In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-04-216 CR
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SIDNEY EUGENE TRAHAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Orange County, Texas
Trial Court No. D-020436-R
A jury found Sidney Eugene Trahan guilty of sexual assault. Trahan pleaded "not true" to an enhancement alleging a prior Louisiana conviction for Molestation of a Juvenile. The jury found the enhancement allegation to be true, and, pursuant to Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2005), the trial court sentenced Trahan to life imprisonment. Appellant raises two issues on appeal.
Trahan first argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for sexual assault. The elements of sexual assault pertinent to this case are the following: (1) A person (2) intentionally or knowingly, (3) caused the penetration of the sexual organ of a child (4) by the person's sexual organ. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2005). Appellant denies committing the act.
In a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and then determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we will set the verdict aside only if the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contrary evidence is so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Escamilla, 143 S.W.3d at 817. The jury is the trier of the facts. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 (Vernon 1981); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The complainant SS, a sixteen year old mentally handicapped female, testified at trial. (1) She confirmed Trahan came in her room one morning, pulled his pants down, and "sexed her." She told him to stop. He stopped when her brother, Billy, opened the door and looked in. SS indicated she and Trahan were under the covers; he was on top of her, and he put his sexual organ inside of her. SS testified she "was scared."
Billy testified at trial. He acknowledged he had been convicted of six felonies, (2) admitted he smoked marijuana in the home, and was incarcerated at the time of trial. On the morning of the alleged offense, seventeen year old Billy went to check on then fourteen year old SS when he did not find her watching cartoons in the living room. Opening her bedroom door, Billy saw Trahan "under the covers on top of [SS]; and [Trahan] froze up when [Billy] walked in." Billy testified that although he could not see what was going on under the covers, he could tell Trahan was lying on top of SS with his waist between her legs. Believing Trahan was sexually assaulting SS, Billy slammed the door and "went looking for [his] gun[,]" because, as he explained, "I was going to kill him." Billy's girlfriend, Theresa, testified Billy was "trembling with anger [and] fear" after coming from SS's bedroom. Billy told Theresa to check on SS. Theresa indicated when she went to the bedroom, she found SS on the bed under the covers. Sitting on the side of the bed, Trahan was wearing shorts and a shirt and had no shoes on. "He had his hand in the back of him like he was rubbing on her leg, maybe." "It looked like it was on her inner thigh." Theresa observed Trahan take his hand off SS. On cross examination, she acknowledged he could have been scratching his back. Theresa testified Trahan was "shocked, like maybe surprised[,]" and SS "looked nervous."
Billy talked to SS and called the police after she told him Trahan had sex with her. Theresa testified she tried to comfort SS after Trahan left. SS was crying and told Theresa "[h]e had sex with me, Resa." Her exact words were "[h]e sexed me." Theresa told police SS said Trahan told her he would hurt her if she told anyone.
SS's mother testified Trahan had been staying at her home. That morning, her son Billy told her what he had seen. Billy was "very mad," "very upset," "[s]haking." He was looking for the gun. After the police were called, SS's mother took SS to the hospital to be examined by the "sexual assault nurse examiner." The nurse testified SS "was crying. She was very upset, wasn't sure exactly what was going on and what was going to happen." The pelvic exam is the last exam the nurse performed; visibly upset, SS would not allow the nurse to complete the exam. The nurse's notes state, SS "[c]ould not tolerate pelvic exam and no trauma noted to external area[.]"
The defense offered various defensive theories, sought to impeach Billy's testimony, and pointed out inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's witnesses. Two witnesses testified Trahan remained in the area during May 2002. The implication was that Trahan's continued presence in the area supported the defense theory of innocence. Another defensive theory was that the residents of the home feared Billy and testified to what he wanted. Both Billy's mother and his girlfriend indicated they had problems with Billy, and he acknowledged he was at times violent. Theresa indicated she was afraid of Billy; they had numerous fights; and she thought he was crazy. The mother indicated Billy was not always truthful.
The jury has the responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the evidence, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). Based on SS's direct testimony, along with Billy's and Theresa's description of what they saw in the bedroom and what SS told them, the jury could have found the elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the evidence, when viewed in a neutral light is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; and the contrary evidence, primarily the impeachment evidence, is not so strong that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt could not have been met. Issue one is overruled.
In issue two, Trahan argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing enhancement of his punishment, and that there was "insufficient evidence proving the prior conviction to support the [jury verdict]." The argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, and specifically the sufficiency of the proof of the prior conviction. We employ the legal and sufficiency standards as set out in issue one. During the punishment phase of the trial, the State introduced evidence of a prior Louisiana conviction for "Molestation of a Juvenile." See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.81.2 (West 2004). Unless established otherwise, we presume that the other state's law is the same as Texas law regarding what constitutes sufficient proof of a final conviction. See Langston v. State, 776 S.W.2d 586, 587-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Generally, to establish that a defendant has been convicted previously, the State must come forward with two categories of proof: (a) proof there was a prior final conviction; and (b) proof linking the defendant to that conviction. See id.; see also Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The Texas Penal Code provides that a life sentence must be assessed to a defendant who commits a sexual assault if that defendant has been "previously convicted" of an offense under another state's laws "containing elements that are substantially similar to the elements of [among others, indecency with a child, sexual assault, or aggravated sexual assault]." See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v) (Vernon Supp. 2005); Scott v. State, 55 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Section 12.42(g) sets out the meaning of "previously convicted"in this context:
(1) a defendant has been previously convicted of an offense listed under Subsection [12.42](c)(2)(B) if the defendant was adjudged guilty of the offense or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in return for a grant of deferred adjudication, regardless of whether the sentence for the offense was ever imposed or whether the sentence was probated and the defendant was subsequently discharged from community supervision; and
(2) a conviction under the laws of another state for an offense containing elements that are substantially similar to the elements of an offense listed under Subsection (c)(2)(B) is a conviction of an offense listed under Subsection (c)(2)(B).
Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.42(g) (Vernon Supp. 2005). As applied to the circumstances in this case, a person is "previously convicted" if upon adjudication of guilt, he is given regular probation, whether or not he successfully completes the probation.
Seeking evidence to prove up the prior conviction, the State requested by letter to the Louisiana State Police "certified copies of the judgment and/or orders of the deferred adjudication on [Sidney Eugene Trahan]" along with "certified copies of the complaint and information or indictment, any waivers and any fingerprints on [Trahan]." Admitted without objection, State's Exhibit 9 consisted of fingerprint cards and a listing of the criminal history of Sidney Trahan. This document, which is entitled "Investigative Report" followed by the heading "Criminal Record of: Trahan, Sidney E[,]" contains identifying information such as race, sex, height, weight, hair color, eye color, and social security number. We set out some other parts of the document below:
Criminal Record of: Trahan, Sidney E
. . . .
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A R R E S T Name: TRAHAN, SIDNEY E CCH IDX: 30714019
Arrest Date: 10/15/1997 LID:00047257 AFIS ATN: 100019703287
Arrest Agency: PD DEQUINCY LA
Charge 1 Counts 1
R.S. 39:1104 WARRANT FOR MOLESTATION OF JUVENILE
WARR NUMBER 132290
DQPD
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A R R E S T Name: TRAHAN, SIDNEY E CCH IDX: 32464466
Arrest Date: 01/20/2000 LID: CS658498 AFIS ATN:
Arrest Agency: DOC LAKE CHARLES LA
Charge 1 R.S. 14:81.2 MOLESTATION OF A JUVENILE [(F] Counts 1
Disposition: 10-22-99, 7 YRS LA DOC, SUSP, 5 YRS ASP, BEG 10-22-99, ENDS
10-21-2004. 5/11/2001 PROB WAS REVOKED ON 5/4/2001
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A R R E S T Name: TRAHAN, SIDNEY E CCH IDX: 32776696
Arrest Date: 05/23/2001 LID: 00000000 AFIS ATN:100010102663
Arrest Agency: SO LAKE CHARLES LA
Charge 1 R.S. DCID DOC ID VERIFICATION Counts 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A R R E S T Name: TRAHAN, SIDNEY E CCH IDX: 32787708
Arrest Date: 06/06/2001 LID: 00000850 AFIS ATN: DCLC10100417
Arrest Agency: DOC LAKE CHARLES LA
Charge 1 Counts 1
R.S. PROB PROBATION FOR ARREST OF 10 15 97 BY PD DEQUINCY LA MOLESTATION OF A JUVENILE FELONY 05 04 2001 CSU 658498 7 YRS DOC ALL BUT 6 MONTHS
SUSP 5 YRS ASP AFTER RELEASE WITH SPEC COND PROB BEGINS 06 05 2001 PROB ENDS 06 04 2006
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
A R R E S T Name: TRAHAN, SIDNEY E CCH IDX: 32865349
Arrest Date: 09/17/2001 LID: 00077777 AFIS ATN: 060010101195
[A]rrest Agency: SO BEAUREGARD, LA
Charge 1 R.S. 15:542 REGISTRATION OF SEX OFFENDERS Counts 1
When the State offered Exhibit 9 into evidence, the following exchange occurred between
the prosecutor and Lynn Arceneaux the State's fingerprint expert:
Q. (Prosecutor): I'll show you what's been marked as State's Exhibit No. 9. Can you identify that?
A. (Lynn Arceneaux): Yes, sir, I can.
Q. What is it?
A. It's a packet of information. It also contains fingerprints.
Q. Okay. So, it contains a set of fingerprints. Were those prints made by Sidney E. Trahan who was convicted of molestation of a juvenile in the 14th Judicial district Court of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana?
A. That's what it says on here, yes, sir.
. . . .
(Prosecutor): Your Honor, State would offer State's Exhibit No. 9 into evidence.
(Defense Counsel): We have no objection.
(The Court): All right. Admitted.
Arceneaux also testified fingerprints taken from Trahan on the day of trial matched the fingerprints on State's Exhibit 9. No objection was raised to Arceneaux's testimony.
Evidence of the conviction that is the functional equivalent of the judgment and sentence required by Texas law may be used to prove up a valid conviction. See Mitchell v. State, 848 S.W.2d 917, 918-19 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, pet ref'd). Similarly, there are a number of methods by which the State may prove identity for purposes of the prior conviction. See Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987, opinion on rehearing). The jury had before it evidence of a prior conviction of molestation of juvenile through Arceneaux's testimony and the records from the Louisiana State Police. No objection was made to this evidence offered to prove the conviction. The exhibit apparently indicates Trahan had been placed on probation for the Louisiana offense, and the probation was revoked. See Johnson v. State, 784 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (After the State establishes a defendant has been convicted, it will be presumed the conviction is final when faced with a silent record). (3) The trial court was asked to and did find that the offense as submitted to the jury in Exhibit 9 was a "substantially similar" offense under the laws of another state; appellant does not argue on appeal the offense was not "substantially similar." The State's evidence linked Trahan to the prior Louisiana conviction. An expert testified without objection that the fingerprints taken from Trahan on the day of trial matched those contained in the exhibit. The evidence is sufficient proof the defendant in this case is the same Sidney Trahan with the prior Louisiana conviction for molestation of a juvenile. When all the evidence admitted into evidence is viewed in favor of the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt Trahan was previously convicted of molestation of a juvenile, and viewing all the evidence in a neutral light, the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d at 817 (legal and factual sufficiency). Issue two is therefore overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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DAVID GAULTNEY
Justice
Submitted on April 7, 2005
Opinion Delivered July 13, 2005
Do Not Publish
Before Gaultney, Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
1. 2. 3.