UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4087
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT L. COLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00102-JAG-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 9, 2015
Before DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Dominick S. Gerace, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert L. Coley appeals his jury conviction for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). Coley challenges the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm.
Coley’s motion to suppress challenged the protective
weapons frisk that preceded his arrest. We review factual
findings underlying a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 2015). A Fourth
Amendment seizure occurs when a “[police] officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains [an
individual’s] freedom of movement.” Brendlin v. California, 551
U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f
the officer has a ‘reasonable fear for his own and others’
safety’ based on an articulable suspicion that the suspect may
be ‘armed and presently dangerous,’ the officer may conduct a
protective search of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the
suspect’s clothing for weapons.” United States v. Holmes, 376
F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1968)).
Our de novo review of the record confirms that the district
court did not err in finding that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable
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suspicion that Coley might be armed and dangerous at the time
they frisked him for weapons. See United States v. George, 732
F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[M]ultiple factors may be taken
together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each
factor, taken alone, would be insufficient.”), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 1530 (2014). We therefore conclude that the district
court correctly denied Coley’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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