FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 09 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QIU QUIANG-LI, No. 11-72820
Petitioner, Agency No. A070-167-870
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 3, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, FISHER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Qiu Quiang-Li petitions for review of the decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we review for an abuse of discretion,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010), and we deny the
petition.
1. The BIA did not misstate the basis of Quiang-Li’s motion to reopen.
Although the BIA noted that Quiang-Li’s conversion to Christianity was a change
in personal circumstances that did not qualify as a change in country conditions,
the Board went on to address, and reject, Quiang-Li’s argument regarding changed
country conditions in China. See Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1038-39 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding that a petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen may qualify
under the changed conditions exception, even if the changed country conditions are
made relevant by a change in the petitioner’s personal circumstances, so long as
the petitioner ultimately establishes not only a change in personal circumstances
but also a change in country conditions).
2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Quiang-Li failed
to establish a material change in country conditions for Christians in China. The
2009 State Department reports upon which Quiang-Li relies show a continuation
rather than a material change in conditions. The 2009 ChinaAid report contains no
information regarding Quiang-Li’s home Fujian Province and includes no
comparison between 2009 and 1994. The 1995, 1997 and 2006 country reports
upon which Quiang-Li relies to establish a baseline are not a part of the
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administrative record and, accordingly, are not included in our review. See Fisher
v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The personal evidence
presented by Quiang-Li, including the letter from his aunt in China, would lend
some support to a claim for asylum, but does not compel the conclusion that
conditions have materially worsened for Christians in China between 1994 and
2010.
3. Because the BIA properly denied the motion to reopen due to Quiang-
Li’s failure to establish a material change in country conditions, we do not reach
his challenge to the BIA’s alternative ruling that he failed to establish prima facie
eligibility for relief.
PETITION DENIED.
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