COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
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CRYSTAL WILDER, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
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No. 08-02-00356-CR Appeal from the 384th District Court of El Paso County, Texas (TC#20010D06342) |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Crystal Wilder was convicted in a bench trial of one count of attempting to secure execution of a document by deception and two counts of tampering with governmental records. The trial court sentenced her to three years= confinement for attempting to secure execution of a document by deception and two years= confinement for tampering with governmental records. On appeal, Wilder argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the convictions. Because Wilder waived her right to appeal, we will dismiss.
Procedural Background
After the trial judge found Wilder guilty, the parties appeared for the punishment phase of the trial. They announced that they had reached an agreement as to punishment in this case and had reached plea agreements in two other cases that were pending against Wilder. The judge proceeded to admonish Wilder about the consequences of the agreements and of her guilty pleas. The following exchanges between the judge and Wilder relate to the punishment agreement in this case:
Judge: I do want you to understand that if I follow this plea agreement, and I give you the three years to serve on Count I of this indictment, two years to serve in Counts II and III, in this case you will not be permitted to appeal this case. Do you understand that?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
Judge: You=re, in essence, waiving your right to appeal any issues that you may feel that you have. Do you understand?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
Judge: Do you know what an appeal is?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
Judge: Are you sure?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
. . .
Judge: [Y]ou=re agreeing to give up your right to appeal the issues that you may have in Counts 20020D06342 [sic] . . . . Do you understand?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
. . .
Judge: Now, you=ve indicated to me that you understand what an appeal is?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
Judge: Now, do you give up your right, freely and voluntarily to appeal any issue that you may feel you have on this Court=s rulings, your attorney=s defense of you, and the prosecution=s and/or the witnesses= acts against you in this case in return for the agreement that I stated on the record, ma=am?
Wilder: Yes, sir.
The judge then inquired as to whether Wilder=s decision was the result of threats, force, or promises. He determined that Wilder had completed high school and two years of college, was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and had never been treated by a psychiatrist or psychologist, been declared mentally incompetent, or suffered from blackouts. In response to questions from the judge, defense counsel stated that he had no difficulty communicating with Wilder and that she was able to assist in her defense. The judge concluded:
[B]y virtue of your representations, your attorney=s representations and my observations of you today and on previous occasions, I find you are competent to enter these pleas of guilty in these two cases and competent to waive your right to have punishment hearings before the bench in cause number 20010D06342.
The judge sentenced Wilder in accordance with the agreement.
Wilder subsequently filed a AMotion to be Declared Indigent,@ in which she expressed a desire to appeal. The trial judge appointed appellate counsel to investigate whether there were issues for Wilder to appeal. But the judge stated on the record in open court that he was not giving her permission to appeal.
Discussion
A valid waiver of appeal prevents a defendant from appealing without the permission of the trial court. Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The record reflects that Wilder knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal. At the time she made the waiver, she and her counsel were aware of possible errors that occurred during trial and of the punishment that would be assessed. See Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (suggesting that a post-conviction waiver of appeal made in exchange for a sentencing recommendation is enforceable because the defendant was aware of errors that may have occurred at trial and knew what his punishment would be). Moreover, the responses of Wilder and her counsel to the judge=s questions indicate that the waiver was voluntary. Wilder does not argue on appeal that the waiver was involuntary.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the appeal is dismissed.
SUSAN LARSEN, Justice
January 15, 2004
Before Panel No. 1
Larsen, McClure, and Chew, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)