In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-02-063 CV
____________________
DARRELL WILLIAMS AND TONI L. WILLIAMS, Appellants
V.
PRECISION TIRE & ALIGNMENT, INC., and CHRIS ESSEX, Appellees
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 14421
This case arises from a foreclosure by Precision Tire & Alignment, Inc., and its owner, Chris Essex (appellees) on a vehicle owned by Darrell and Toni L. Williams (the Williams) and financed by Arcadia Financial Ltd. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 70.001, 70.006 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Arcadia filed suit against the Williams, Precision Tire, Chris Essex, and the Texas Department of Transportation seeking damages for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and damages for conversion of their security interest. The Williams filed a cross-complaint alleging breach of contract, conversion, usury, fraud, and wrongful foreclosure against Precision Tire and Chris Essex. Subsequently, Arcadia non-suited all defendants.
Appellees moved for summary judgment against the Williams on the grounds (1) the sale of the vehicle was valid because Precision Tire complied with all applicable statutory provisions when it executed and foreclosed on a statutory Worker's Lien on the vehicle; (2) the vehicle was not converted by Precision Tire because it held a valid statutory lien that gave it the right to possess the vehicle and subject it to a lien foreclosure sale. Appellees also moved for summary judgment on the basis of "no evidence" under Tex. R. Civ. P. 166 a(i) as to certain causes of action. Appellees argued there was no evidence they loaned the Williams money, an element of the cause of action for usury. Appellees argued there was no evidence of an offer or acceptance, an element of breach of contract. Lastly, appellees argued there was no evidence of any of the elements of the cause of action for fraud. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998).
The trial court granted appellees' motion without specifying the grounds upon which summary judgment was granted. Therefore, if any of the several grounds alleged in appelles' motion for summary judgment are meritorious, the summary judgment will be affirmed. See Harwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tex. 1995); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989).
When reviewing a summary judgment on appeal, this court must determine whether the movant carried his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether or not there is a disputed fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant is to be taken as true and every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in his favor. Id. We review a no-evidence summary judgment under an equivalent standard. "We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the adverse party, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. A no-evidence summary judgment is improper if the adverse party has produced more than a scintilla of probative evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each challenged element of a claim or defense." Vallance v. Irving C.A.R.E.S., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2000, no. pet.) (citations omitted). See also Allen v. W.A. Virnau & Sons, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).
The Williams present four issues on appeal. They contend there are fact issues precluding summary judgment on their claims for wrongful foreclosure, conversion, breach of contract, and fraud. The Williams do not argue a fact issue exists precluding summary judgment on their usury claim. Accordingly, we must affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment on that cause of action.
Attached to the response to appellees' motion for summary judgment as evidence is deposition testimony taken from Charles Essex, Darrell Williams, and Toni Williams. Essex agreed the lien arose when the work was completed and Williams was billed. Essex testified the work order shows the repairs were completed September 30, 2000. The notice of lien foreclosure contended the repairs were completed September 5. Essex explained that as a typographical error. According to Essex, he "never told them that date was when it was completed." Thus appellees' assertion that "Appellants' conclusory statement that a worker's lien did not exist until September 30th is unsupported by any evidence in the record" is flatly contradicted. Accordingly, the notice of lien foreclosure, dated October 24, was sent before close of the thirty day period after charges accrued, and the 31st day after notice could have been given was not November 24, but November 30.
The work order reflects the total amount of the repairs was $2,222.67. The notice of lien foreclosure demanded $2,322.67. According to Essex, the $100 over the repair order was the "lien company" fee. Williams had paid $100 before work began, when the transmission was ordered. On October 7, Williams made a payment of $200. On October 11, Williams made another $200 payment. The demand in the notice of lien foreclosure did not account for the $500 the Williams had already paid.
After the notice of foreclosure was sent, appellees accepted three more payments from the Williams. On October 26, a payment for $249 was made by Williams. Another payment was made by Williams on November 2 for $400. On November 22, $400 was paid. Thus, by November 29, the 61st day after the lien arose, the Williams had paid $1,549 and owed a balance of $673.67 according to the original repair order, or $773.67 per the notice of lien foreclosure. Toni Williams testified they went to Precision Tire on November 30 with $1,200 to pick up the vehicle. (1)
Section 70.006 (f) requires "a public sale." Essex testified he purchased the car on November 27. Essex testified the sale was public but when asked, "What did you do to make it a public sale?", he said "I mean, anybody could have bought it at that point in time for the repairs." Essex testified he did not advertise the sale and it was held at the shop. He purchased the vehicle for the remainder owed on the repairs but could not recall the amount. (2) When asked how the sale was conducted, Essex answered, "It was not a public auction. . . . They told me all I had to do was take it down to the courthouse and sign the papers over. The papers were signed over in my brother's name - these papers here. So, I had to bring it over into my name at that point in time." Essex testified he went to the Orange County courthouse and changed the title into his name. Essex testified the tax was over $200 and was calculated "off the paperwork that said 22 or whatever is on there or 2300" but that he only paid the remainder that was due for the vehicle. (3)
The summary judgment evidence raises fact issues concerning Essex's compliance with section 70.006. The notice of foreclosure was premature and provided an incorrect date on which foreclosure could occur. Further, the foreclosure and the sale occurred three days before the 61st day after charges accrued. There is a fact issue as to whether the sale was public since the record does not indicate anyone other than Charles Essex knew of its occurrence. Accordingly, we find the Williams presented summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on their claim for wrongful foreclosure.
We further find the Williams presented summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on their claim for conversion. "[A] proper tender of the amount claimed in the notice is sufficient; the possessory lien expires upon tender the same as if the tendered amount had been retained; the subsequent refusal to surrender the car to the lienholder constitutes conversion." See Collision Ctr. Paint & Body, Inc. v. Campbell, 773 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1989, no writ). Taking into account the payments already made, there is evidence the Williams' tendered more than the amount claimed due in the notice on the day before foreclosure could have properly occurred.
Regarding breach of contract, the only element challenged in appellees' no evidence motion for summary judgment was offer and acceptance. Therefore we do not address appellees' arguments on appeal as to any other elements. Since those elements were never presented as grounds in the motion, the trial court could not properly have granted summary judgment on those bases. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
In their response to the motion for summary judgment, the Williams claimed an implied contract arose. Darrell Williams testified "we had an agreement that we were making payments." According to Darrell, Essex told him that he would accept the payments and Darrell asked him "to set me up some payments." Darrell started making payments and Essex accepted them. Darrell testified there was no set amount and no deadline. "An implied contract arises from the dealings of the parties, from which the facts show that the minds of the parties met on the terms of the contract without any legally expressed agreement thereto." Angeles v. Brownsville Valley Regional Med. Ctr., Inc., 960 S.W.2d 854, 859 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). The evidence of the course of dealing between the Williams and Essex, along with Darrell's testimony, constitutes more than a scintilla of evidence that a "meeting of the minds" occurred and an implied contract arose. We find a fact issue was raised on the breach of contract claim.
Appellees challenged each element of fraud in their no evidence motion. The Williams contended "Essex's actions [in] continuing to accept payments silently after sending the October 24, 2000, letter are material misrepresentations that implied he would continue to accept payments. Essex's demand of an unknown amount to be paid in two days after more than two months of accepting payments is unconscionable." Essex's testimony demonstrates he accepted three partial payments from the Williams after he sent the notice of foreclosure. The record indicates that those payments were part of a course of dealing between the parties, that Essex knew at that rate the Williams would not have paid the full amount in time to avoid foreclosure, and that Essex failed to inform the Williams of that fact. The Williams relied upon Essex's actions by continuing to make periodic payments as they had in the past. Thus by November 24 they had paid another $1,049, which they lost when Essex foreclosed anyway. Accordingly, we find there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support each element of the Williams' cause of action for fraud.
For all of the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, conversion, breach of contract, and fraud. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed only as to the cause of action for usury.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on November 1, 2002
Opinion Delivered November 21, 2002
Do Not Publish
Before Walker, C.J., Burgess and Gaultney, JJ.
1. 2. 3.