In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-00-344 CR
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KAREN YVETTE MILSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 64610
Karen Yvette Milson pleaded guilty to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The offense was a third degree felony on the date of its commission, February 12, 1993. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 932. On September 27, 1993, the trial court deferred adjudication, fined Milson $750 and placed her on community supervision for four years, pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain agreement between Milson and the State. On July 25, 1997, the trial court extended Milson's community supervision term to September 27, 1999.
On April 21, 1999, the State filed a motion to revoke Milson's supervision. Her term of community supervision expired on September 27, 1999. On May 26, 2000, the State filed a first amended motion to revoke unadjudicated probation. The motion was heard on July 3, 2000. Milson pleaded "true" to count two of the amended motion (1), i.e. that she had failed to report to her probation officer as directed by the court. The trial court then revoked her community supervision and adjudicated her guilty of the charged offense.
Milson filed a general notice of appeal that fails to comply with the requirements of the rules of appellate procedure. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3)(A). (2) After appeal was perfected, Milson's appellate counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 493 (1967) and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The brief concluded there was no arguable error to support an appeal. Milson was given an extension of time to file a pro se brief, but did not do so. We conducted an independent review, found arguable error, abated the appeal, and remanded the cause to the trial court for appointment of new appellate counsel.
Milson brings one issue. She claims the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her community supervision based on the first amended motion to revoke that was filed after the expiration of her community supervision term.
Though the State does not contest our jurisdiction, we first must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear this matter.
Milson concedes she filed only a general notice of appeal. And, on June 28, 2001, when we remanded this cause for appointment of new counsel, it appeared that proper appellate jurisdiction perhaps existed under Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)(Rule 25.2(b)(3) does not apply to appeals challenging issues "unrelated to" the conviction), which was decided on June 20, 2001.
Subsequently, our Court of Criminal Appeals clearly has held that Rule 25.2(b)(3)(A) is a procedural requirement that must be followed in cases such as this one in order to invoke properly an appellate court's jurisdiction. See White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). If the jurisdiction of a court of appeals has not been properly invoked, the appellate court has no power to act. Id. However, as the White Court explains, an appellant who has failed properly to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction under the rule, as is true here, has not waived a claim of jurisdictional error. Id. at 428. "A plea-bargaining defendant can challenge the trial court's jurisdiction in an application for writ of habeas corpus." Id.
We dismiss Milson's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
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DON BURGESS
Justice
Submitted on November 30, 2001
Opinion Delivered February 6, 2002
Do not publish
Before Walker, C.J., Burgess, and Gaultney, JJ.
1. While the original motion is not part of the appellate record, the State concedes
that the revocation was based solely on the first amended motion.
2.