IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30884
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HARRY HANDY, also known as Dubie,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CR-319-1-D
October 21, 2002
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Harry Handy appeals his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Handy contends that
the district court committed reversible error by failing to advise
him at rearraignment that the right to trial included the right to
a jury trial. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R.47.5 the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
States v. Vonn, 122 S.Ct. 1043 (2002), which was decided after
Handy’s brief was filed, Handy concedes that this argument is
frivolous. We agree that Handy has not shown that the district
court’s omission of the word “jury” from the plea colloquy affected
his substantial rights. See Vonn, 122 S.Ct. at 1048; United States
v. Caston, 615 F.2d 1111, 1114-16 (5th Cir. 1980).
Handy has filed a supplemental brief on appeal arguing for the
first time that the district court’s denial of his oral motion to
withdraw his guilty plea requires reversal. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Handy’s last-minute pro se
request to withdraw his guilty plea (made near the conclusion of
the sentencing hearing and over three and a half months after the
plea had been accepted) because Handy did not properly support the
motion by asserting any fair and just reason for withdrawing his
plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e); United States v. Badger, 925 F.2d
101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991). Contrary to the contention in the
supplemental brief, the district court’s remarks do not indicate
that the district judge “considered withdrawing the plea a legal
impossibility;” they indicate nothing more than that the court (the
same judge who had accepted the plea), seeing no fair and just
reason for withdrawal of the plea, would not allow it.
As for the contention in the supplemental brief that Handy
(who was represented by counsel throughout) was not given an
opportunity to state reasons for his motion, neither he nor his
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counsel ever sought or attempted to state any reasons or ever
requested to be allowed to do so, or requested a hearing or an
opportunity to confer or the like, or made any objection to the
court’s ruling on any such ground (or indeed on any ground). All
contentions respecting withdrawal of the plea were raised for the
first time in the supplemental brief on appeal. Nowhere in that
brief, nor anywhere in the record, is there any suggestion of any
reason why or on what basis withdrawal of the plea was sought or
should have been allowed or what would or could be shown in that
respect if the case were remanded; indeed the record indicates it
is highly improbable that there could be any fair and just reason
to withdraw the plea. We conclude that the contentions respecting
Handy not being afforded any opportunity to state reasons are
governed by FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), that no prejudice has been shown
and that reversal is not called for. Vonn, supra.
AFFIRMED.
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