcia and Appellant but to pay the laborers who had been painting the motel. He paid the men in cash rather than by check because "they live in Florida". Castro informed Ovidio they were going to search the car and Ovidio responded that he did not have a problem with them searching the car.
Castro then informed the passenger seated in the front seat, Garcia, that they were going to search the car and asked him to exit it. He also had bulges in his pockets and Castro determined during a consensual pat-down search that Garcia also had a large sum of money. Garcia told him that he had $6,000 or perhaps $7,500. (2) Castro noticed that Garcia had money stashed in several pockets. Garcia told Castro that he worked for Ovidio's company, which he called "ENS". Castro questioned him about the source of the money and what he was going to do with it. Garcia insisted that the money belonged to him and his wife, but he did not have any bank receipts for the money. He was going to buy a boat in New Mexico when they were through with the job because boats are cheaper in New Mexico than in Florida. He explained that he was going to buy a boat trailer and rent a truck to drive back to Florida. When Castro informed Ovidio they were about to start searching the car, he volunteered that he had more money in his left pocket. Castro verified that Ovidio had almost $1,500 in his left pocket. (3) At this point, Castro informed Appellant, who was still seated in the backseat, that Ovidio had consented to a search of the car. He asked Appellant whether there was anything illegal in the car and he replied "Not that I know of". Castro asked whether he had any weapons or a wallet in his pockets, and Appellant told him that he only had money. Appellant exited the car and Castro verified that he also had a large sum of money in his pocket. Appellant told Castro that he had $4,500. (4) Appellant, who had been within earshot of the earlier conversation between Castro and Garcia, claimed that the money was his and he and Garcia planned to buy a boat when they were through with the job. They would take it back to Miami and sell it, or perhaps use it. He did not know what type of boat they planned to buy. Castro returned to speak with Ovidio about the money. He knew the other two men had large sums of cash but claimed that all of it belonged to his company and he was going to use it to buy the paint and pay the laborers. Ovidio later told Castro that the money in Garcia's possession was Ovidio's separate property, and did not belong to the company, and he was going to use it to pay for living expenses while they were in Albuquerque. He did not know how long they would be in New Mexico. Ovidio told Castro that he had not been in Texas for quite some time, but then said he had been in El Paso, Texas approximately one and a half months ago. He was married but separated from a woman who lived in El Paso or perhaps Las Cruces. He also had a son.
The driver's license checks did not reveal any warrants but Castro and Richter learned through the EPIC check that the three men had been the subject of surveillance in South Texas only a month and a half earlier. (5) Castro and Richter searched the car but did not immediately find any controlled substances. Based upon all of the circumstances, including the large sums of cash carried by the men and their conflicting stories about the money, Castro and Richter suspected that the three men were involved in a money laundering operation. Consequently, they decided to seize the money for forfeiture. In accordance with procedure for handling seized money, they went to the Sheriff's Office in Ozona so they could get an accurate count and give the men receipts for the money. Ovidio, Garcia, and Appellant voluntarily agreed to accompany the officers to Ozona and give statements regarding the sources of their money. After they counted the money and issued receipts, Castro took written statements from Appellant and Garcia but Ovidio decided against giving a statement. Based upon Ovidio's consent to search, Castro then conducted a canine search of the exterior of the vehicle. The dog first alerted on the exterior of the vehicle, then he alerted inside of the vehicle, both in the backseat and front seat. However, he alerted most aggressively in the front seat of the vehicle. Richter opened the hood and found an oblong-shaped object wrapped tightly in black electrical tape hidden in the car's air filter. Richter could smell the distinct odor of heroin even before they punctured the package. Ovidio, Garcia, and Appellant were immediately arrested for possession of heroin. A field-test confirmed that the substance contained within the package was heroin. Laboratory testing verified the field test and further established that the package contained 301.43 grams of 8 percent heroin, or approximately 3000 individual doses. Richter estimated that a dealer would purchase this quantity of heroin for approximately $20,000 to $30,000 but its street value was approximately $60,000. In other words, a dealer would double his investment.
On the day following the arrests of the three men, Ovidio's wife, Denora Martinez, appeared at the Crockett County Sheriff's Office and advised them that she needed to retrieve a child's car seat from the rental car. The car seat was inspected and found to have $28,000 in cash hidden in it. They also found Ovidio's "drug ledger". The ledger had names and amounts written next to them. Ovidio and Garcia disappeared after making bond. Appellant was unable to make bond.
Appellant testified in his own behalf at trial. He and Ovidio Martinez are half-brothers. Appellant was born in Cuba and lived there until he was 24 years' old. He left Cuba in 1994. He lived near Ovidio in Miami and began working for him as a painter. Ovidio owned a painting company and employed about five people. Ovidio was married to Denora Martinez, who lived in Texas, and they had a seven-year-old son. Garcia also worked for Ovidio but Appellant had known Garcia in Cuba. Appellant stopped working for Ovidio in 1997 and began working for a sheet metal subcontractor. He moved from Miami to Lake City, Florida. At the time of his arrest, he was living in a mobile home. A few days prior to October 25, 2000, Ovidio called Appellant and told him that he and Garcia had just returned from Cuba. Ovidio needed his help on a painting job in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Appellant was not working at the time so he agreed to help after negotiating how much Ovidio would pay him. On cross-examination, however, Appellant could not state the terms of the agreement he had reached with Ovidio. Appellant initially was going to take only $1,000 on the trip but Ovidio told him to take more money because he could buy an antique car or a boat in Albuquerque. Consequently, Appellant carried $4,000 of his own money with him on the trip. He had earned the money by working. According to Appellant, the officers were incorrect in stating that he had only $3,200 in his possession at the time of the arrest. (6) Ovidio was driving and talking on the cell phone to his wife, Denora Martinez, when Castro stopped their car. He did not know that there was any heroin in the car. The jury rejected Appellant's defense and found him guilty of possession with intent to deliver as charged in the indictment.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In Point of Error Number One, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction because it does not affirmatively link him to the heroin found hidden in the car.
Standards of Review
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must review all the evidence, both State and defense, in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The critical inquiry is whether, after so viewing the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. Our duty is not to reweigh the evidence from reading a cold record but to act as a due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The standard of review is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 158.
When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, but we do not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Levario v. State, 964 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1997, no pet.). We review the evidence weighed by the jury that tends to prove the existence of the elemental fact in dispute and compare it with the evidence that tends to disprove that fact. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A defendant challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence may allege that the evidence is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or in a case where the defendant has offered contrary evidence, he may argue that the finding of guilt is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11. Although we are authorized to set aside the fact finder's determination under either of these two circumstances, our review must employ appropriate deference and should not intrude upon the fact finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any evidence presented at trial. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. We are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because we feel that a different result is more reasonable. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135.
Affirmative Links Analysis
A person commits the offense of possession of heroin with intent to deliver if he knowingly or intentionally possesses the controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(a) (Vernon 2003). The Penal Code defines possession as "actual care, custody, control, or management." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(38) (Vernon Supp. 2004). To support a conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that the accused (1) exercised actual care, custody, control, and management over the contraband, and (2) the accused knew the substance he possessed was contraband. See Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Menchaca v. State, 901 S.W.2d 640, 651 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref'd). By either direct or circumstantial evidence, the State must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous. Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747.
When the defendant is not in exclusive possession or control of the place where the contraband is found, as in this case, the State must prove independent facts and circumstances affirmatively linking him to the contraband. Hackleman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, pet. ref'd, untimely filed). An affirmative link generates a reasonable inference that the accused knew of the contraband's existence and exercised control over it. See Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 747; Menchaca, 901 S.W.2d at 651. These affirmative links may include: (1) the accused's presence when the search was executed; (2) the contraband was in plain view; (3) the contraband is in close proximity to and accessible by the accused; (4) the accused was under the influence of a controlled substance when arrested; (5) the accused was in possession of other contraband when arrested; (6) the accused made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) the accused attempted to flee; (8) the accused made furtive gestures; (9) there was an odor of the contraband; (10) other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) the accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the contraband was found; (12) the place the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) the amount of contraband; and (14) possession of weapons. Hackleman, 919 S.W.2d at 444.
Review of the Evidence
Appellant argues that only the third and fourteenth factors are present in this case. However, the number of factors present is less important than the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense. Hurtado v. State, 881 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). Furthermore, the list of affirmative links is not exhaustive. Appellant's driver's license had a Miami address although he claimed to live in another Florida city. Miami is a source city for narcotics. The jury could have disbelieved Appellant's explanation that they were traveling in a rental car from Miami, Florida to Albuquerque, New Mexico to paint a Motel 6 particularly since none of the men, including Ovidio Martinez, knew the address for the motel and they had no painting supplies or painter's clothing with them in the car. Ovidio's claim that he operates his painting company as a cash-based business is also subject to skepticism. Including the money found hidden in the baby seat, more than $50,000 was found in the car and in the possession of Appellant, Ovidio, and Garcia. A drug ledger was also found in the car. The three men gave conflicting stories regarding the source of the money found in their pockets and what they intended to do with it. After overhearing Garcia's conversation with Castro, Appellant claimed to have earned the money through other employment and had brought it with him to purchase a boat. Appellant did not know what type of boat he and Garcia intended to buy or how much it would cost. Ovidio, on the other hand, claimed that the money in Appellant's possession belonged to his painting company and Appellant was merely holding it for him. Thus, Ovidio linked the money in Appellant's possession to the large amount of money in the car. The evidence supports an inference that the large sum of money found in the possession of these three men and in the car was the proceeds from illegal narcotics activity. The money, in turn, links Appellant to possession of the heroin. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant had knowledge of the heroin and exercised care, custody, and control of it. Having reviewed the evidence under the proper standards of review, we conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support Appellant's conviction. Point of Error Number One is overruled.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In Point of Error Number Two, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the continued detention after the purpose of the stop had been completed was unreasonable and not supported by reasonable suspicion. He contends that, at the very least, he should have been released after the roadside search yielded no contraband.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court's ruling using the bifurcated standard articulated in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). See Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Krug v. State, 86 S.W.3d 764, 765 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2002, pet. ref'd). Under this standard, we afford almost total deference to the trial court's express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo the court's application of the law to those facts. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Krug, 86 S.W.3d at 765. As there were no explicit findings of historical facts by the trial court, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327.
Investigative Detention
A routine traffic stop resembles an investigative detention. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3149-50, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984); State v. Cardenas, 36 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we apply the test articulated in Terry v. Ohio: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The United States Supreme Court has held that, as a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). Under Texas law, a peace officer is authorized to arrest a driver found committing a traffic violation other than speeding. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977) (a peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.001 (Vernon 1999) (general authorization to arrest); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 543.004 (Vernon 1999) (exception for speeding offense). Therefore, traffic violations committed in an officer's presence provide probable cause to stop the vehicle and detain the driver. McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Hargrove v. State, 40 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd) (traffic violation, i.e., failure to signal lane change, committed in officer's presence provides probable cause and justifies detention); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
A search that is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its excessive intensity and scope. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Under the second Terry guideline, an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. The propriety of the stop's duration is judged by assessing whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly. Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245. Once the reason for the stop has been satisfied, the stop may not be used as a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S. Ct. 417, 422, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243. In analyzing the reasonableness of the detention, we keep in mind that during a routine traffic stop, an officer has the right to check for outstanding warrants and request: (1) a driver's license; (2) insurance papers; and (3) identification. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245. The officer may also question the driver about ownership of the vehicle, the driver's destination, and the purpose of the trip. See Powell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). It is also reasonable for the officer to ask similar questions of the passengers. See Duff v. State, 546 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). If during the course of a valid traffic stop the officer develops a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring, a continued detention is justified. Zervos v. State, 15 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd). An officer may rely on all of the facts ascertained during the course of his contact with a defendant to develop articulable facts that would justify a continued detention. Sims v. State, 98 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); Powell, 5 S.W.3d at 377.
Once a valid traffic stop is made, officers at the scene are entitled to take sufficient measures to guarantee their safety. Goodwin v. State, 799 S.W.2d 719, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S. Ct. at 1881 (noting that it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties). Police officers may order persons out of an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and they may frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief they are armed and dangerous. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048-49, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480-81, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977); Goodwin, 799 S.W.2d at 727.
Appellant alleges in his brief that "the evidence clearly indicates that no traffic violation occurred." To the contrary, Castro testified that he stopped the Camry because it was traveling 89 miles per hour in a 70 mile per hour zone. Castro's failure to issue a traffic citation to Ovidio Martinez is not proof that the traffic violation did not occur. The evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that the officer had probable cause to believe Ovidio Martinez had committed a traffic violation.
Appellant next argues that he should have been released approximately eight minutes after the initial stop because the purpose of the stop had been accomplished. He contends that the continued detention was unreasonable and not supported by reasonable suspicion. As part of the traffic stop, Castro asked for identification of the driver and the car's occupants and he ran a warrant check which took several minutes. During that time, Castro and Richter obtained information and made observations which made them suspicious that the men were transporting narcotics or engaging in money laundering. From the driver's licenses and car rental information, Castro learned that the men were from Miami, Florida, a source city for illegal drugs, and they were driving a rental car which is commonly used to transport narcotics. While waiting for the returns on the license checks, Castro and Richter noticed a suspicious bulge in Ovidio's pocket and learned that he had $10,000 in cash in one pocket and more in the other. This further increased the officer's suspicions that the men were involved in illegal drug activity. Consequently, Castro asked for and obtained Ovidio's permission to search the car. Before searching the car and while still waiting for the returns, the officers continued their investigation by talking to the men about their destination and the purpose of the trip. Ovidio's explanation that they were traveling to Albuquerque to paint a Motel 6 was questionable given that he did not have an address for the motel and there were no painting supplies or painter's clothing in the car. The officers' suspicions increased when they discovered that both of the passengers also possessed large amounts of cash and the men gave inconsistent explanations for their possession of the cash. They searched the vehicle and initially found no contraband but determined that they would seize the cash as contraband under Article 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (7) The road side detention lasted almost two hours from the initial traffic stop to the conclusion of the consensual search. Ovidio, Garcia, and Appellant then voluntarily accompanied the officers to the Sheriff's Office to give statements about the money and to obtain receipts for it. After these tasks were completed, the officers' conducted an additional search of the car's exterior with a dog. When the dog alerted, they continued the search inside of the car and soon discovered the heroin hidden in the air filter.
We conclude that the initial detention was lawful and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the initial interference. Thereafter, the continued road-side detention was based on developing information which provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to believe the men were engaged in illegal activity and probable cause (8) to believe that the money was the proceeds of illegal activity. After the road-side detention concluded and the officers developed reason to believe that the money was contraband and subject to seizure, Appellant and the other men voluntarily accompanied the officers to obtain receipts for the money and to give written statements about the source of the money in their possession. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to suppress. Point of Error Number Two is overruled. Having overruled both points of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
July 15, 2004
______________________________________ STEPHEN F. PRESLAR, Chief Justice (Ret.)
Before Panel No. 5
Preslar, C.J. (Ret.), McClure, and Chew, J.J.
Preslar, C.J. (Ret.) sitting by assignment
(Do Not Publish)
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.