NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SEP 08 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
HOWARD ALLEN YOUNG, No. 12-17470
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00114-CRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TRANS UNION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Howard Allen Young appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his action alleging violations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
grant of summary judgment and a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Doe v.
Abbott Labs, 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Young’s RFPA
claim because Young failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendants Visa and Alex Bouja were subject to the RFPA. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 3402 (prohibiting federal government authorities from accessing or obtaining
copies of “financial records of any customer from a financial institution”); id.
§ 3401 (definitions).
The district court properly dismissed Young’s FCRA claim because Young
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants disclosed Young’s
credit records for an improper purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1) (consumer
reporting agencies may furnish consumer reports in response to a proper court
order); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1524(a)(4) (state trial courts permitted to issue
search warrants for evidence that tends to show a felony was committed).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motions to
appoint counsel because Young did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances.
See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard
of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
2 12-17470
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Young’s motion, filed on November 3, 2014, is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 12-17470